Analysis of Crowland's Section on the Usurpation of Richard III
By Edgar de Blieck
© 2003

Section from Crowland Chronicle (translation by & (C)
of Pronay & Cox):
Lord Hastings, who seemed to serve these dukes in every way
and to have deserved favour of them, bursting with joy over this new world, was
asserting that nothing had so far been done except to transfer the government of
the kingdom from two blood relatives of the queen to two nobles of the blood
royal, moreover he asserted that this had been accomplished without any killing
and with only so much blood shed in the affair as might have come from a cut
finger. However, a very few days after these words, grief completely took the
place of joy. On the previous day, with remarkable shrewdness, the protector had
divided the council so that in the morning, part met at Westminster, part in the
Tower of London where the king was.
On 13 June, the sixth day of the
week, when he came to the council in the Tower, on the authority of the
Protector, Lord Hastings was beheaded. Two senior prelates, moreover, Thomas,
archbishop of York, and John, bishop of Ely, saved from capital punishment out
of respect for their order, were imprisoned in different castles in Wales. In
this way, without justice or judgment, the three strongest supports of the new
king were removed, and with all the rest of his faithful men expecting something
similar these two dukes thereafter did whatever they wanted.
The following Monday they came by
boat to Westminster with a great crowd, with swords and clubs and compelled the
Lord Cardinal of Canterbury to enter the sanctuary, with many others to call
upon the queen, in her kindness, to allow her son Richard, duke of York, to
leave and come to the Tower for the comfort of his brother, the king. She
willingly agreed to the proposal and sent out the boy who was taken by the Lord
Cardinal to the king in the Tower of London.
From that day both these dukes
showed their intentions, not in private but openly.
Armed men in frightening and
unheard of numbers were called from the North, from Wales, and from whatever
other districts lay within their command and power, and on the 26th day of the
same month of June, Richard the Protector, claimed for himself the government of
the kingdom with the name and title of king; and on the same day in the great
hall of Westminster, he thrust himself into the marble chair. The pretext of
this intrusion and for taking possession in this way was as follows:
It was put forward, by means of a supplication contained in a certain parchment roll, that King Edward's sons were bastards, by submitting that he had been pre-contracted to a certain Lady Eleanor Butler before he married Queen Elizabeth, and, further, that the blood of his other brother, George, duke of Clarence, had been attainted so that, at the time, no certain and uncorrupt blood of the lineage of Richard, duke of York, was to be found except in the person of the said Richard, duke of Gloucester. At the end of this roll, therefore, on behalf of the lords and commonalty of the kingdom, he was besought to assume his lawful rights. It was put about then that this roll originated in the North whence so many people came to London, although there was no-one who did not know the identity of the author (who was in London all the time) of such sedition and infamy.
Part One: Events in the Tower: June 13
The first problem with the passage is that although it
agrees with the dates of other sources, it conflicts with almost every other
source's sequencing of the events. Mancini, Vergil, More, the Great Chronicle -
all place the execution of Hastings after the capture of the Duke of York. Of
course, given that none of these sources is as reliable as Crowland in terms of
accuracy of dating, sequence and facts generally, the Crowland account should
not simply be dismissed. Crowland gives the correct dates, for example, of
Edward IV's death (9 April), Grey and Rivers' arrests (30 April), the removal of
York from sanctuary (16 June), and of Richard's public claiming of the throne
(26 June).
Until 1972, when Alison Hanham's
English Historical Review article attempting to redate Hastings' execution was
published [1], however, historians were quite content to accept the traditional
wisdom of placing Hastings' death first, on Friday 13 June, and assume mistakes
(either sequential or chronological) in the other sources. However, Hanham based
her conclusions on the shaky and unreliable evidence of a book containing the
minutes of the mercers' company. These seemed to suggest that people thought
that Hastings was alive and at liberty on June 15. She also interpreted the
ambivalent phrase dating Hastings' death (Friday last) in Simon Stallworth's
letter (of 21 June) to Sir William Stonor [2] as "yesterday", meaning
20 June, and not "a week past on Friday", or 13 June. Furthermore, she
dismissed the evidence in various inquisitions post mortem as "notoriously
unreliable".
When each of these pieces of
evidence was reexamined by B.P. Wolffe, however, Hanham's conclusions were
somewhat savaged. Of the records of the Mercers and Merchant Adventurers, Wolffe
wrote they are "not ... entirely above suspicion" [3], and proceeded
to undermine their reliability as evidence. His last word on the acts of court
was that they did not record a decision to petition Hastings made on 15 June
because the matter on which they were petitioning (the tonnage and poundage tax)
had been settled on 2 June 1483 [4]. He noted that to accept Hanham's date of 20
June meant discarding a lot of good circumstantial evidence which disagreed with
it. It would mean that Richard III's administration would have had to falsify
records, with the complicity of the chief justices and archbishops as well as
the men who succeeded them in office, and also a number of other legal men, and
the foeffees and executors of Hastings' family. As he says "this is not
credible on the sole basis of one rather doubtful entry in a sixteenth-century
copy of the records of a London
company" [5]. Wolffe's positive evidence from the building records at the
castle of Kirby Muxloe, shows that work ceased on either Monday 16 or Tuesday 17
June, as a direct result of the news of Hastings' death reaching the clerk of
works, Hastings' steward, Roger Bowlott. This, combined with all the other
evidence (including the accounts of the controller at Calais, which give the
13th as the date of death, and the inquisitions post mortem, consolidated by a
family lawyer) make it clear that the 13 June dating, the dating which Crowland
gives, should stand. Basically, Crowland is superior to the other narrative
accounts in sequencing because the other writers (for a number of reasons gone
into in detail elsewhere) imposed an interpretation of the events on the facts
which allowed Hastings to survive until after Richard had control. Having said
this, one has to accept that the alternative sequence would solve a number of
problems, so it is perhaps not surprising that the chroniclers got it wrong.
Motives For Executing Hastings
But, having asserted that the date of execution was June
13, three days before taking custody of the duke of York, certain other problems
present themselves. The Crowland version of Hastings' execution is dramatic, but
characteristically brief. It gives some concise background detail, though not
much, and hardly enough to be sure of the motives for the execution:
Lord Hastings, (who seemed to serve these dukes in every
way and to have deserved favour of them) bursting with joy over this new world,
was asserting that nothing had so far been done except to transfer
the government of the kingdom from two blood relatives of the queen to two
nobles of the blood royal, moreover, he asserted that this had been accomplished
without any killing and only so much blood shed in the affair as might have come
from a cut finger.
The section about the cut finger is puzzling. Did Hastings actually say
something like this, which the Crowland author picked up, feeling its irony
after the execution? It is certainly not implausible. But what of Hastings'
assertions: to whom and where did he make them? If there is a subtext to his
remarks, (and the author of Crowland is so pathologically succinct that it seems
doubtful that he would have included them if there is not one) then it is surely
that Hastings implied there would be no change of king, but only a change of
power. If Gloucester's mind was already at this stage set on usurpation, then
the chamberlain's assertions would surely have to be dealt with. The full
implications of the assertions for which he was killed, as far as Crowland is
concerned, is that they precluded Buckingham and Richard's two objectives,
namely:
1) to do more than simply transfer the government of the
kingdom from two blood relatives of the queen to two nobles of the blood royal.
2) to have more bloodshed, when the time was right,
(specifically Rivers', Grey's, and Vaughan's blood) and to have greater control
in the kingdom thereby.
In order to understand fully the reasons the Crowland
author gives for Hastings' execution, however, the background details to the
events in the tower contained in Crowland must first be explored, as they
provide the setting for the execution. Above all, the question of how far
Gloucester and Buckingham's military presence was a factor in their handling of
the situation must be assessed.
The Problem Of Assessing Gloucester's Military Strength in the Capital
The difficulty with asserting that Buckingham and Richard
had firm plans made at this stage to launch a bid for the crown is that there is
some (admittedly circumstantial) evidence which gives the opposite impression.
If Richard had from the start intended to overawe the people of London, rooting
out opposition to his plan to usurp, and removing the threat of King Edward and
his brother (and this is certainly the impression Crowland gives), it seems
unusual that he had to send a hastily penned note to York on June 11, asking for
as many well armed men as possible:
to aid and assist us against the
queen, her blood adherents, and her affinity who have intended and do daily
intend to murder and utterly destroy us, our cousin the duke of Buckingham, and
all the old blood of this realm[6]
It does not seem too far-fetched
to suggest that there is a note of paranoid hysteria in this letter, and this
certainly does not come across in the Crowland account. If Richard was planning
a staged usurpation, did he write this letter as an afterthought? Did he need
these troops? Did he expect them simply to come rather in time to overawe the
nobles who were coming to London for his coronation than to use against Hastings
and the Woodvilles? We do know from
Fabyan's evidence [7] that they were dismissed immediately after his coronation,
and this may suggest that their primary purpose was to act as an impressive,
though cosmetic force rather than to campaign actively. However, even if, as
events transpired, they were mainly retained "for show", inasmuch as
they did no actual fighting, the reason for calling the force into being must,
in the absence of other evidence, remain uncertain. The problem, of course, is
whether Richard was genuinely in a panic, or whether he was trying to put the
recipients of the letter in a panic.
Although this letter was
dispatched in a rush (arriving with Ratcliffe on June 15), Hastings was executed
and the duke of York was captured before the arrival of troops. The difficulty
with the section of Crowland which deals with Hastings' execution is that it
does not give a full evaluation of Richard and Buckingham's strength in the
capital on the long weekend of 13-16 June. Without a rough knowledge of Richard
and Buckingham's numerical military strength, it is impossible to answer the
question of whether or not the events in these four days were precipitate or
planned. It is sure that after the removal of the duke of York:
armed men in frightening and
unheard of numbers were summoned from the North, from Wales and from whatever
other districts lay within their command and power
But as to how many armed men there
were until this time, none of the sources are numerically reliable [8].
Presumably, though, the protector's and Buckingham's forces were quite large:
the queen kept sanctuary, and apparently had little luck in raising troops
against them [9]. The Great Chronicle's comment, describing the Protector's and
the king's entry to London may be significant:
Whan the blak fflete of Norwaye,
Is cummyn & goon,
Than buyld ye yowir howsis/
Of lyme & of stoon. [10]
The point of this proverb is that
it is not until after the black fleet of Norway (in this context it seems most
likely to be a punning reference to the protector's black clad contingent of
mourners/soldiers) has been and gone that one should invest in the expense of a
lime and stone house, for there will surely not be one stone left on top of
another after their visit. It is
interesting to note that the Great Chronicle makes the claim that this proverb
was remembered when the protector came to London at first: evidently the sight
of his troops, all parading through the city, dressed in black was an impressive
sight. The importance of this proverb is that it gives the same impression of
Richard's strength as the Crowland author does when he writes that it was a
great crowd with swords and clubs which came to Westminster. Perhaps these two
pieces of evidence support the view that Richard's actions in executing Hastings
and removing the duke of York were neither rushed nor risky, as Richard had
sufficient forces to rely on in the event of trouble.
Only Mancini says that Gloucester,
Buckingham and the king entered with no more than five hundred soldiers. It
seems possible, however, that Mancini made a mistake, meaning the number five
hundred to refer to the official London party; More [11], and the Great
Chronicle [12] both give this figure for the Londoners, but do not specify how
many men Richard and Buckingham brought into London. One does not need to argue
a mistake, however. This could simply be the number entering on one occasion.
Mancini, describing the capture of
the king [13], makes it quite clear that the two dukes had a large retinue: they
found out the king's route to London so that in their company his entry to the
city might be more magnificent. And
Richard took possession of the king with a large body of soldiers.
Contrary to the traditional interpretation, Mancini does not say that
nearly all of the attendants from Wales were ordered home; rather it was the
ministers of the king's household and his attendants who were dispersed.[14]
Crowland too does not say that the king's troops (or Earl Rivers' troops)
were dispersed: it does say that Richard had it proclaimed that:
Anyone of the king's household
should withdraw from the place at once and that they should not come near any
places where the king might go, on pain of death.[15]
However, because the king and his
forces were in different villages, the order seems specifically directed against
the advisers and household of the king rather than the soldiers. The combined
evidence from Crowland and Mancini, as well as More and the Great Chronicle is
that Richard entered the capital with a large number of troops. Therefore,
although the arrival of the men from York did not actually take place for a
while, the dukes of Gloucester and Buckingham had effectively extended their
military control of the city.
The Stallworth letter of 21 June
[16], for example, corroborates the Crowland account's picture of increasing
militarisation in the capital:
On Monday last [ie June 16] was at
Westm. gret plenty of harnest men ... Yt is thought ther schalbe XX thousand of
my lord protectour and my lord of Bukyngham men in London this weeke ...
In passing, it may be said that
the number 20,000 is often used in English fifteenth century sources to indicate
a "large number". (One might compare the accounts of the Oldcastle
rising in 1414, for example.) However, adding to the picture of martial takeover
is the detail that the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of Ely's property was
being guarded:
Žer ar men in ther placese for
sure kepynge. And I suppose žat žer shall be sente menne of my lord protectour
to žeis lordys places in že countre.
The picture is completed by the remark:
All že lord Chamberleyne mene be
come my lordys of Bokynghame menne.
Although "How many of
Hastings' retainers joined the duke is not known", it has been speculated
that he was struck down "to prevent [him] from calling up to London [his]
company of faithful retainers" which included at least 88 knights, esquires
and gentlemen, and 2 peers [17]. Nevertheless, it certainly seems doubtful that
in the hostile climate of Woodville London after the death of Edward IV, that
Hastings, who vehemently opposed the Woodvilles in council, would have been
alone and without some fighting men. Indeed, More tells us that the queen's party in London was
prevented from raising troops because Hastings persuaded the council that
Richard's action in capturing the king were legal and legitimate, and confirms
the Crowland account which gives the impression of two armed camps in London:
Some collected their associates
and stood by at Westminster in the name of the queen, others at London under the
protection of Lord Hastings.[18]
In summary, it seems that as far
as its depiction of the atmosphere goes (that is the atmosphere generated by the
protector's forces), Crowland is an extremely good source. It gives a
frighteningly realistic picture of the climate of tension and fear which
oppressed the capital during June 1483, and conveys a sense of the military
nature of the coup.
Why was Hastings Executed?
Returning, therefore, to the question of why Hastings was
murdered, it should be noted that Crowland, More, Mancini, and the Great
Chronicle all either state or give the impression that Hastings was caught
totally off-guard by the action of the protector. Crowland also makes the claim
that in all his outward conduct, Hastings seemed to be on the protector's side,
and to have deserved favour. There is certainly no indication of a treasonable
plot by Hastings in the Crowland account, unless (and this is surely too remote
to be plausible) it is implied in the inherent contradiction that Hastings was
at the same time bursting with joy over a new world, and denying that world's
existence. Mancini too emphasises the apparently good terms between Richard and
Hastings (he had a friendship of long standing with the duke [19]), and although
Mancini like More, the Great Chronicle and Vergil places the death of Hastings
after the removal of the young prince from sanctuary, his judgment on the matter
of Richard's motivation for beheading Hastings is the same as Crowland's in
essence:
the protector rushed headlong into
crime, for fear that the ability and authority of these men [Rotherham, Morton,
and Hastings] might be detrimental to him: for he had sounded out their loyalty
through the duke of Buckingham, and learnt that sometimes they forgathered in
each other's houses.[20]
It has recently been argued that
in spite of Crowland's evidence, the reason Richard had Hastings executed was
that he "suspected that ... Lord Hastings was plotting against him,
possibly communicating with the Wydevilles through Edward's former mistress,
Jane Shore, now mistress to Hastings himself. The knowledge that Hastings,
Thomas Rotherham ... and John Morton ... were frequenting each other's houses
besides meeting in the council may have been the prime cause of his
suspicions."[21]
From other evidence we know that
Shore was locked up by the Ricardian regime. Stallworth's letter to Stonor says:
Mastres Chore is in prisone: what
schall happyne hyr I knowe nott [22]
and the Great Chronicle talks about her in the context of
her punishment for harlotry, with Hastings, put to open penance:
ffor the lyfe that she ledd wt že
said lord hastyngys & othir grete astatys.[23]
But although these things
happened, there is nothing concrete to suggest a Woodville-Hastings connection,
whether through the Marquis of Dorset, or Foster (a co-steward with Hastings of
the abbey of St. Albans) and more to suggest animosity between Hastings and the
Woodvilles. Hastings contacted Gloucester to warn him of the Woodvilles'
activities in London. He also threatened to withdraw to Calais in protest at the
Woodville's political manoeuvres in the capital. It seems easier to agree with
Mancini, when he says:
Thus fell Hastings, killed not by
those enemies he had always feared, but by a friend whom he had never
doubted.[24]
Even given the ingenuity of Hanham
and others who have argued that there was a Ricardian plot to connect the
Woodvilles with Hastings, (because Shore was imprisoned and had her property
seized at about the time when Hastings was executed, and was also named as the
mistress of the marquess of Dorset later [25]) the animosity of Hastings and the
Woodvilles is so widely reported that it seems incredible. Shore may well have
been an innocent, incidental to the plot, and the fact that she does not appear,
and no hints of her activity appear in the Crowland account does suggest so:
Hastings, rather than being a participant in treasonous plots against Richard,
found himself caught off-guard. But the most interesting thing about Jane
Shore's arrest, is that Stallworth thought it worth mentioning. Was she
connected to him or his family in some unknown way? Or perhaps she really was an
important factor in the political takeover? Without other evidence to the
contrary, the broad picture of all the narrative sources extant is that Hastings
did find himself caught off-guard. This seems the most likely explanation for
his lack of caution and his surprise at Richard's identification of him as a
traitor. What this leaves us wondering, though, is precisely how the duke of
Buckingham managed to sound out the loyalty of Rotherham, Morton and Hastings.
In the absence of firm evidence, speculation is not helpful one way or another.
Clearly, he may have taken a personal hand in the matter, or he may have used
agents, trustworthy or otherwise. There may be something in the accusations of
treachery, which More levels against Catesby [26].
Before dealing with this
accusation, we may note that another difficulty with the Crowland account is the
ambiguity of the phrase:
However, a very few days after
these words, grief completely took the place of joy.
How many days are meant by a very
few days after is impossible to tell. All that can be inferred is that, in the
eyes of the author of Crowland, Richard's action was not spontaneous and came as
the direct result of brooding with Buckingham upon the chamberlain's assertions.
Either that, or Hasting's satisfaction with events was expressed in early June.
What, then, is to be made of
More's tantalising suggestion that it was William Catesby's doing that Richard
had Hastings executed?
And undoubtedly the protector
loved him well [ie Hastings] and was loth to have lost him, saving for fear lest
his life should have quailed for their purpose. For which cause he moved Catesby
to prove with some words cast out afar off, whether he could not think it
possible to win the Lord Hastings into their part. But Catesby, whether he
assayed him or assayed him not, reported unto them that he found him so fast and
heard him speak so terrible words that he durst no further break ... And
therefore [Catesby] fearing lest their motions might with the Lord Hastings
minish his credence, whereunto only all the matter leaned, procured the
protector hastily to rid him.[27]
More's story is not altogether
incompatible with the Crowland version: according to both accounts, Hastings was
killed on the authority of the protector. Catesby certainly could have convinced
the protector to do this in order:
to obtain much of the rule that
the lord Hastings bare in his country [28]
even although his part in the affair is not remembered in
Crowland. Catesby had sufficient motive in cupidity: the Midlands estates he
sought were certainly worth having. He also had plenty of opportunity. The slant
which More puts on the protector's actions, and the motives he ascribes to him
are similar to those implied in Crowland. Whereas More describes the ways in
which the protector sussed out the men who were for and against him, Crowland
reports (after the executions and imprisonments):
In this way, without justice or
judgment, the three strongest supports of the new king were removed ...
The difficulty with using the
evidence of More to corroborate Crowland is that, although like all the
contemporary accounts Crowland simply adumbrates the events and motives,
additional evidence from Tudor sources is not always the culmination of a
disinterested tradition of information gathering, meriting confidence: sometimes
(indeed often, in More's case) Tudor sources simply rehearse an authorised,
entrenched, standardised doctrine, complete with exaggeration, and invention.
Because More includes some attestable facts - facts which often imply a modicum
of research - it can be difficult to know when precisely to discount the
evidence he presents as unreliable or uncorroborated. In the absence of other
corroborating or contradicting evidence, his angle on the chamberlain's death
must be used only with caution to inform Crowland's more reliable, if sketchier
picture. We must conclude that the reason why Richard took action against
Hastings (after brooding on the assertions Hastings may or may not have made
publicly) could have been because Catesby let him hear of these assertions. The
point, in other words is unresolved. However, as with Shore, Catesby does not
feature in Crowland, and although negative evidence is very slight evidence,
this does suggest either that Catesby was not involved (Mancini suggests
Buckingham - not Catesby - did Richard's reconnaissance) or that Crowland's
author did not know of Catesby's involvement. Surely, given Crowland's generally
high standard of information, the latter is the least likely circumstance, even
taking the continuator's general brevity into consideration?
But the author of Crowland does
make some mistakes. In the description of the aftermath of the events in the
tower, for example, he says that both Thomas, archbishop of York and John,
bishop of Ely:
were imprisoned in different
castles in Wales.
In fact, although the bishop of
Ely was taken to Wales in Buckingham's custody, Rotherham's fate was different,
he being, according to Vergil, taken not to Wales, but:
committed to the custody of sir
James Tirrell, knight. [29]
What is more, he seems to have come to terms with the new
regime. As far as it goes, the negative evidence, that he did not participate in
the autumn rising, suggests this.
However, although this is probably
little more than an unconscious mistake, and Crowland is in general attestably
the most accurate source, it is difficult to distinguish what it tells us about
the position of the chronicler relative to the events he describes. The
complication of not knowing for sure who wrote the continuation poses the
greatest difficulty even in a passage as factually correct as this one:
discerning the unconscious bias inherent in point of view is not possible.
However, as a broad analysis of
the results of the events in the tower on 13 June, Crowland is extremely
reliable. The Protector was shrewd to take full advantage of the normal practice
of dividing the council. Perhaps the Cely paper's comment to the effect that
John Russell, who was heading up the other half of the council on June 13, was
dyssprowett and nott content [30] strengthens the credibility of the analysis in
the Crowland account, which says:
In this way, without justice or
judgment, the three strongest supports of the new king were removed and with all
the rest of his faithful men expecting something similar these two dukes did
whatever they wanted.
In other words, the desperation
Cely attributed to Russell, (who it should be remembered may either have written
the Crowland account, or may have been associated with its author [31]) seems
indeed to have been contagious and widespread. This fear is an important element
to bear in mind: its presence implies that Richard III came to the throne
against the wills of many and as a direct result of a negative sentiment which
would surely be a factor in the relations he had over the next few days
in his bid for the throne. In that the impression of the atmosphere which
Crowland presents is substantially similar to that of the other sources, it
seems a highly reliable account. In that Crowland mixes factual accuracy with an
analytical gloss on the facts, it is for the events of 13 June a source
unsurpassed in usefulness.
Part Two: The Removal of the Duke of York from Sanctuary
As the Crowland chronicle says, apart from the capture of
the king's relatives at Stony Stratford, the flight of the queen and many of her
party into the sanctuary of Westminster caused a reaction in London. Her
decision to take sanctuary was a clear sign for all to see:
that the protector did not show
sufficient consideration for the dignity and peace of mind of the queen [1].
Simon Stallworth, writing on the ninth of June to Sir
William Stonor began his letter:
As for tydyngs seyns I wrote to
yove we her noun newe. Že Quene kepys style Westm., my lord of „orke, my lord
of Salysbury with othyr mo wyche wyll nott departe as „ytt.[2]
In other words, having already written sometime before the
fifth of June [3] to inform Stonor of the queen's May day flight into sanctuary,
Stallworth updated him on the situation on the ninth of June. The point of the
queen's flight into sanctuary was that she hoped by it to safeguard her sons. It
was a move calculated to embarrass Richard, and on 16 June he did something
quite spectacular about it. Crowland, having set the scene, and given an
impression of mounting pressure in London, gives an account of the removal of
the duke with an analysis of the politics and import of the events.
The Question of Consent and the Official Pretext for
Removing the Duke of York from Sanctuary
The two best sources for the events of 16 June are Mancini
and Crowland. The accounts give a very similar picture of the events of that
day, and the best touchstone for measuring the value of Crowland as a source is
Mancini. Crowland includes some accurate information not found in Mancini, and
Mancini expands upon certain features of Crowland [4].
Mancini does not mention, as
Crowland does, that the party which came to Westminster arrived by boat [5], but
gives a similar impression of the scene:
Therefore, with the consent of the
council he surrounded the sanctuary with troops. When the queen saw herself
besieged and preparation for violence, she surrendered her son. [7]
Although Crowland does not say in
as many words that this action was taken with the specific consent of the
council, it does give the impression that at the least, seeing what had happened
to Hastings, it was not about to offer any opposition:
In this way, without justice or
judgment, the three strongest supports of the new king were removed, and with
all the rest of his faithful men expecting something similar these two dukes
thereafter did whatever they wanted.
Although Mancini at first gives
the impression of a weak-willed council, he later notes that:
the lords consulted their own
safety, warned by the example of Hastings, and perceived the alliance of the two
dukes, whose power, supported by a multitude of troops, would be difficult and
hazardous to resist.[8]
It is important for an analysis of
the strengths and weaknesses of Crowland to note that the two accounts of
Mancini and Crowland conflict in the details of the official motives Richard put
forward for laying siege to Westminster. Whereas
Crowland puts forward the idea that the queen was entreated:
to allow her son Richard, duke of
York, to leave and to come to the tower for the comfort of his brother the king,
Mancini says that the protector
claimed that the young prince:
was held by his mother against his
will in sanctuary, and that he wanted to be with his brother.[9]
It is therefore necessary to look
more closely at the Tudor sources, to see if they shed light on the accuracy of
Crowland. In fact, Vergil offers a different official reason for the forcible
removal of the Duke than Crowland. His highly dramatic version of the events has
Richard asking rhetorically:
But what shall we say of the evell
cownsayle which they who most maligne and hate me have geaven to quene
Elizabeth? who withowt any just cause, cownterfayting feare so folyshly, hath
enterprysed to cary in all haste the kings children as wicked, wretched, and
desperate nawghtie parsons into sanctuary, thonly refuge in earth of povertie,
det, and lewd behavyor, as thoughe we went abowt to destroy them, and that all
owr doinges tendyd to violence ... But we are to provyde remedy betimes for this
womanishe disease creping into owr commonwelthe, to the woorst example trewly
that may be. What a sight I pray
you shalle yt be to se the day wherin the king shalbe crowned, yf ... his
mother, brother, and sisters shalbe remane in sayntuary.[10]
Unlike Crowland, Vergil's account
of the official justification for taking possession of the boy thus stresses the
impropriety of the prince's being in sanctuary, and the need for him to attend
the coronation.
Similarly to Vergil, More writes
that at a meeting of the lords of the council, the protector:
proposed unto them that it was a
heinous deed of the queen and proceeding of great malice toward the king's
counsellors, that she should keep in sanctuary the king's brother from him,
whose special pleasure and comfort were to have his brother with him ... And
verily it redoundeth greatly to the dishonor both of the king's highness ... to
have it run ... that the king's brother should be fain to keep sanctuary. For
every man will ween that no man will do so for nought. [11]
Thus, for More, the impropriety of
the Duke's situation, as well as the king's own desire to see his brother are
the paramount considerations of the pretext for threatening to breach sanctuary.
It may be, given that both of these elements are proposed in more than one
source, that they were both offered by the protector's regime. Although there is
no convincing proof which makes the Tudor sources' accounts preferable to
Crowland, they do seem to offer more likely terms of official justification for
forcibly taking custody of a boy in sanctuary. Whatever the case, it needs also
to be remembered that the sanctuary debate may well reflect issues of lively
debate at the time when More and Vergil were writing. It seems on the face of it
unlikely that the young king's supposed desire to see his brother would have
been put forward as an official justification for so drastic a course of action.
The notion that the duke of York had some official part to play at the
coronation, or that it was improper for him to be in sanctuary, have more
weight. The Crowland author may be correct, but it seems perhaps more likely
that he is adding a detail of dramatic pathos to the scene.[12]
The Roles of the Cardinal Archbishop and the Queen
Skirting over the issue of the pretext for removing the
duke from sanctuary, the Great Chronicle says only that:
The protectour beyng accompanyed
wyth tharchbysshopp of Cauntyrbury than naymd doctor Bowser went unto
westmynstyr and there behavid hym soo gloriously unto the Quene with his
manyffold dyssymylid ffayer promysys, That nowthir she nor yit the bysshopp hadd
In hym any maner of Suspicion of Gyle, But In good & lovyng maner trystyng
ffully It shuld be ffor the weale of the child, delyverd unto theym the duke of
york than beyng a child abowth Že age of Sevyn yeris ...[13]
Because in many aspects of detail
the Great Chronicle version is corroborated by the other sources, it is useful
for corroborating the account found in the Crowland Chronicle. It is especially
helpful for analysing the Crowland account's depiction of the roles of the queen
and the cardinal. Mancini, for example, corroborates the Great Chronicle's
affirmation of the Cardinal's lack of suspicion, saying that:
Indeed, the cardinal was
suspecting no guile, and had persuaded the queen to do this, seeking as much to
prevent a violation of the sanctuary as to mitigate by his good services the
fierce resolve of the duke.[14]
Although Crowland's account of the
cardinal's role has to be interpreted in the light which the other sources shed
on his motives, suspicions, and conduct, in this instance the version Crowland
gives does not necessarily conflict with Mancini and the Great Chronicle, but
neither does it definitely confirm what they say:
They came ... with a great crowd
... and compelled the lord Cardinal of Canterbury to enter the sanctuary, with
many others to call upon the queen, in her kindness to allow her son ... to
leave.
The difficulty with this passage
is that the term compelled [15] could mean a number of different things about
the attitude of Bourchier. Did the cardinal not have any choice but to approach
the queen, having been threatened with violence if he did not? Or did the
thought of a violation of sanctuary compel him to talk to her? It must be
remembered that the arrests of two powerful churchmen (viz Rotherham and Morton)
took place only a few days before, and this would certainly have focused the
cardinal's mind.
And what does the Crowland text
mean when it says that the queen willingly agreed to the proposal and sent out
the boy? Was she taken in by the Cardinal, and the many others [16] who told her
lies to preserve the sanctuary, or is it simply the writer's sarcastic gloss on
her predicament? Surrounded by armed troops, and presented by the cardinal
archbishop, the highest churchman in the land, with the argument that the boy
ought not to remain in sanctuary, the Crowland author seems to ask: what else
could she do? If one interprets the Crowland text's statement as an additional
piece of pathos, and not a genuine desire on the part of the queen to relinquish
her son, then Crowland can again be said to convey a vivid sense of the reality
of the scene
Edward V's Sisters
What was the place of the young king's sisters in all of
this? Crowland is ambiguous on the matter of whether or not the girls were
wanted. It says simply that the cardinal was compelled to ask the queen:
to allow her son ... to leave
but this, of course, does not mean that the daughters were
not also asked for. Since in the end it was only the Duke of York who left, it
might not have been recorded that the girls were also requested [17].
Because Vergil mentions the girls,
Crowland's omission is important. Vergil, who in some of his detail is
corroborated by Stallworth, states that the archbishop of Canterbury, the duke
of Buckingham, Lord Howard, and sundry other grave men went to the sanctuary:
to perswade the quene with many
fayre wordes and perswations that she wold returne with hir children into the
palace ... but the woman ... could not be movid ... which whan they understoode,
fynally they demandyd to be delyveryd to them hir soon Richerd onely [18]
Mancini explains that the son of
the late George, duke of Clarence was kept in confinement in the household of
[Richard's] wife ... For he feared that if the entire progeny of King Edward
became extinct, yet this child, who was also of royal blood, would still
embarrass him. [19] Was there, as Crowland's silence on the matter suggests, no
potential for embarrassment from Edward IV's daughters?
It is an interesting comment on
the accuracy of Crowland in depicting the political situation that although
Stallworth talks about the duke of York in his letter of 9 June, he, like
Crowland omits to mention the daughters of the queen - Elizabeth, Cecily, Anne,
Catherine, and Bridget, who were also in the sanctuary. Obviously, like the
Crowland author he did not consider them to be of great political importance.
Earlier on in his narrative,
Mancini makes it clear that Buckingham was of the opinion that:
it was not the business of women
but of men to govern kingdoms [20].
Mancini also records, however,
that Richard, on hearing the news of his brother's death, wrote a letter to the
queen and professed his loyalty to all his brother's issue, even female, if
perchance, which God forbid, the youth [ie Edward V] should die.
Vergil, who also records the fact
that Richard wrote to the queen, says that in the letter he promised naturall
affection towards his brothers children [21] but does not suggest that Richard
said he would be loyal even to his nieces.
Of the correspondence, Crowland
says only that Richard:
promised to come and offer
submission, fealty and all that was due from him to his lord and king.[22]
What does this mean, then, in
terms of the queen being allowed to retain her daughters? Did she look on them
as a security, regarding them as potential queens, whose husbands could resist
Gloucester in case her sons were murdered? It is difficult to see how this could
be the case, because the Yorkist claim to the throne had, since the descent from
Edmund Langley, duke of York in Edward III's time, been in the male line. (Of
course, strictly speaking, this male descent was valid only since 1471, and it
ought to be noted that in 1460, Richard, duke of York had put forward a claim in
the female line.) Equally, then, it is hard to know what the decision not to
take the girls tells us about Richard's motives. Did he feel that acquiring all
the boys of royal stock was enough to secure his position as ruler? If he
intended at this stage to usurp the throne, why did he not remove the queen's
daughters as well as her son? To these questions, Crowland does not give a
complete answer, although it does suggest that Richard did not intend to base
his power solely on the removal of all other contenders to the throne:
From that day both these dukes
showed their intentions, not in private but openly. Armed men in frightening and
unheard of numbers were summoned from the north, from Wales and from whatever
other districts lay within their command and power.
In that Crowland concentrates very
much on the realpolitik, it gives the most credible explanation of why the
protector sought mainly the duke of York, and not his sisters: the political
situation depended on military might and the ability to enforce a claim to the
throne.
The Political Effects of Taking York from Westminster
Irrespective of when Richard actually decided to usurp, his methods, and
their effects are made clear in the Crowland chronicle. Its most telling remark,
in terms of Gloucester's strategy, and in some ways the most astute piece of
political commentary is that it was from the day of capturing the duke of York
that the dukes did not conceal their intentions.
Before the princes were both in
the tower, Richard's plans were anyone's to guess, but after so shocking and
sudden a manoeuvre, which followed close on the heels of the capture of the
queen's relatives, the execution of Hastings and the imprisonment of the bishop
and the archbishop, his intentions were not hard to discern. The Crowland
account's statement that their intentions became clear after taking possession
of York is partially corroborated by More, who writes:
When the protector had both
children in his hands, he opened himself more boldly, both to certain other men,
and also chiefly to the duke of Buckingham, although I know that many thought
that this duke was privy to all the protector's counsel even from the
beginning.[23]
According to Mancini [24],
unprecedented alarm caused by Hasting's death made it seem that the coronation
must be deferred ... All the peers of the realm ... supposed they were called
[to London] both to hear the reason for Hasting's execution and to decide again
about the coronation of Edward.
In spite of what Mancini says
about the effect of the death of Hastings on the public of London, however, of
itself, and probably because of the measures taken to calm the multitude, as
Mancini put it [25], the execution of Hastings apparently caused no one to fear
for the princes: neither the Stonor letter of 21 June nor the Cely letter of 24
June [26] was inspired by the immediate political circumstances of the
chamberlain's execution. Stonor was prompted to write by the deliverance of the
duke of York. He gives Hastings' death a sentence, but the impression one gets
is that it is much more background information. Perhaps earlier letters by
Stonor and Cely, which no longer survive, detailed the initial reaction to that
event. Letter writers in the middle ages often repeated or recapitulated vital
details in sequences of letters, in case one written second should arrive first,
or the first should get lost. This is the case, for example in numerous
ambassadorial exchanges recorded in the Calendars of State Papers for Milan and
Venice. What worries Stallworth is the thought that the duke of York may have
been in danger. Although he writes that the duke was mery, the force of the
statement is that he is, blessid be Jhesus, mery.
George Cely, jotting his
impressions of the volatile political events, calculated that the king was in
danger: God ssaffe his lyffe, he writes. Both letters reinforce the argument of
the Crowland analysis of what the effect and purpose of the removal of the young
Duke of York from sanctuary was. If Cely had not heard of the suspicious and
violent removal of the prince, why should he have feared for the king's future?
And why should he write that the "Lorde Prynsse" [ie the Duke of York]
might be "trobellett"? There would be little need to add "wher
[whom] God defend" if the Duke was in no trouble.
The Crowland version, which
correctly places the execution before the abduction modifies Mancini's vision of
a hysterical populace, outraged by the execution of Hastings. The real reason
the peers were in London and meeting in Westminster was neither to decide on a
new date for the coronation, nor to find out why Hastings had died: the previous
dates had been
picked without their assistance, and it was published in lengthy pre-prepared
notes that Hastings was a traitor. They were there to witness Richard's show of
force. He had packed the capital with his men. He had ensured that no one
brought more of a retinue than a few attendants, who were indispensable for
their personal service [27]. They were there, in effect, to witness the
protector thrust himself into the marble chair. Because Crowland gets the sequence of events correct, its
analysis of the protector's method is a lot clearer, and so is its understanding
and recollection of the political effects of removing York from Westminster.
From the Crowland Chronicle's
account of the usurpation, it seems that although the execution of Hastings was
an important event politically, its importance may not have immediately been
apparent to the population at large. In fact, it did not provoke any wide-scale
panic. The events which really set alarm bells ringing were the capturing of the
duke of York, and the arrival in or near London of large numbers of northern
retainers, along with the propaganda for which Richard and Buckingham were
responsible. Of course, the capital was full of armed men, so there would be
little chance of effective and speedy opposition to the two dukes. Alarm could
not be transposed into action.
Part Three: Non Clanculo sed Palam
The last section of the extract of the Crowland chronicle
is the least informative, in terms of reliable details, although it does give a
realistic outline of the important historcal issues. After describing the
removal of the duke of York, Crowland says that: these dukes showed their
intentions, not in private but openly.
The Crowland account does not give
any specific information of the numerous steps which Richard and Buckingham took
to undermine the princes' claims to the throne, and to secure the throne for
Richard. For example, it says nothing of the fact that Richard took immediate
action to defer the date of the coronation [1]. Although Crowland says that the
dukes showed their intentions openly from that day forth, this is technically
inaccurate. The fact that the coronation was officially deferred until November,
as well as the fact that official writs were sent out to postpone parliament [2]
and the coronation means that even after 16 June, Richard was keen to give the
impression of loyalty to Edward V. What the author of Crowland probably meant
was that from the capturing of the princes on, the intentions of the dukes were
obvious.
Crowland's remarks to the effect
that Richard and Buckingham showed their hand are true, only inasmuch as they
abbreviate the detailed programme of propaganda on which the dukes embarked
between the capture of York and taking possession of the throne. What does come
across in Crowland is the way in which Richard sought to cultivate public
opinion by pretending if not to a reluctance to accept the crown, then certainly
to reticence about actively seeking it: Crowland emphasises the fact that
Richard had his entitlement to the throne put to him (it was put forward by
means of a supplication etc) and that he had it put about that this roll
originated in the north, whence so many people came to London.
In other words, Crowland does
suggest that Richard kept himself in the background and relied on other people
to make the running.
The Crowland author, however, does
not, as Mancini does [3], relate the details that Richard took off his mourning
garb, adopted purple raiment and processed through the capital in regal style to
receive applause, daily entertaining more and more people to dinner. Neither
does Crowland refer to the preaching at St Paul's cross of Dr Shaa on Sunday,
June 22, or to the speeches of Buckingham and Sir Thomas Fitzwilliam in the
guild hall on June 24, or to the situation of the public petitioning of Richard
on his balcony at Baynard's Castle on June 25.[4]
For Crowland, the steps taken to
manipulate public opinion were less important that the fact of Richard's
military strength, and his actual taking possession of the throne. The author of
the chronicle says that he gives a delineation of the pretext of this intrusion
and for taking possession. In fact, all that he does is repeat almost verbatim
some parts of the text of the parliamentary document (the supplication contained
in a certain parchment roll) [5] of January 1484. This parchment roll was
produced when parliament was asked to ratify Richard's usurpation, and a
petition to the duke of Gloucester (ie not to King Richard) was presented to the
house. In this case, Crowland's evidence, because it draws on another official
source, is not the best one on which to rely for a clear picture of all the
claims and manoeuvres (or sedition and infamy!) with which Richard justified his
claim and entitlement to the throne. This is the case, even although Crowland
does say nothing, which is not in the text of the roll. The supplication itself
contains more reasons why Richard should be king, and charges against Elizabeth
Woodville.[6]
Difficulties with the Pretext for taking the throne: Did
Richard Accuse His Mother of Adultery?
Crowland's version of the Ricardian pretext for taking the
throne contains details which are somewhat different to those reportedly
contained in Shaa's and Buckingham's addresses. Whereas the accounts of Shaa's
speech suggest that he declared the duke of Gloucester's title to the throne by
reason of the illegitimacy of both Edward IV and his sons [7] Crowland says only
that:
King Edward's sons were bastards
[because] he had been pre-contracted to a certain lady Eleanor Butler before he
married Queen Elizabeth.
In all the accounts of Buckingham's address to the mayor,
aldermen and citizens of London in the guild hall [8] Buckingham too reasoned that Richard should be king on the
grounds of the illegitimacy of both Edward IV himself and Edward's sons.
It is difficult to know whether or
not in this instance Crowland has recorded all the reasons actually put forth
for making Richard king. Although there is unanimity in the other sources
suggesting that Richard was quite content to slander his mother's reputation, it
is interesting to note that Crowland does not refer to this aspect of the
propaganda. When one remembers that Richard was actually residing in London in
his mother's house, it does seem unlikely that he would deliberately invite her
wrath by himself having her adultery proclaimed abroad.
Nevertheless, if Richard did not
claim that his mother was an adulteress, then the claim of his nephew the earl
of Warwick, Clarence's son, would not easily be dismissed. It is perhaps
significant that in the parliament roll and in the Crowland account only Edward
IV's sons were declared bastards, and not Edward IV. If Edward IV had been
illegitimate, then the issue of George, duke of Clarence would have had a better
claim than Richard, since Clarence's treason (against an illegitimate king)
could hardly have debarred his son's succession. Crowland says quite
categorically that:
no certain and uncorrupt blood of
the lineage of Richard, duke of York, was to be found except in the person of
the said Richard, duke of Gloucester
because:
the blood of ... George, duke of
Clarence, had been attainted.
Perhaps there was some uncertainty
(or over-zealousness) in the preaching of Shaa, and in the spin doctoring of
Buckingham, and this has survived in the records left by the other commentators,
who did not refer as Crowland did to the official pretext for taking the throne.
It is, however, hard to read into Buckingham's speech an attempt to place
Richard on a sabotaged throne with a view to knocking him off it again later. To
do this would be to disregard the great help Buckingham gave to Richard in
making his bid for the throne, and most probably to overrate both his
deviousness and imagination. It is easier to believe that Buckingham either made
a mistake in his script (perhaps he thought up another reason for debarring
Edward V and his brother from the succession on his own, in the heat of the
moment) or that he has been misquoted. Are we to doubt his deviousness or his
intelligence?
Crowland: the Official Rationalisation
That Crowland gives the official pretext for Richard's
taking the throne is a fact which is made plain not only by the parliamentary
roll, but also by evidence from Harleian manuscript 433, the signet docquet book
[9]. There is a mandate to the receiver of the honour of Tutbury to make
payments for services to:
Our dearest brother, late king,
whom God assoil
and also to:
Edward bastard, late called King
Edward the fifth.
Clearly, as far as the official
documents go, Crowland is correct to say that Richard's entitlement to the
throne was that his nephews were barred. Crowland is accurate about the official
date of Richard's assumption of the throne. It was:
on the 26th day of ... June [that]
Richard, the protector, claimed for himself the government of the kingdom, with
the name and title of king.
The Niceties of Usurpation
It is interesting too that Crowland emphasises the ways in which the
formalities of Richard's assumption of power were observed:
in the great hall of Westminster
he thrust himself into the marble chair.
Even if Crowland does not go into
the same detail as More, Vergil, or the other chroniclers who give an account of
Richard's machinations, and who detail the extent to which he had difficulty
rigging public opinion, there is a lot of sentiment behind the word thrust [intrusit],
and the general impression is that Richard made himself king through fear. Like
Edward IV, Richard followed certain procedures in order to give the semblance of
a formal and legitimate possession of the throne. Claiming kingship, Richard sat
upon (and thus took possession of) the king's seat - the seat where justice was
done formally, in the middle of the king's bench.
More adds some details which may
help to flesh out Crowland's few, but reliable details. Richard declared that he
would take the crown, and minister the law, as he considered it the king's first
duty to minister the laws. Richard also offered a general pardon, and a specific
pardon for Sir John Fogge [10], before leaving to greet the crowds. The point of
the exercise was that Richard tried to justify and legitimise his actions by
following the precedents of his brother, and by going through traditional
procedures. Although Crowland does succeed in portraying this, its account is a
lot sketchier than others of the chronicles.
Conclusion
As a source for the usurpation, Crowland is unsurpassed.
Its chief merit is its accuracy, not only about names, and events, but also
about sequences and dates. Although it is at times frustratingly brief (perhaps
the circumstances in which it was written allowed its author little opportunity
to expand?), it conveys in its brevity something of the speed of the events, as
well as the various stages of bewilderment, discontent and fear through which
the majority of the population must have passed. Furthermore, it creates these
impressions by sticking to the bare bones of the usurpation, without extraneous
detail: the Crowland author's is the almost detached viewpoint of someone with
an eye for political analysis, but not blind to the horror. Crowland sheds light
on murky business.
Lingering in one's mind after
reading the Crowland account are a series of unpleasantly clear images: There is
the scrupulosity of a "protector" who painstakingly legitimises the
illegitimate; the pathos in the plight of those whom neither God nor holy church
would defend; the suddenness and unexpectedness of the grief which inexplicably
took the place of joy; the intrusion into the throne of Divine justice of a
devil. Although the Crowland author has a very clear idea in his own mind of
what the events were about, and his purpose in writing is to record them without
any conscious introduction of falsehood, hatred or favour [1], it is difficult
to read this account and remain an admirer of Richard III, no matter what
provocation or pretexts he may or may not have felt he had.
Appendix: a Note on Authorship
The problem of the authorship of this section of the
Crowland chronicle has never been solved. However, there is some internal
evidence in this passage which seems to support the theory that the chronicle
was written by an associate of the chancellor, John Russell.
In the Cely letter [1], John
Russell is referred to as being dyssprowett and nott content. Hanham's comment
to the effect that "Thomas Rotherham, Archbishop of York, had been replaced
as Chancellor by John Russell, Bishop of Lincoln ... but is probably the person
meant" [2] in the phrase the Chavnseler ys dyssprowett is unconvincing, and
hinges on an interpretation of the word dyssprowett which, given the context of
the passage is less likely than the interpretation which says the word is a
corruption of desperate [3]. Furthermore, John Russell, as Professor J.A.F.
Thomson has pointed out [4], was a man whose "departmental responsibilities
inevitably kept him near the centre of royal administration at Westminster"
and "most indications of his location after his promotion to the greater
see of Lincoln in 1480 suggest that public duties kept him close to
London". In other words, as a wealthy and impressive churchman in contact
with Londoners almost daily, as well as a leading figure in the royal
administration, it is difficult to believe that he could be mistaken for his
predecessor in the office. Furthermore, more than a month had passed since his
appointment. It certainly seemed to
some that the chancellor (Russell) genuinely was desperate and not content: when
the protector's men burst in on the half of the council meeting in the tower on
June 13, Russell was not present and there is no indication that he was privy to
what was to happen. Albeit that this does not constitute firm evidence of his
disapproval of Gloucester's actions, it nevertheless does not discount the
possibility that observers of events, who knew that he was not present at the
tower [5], might have seen in his reaction to the events a sense of desperation,
and uncertainty.
If it is objected that his
presence at the removal of the Duke of York is evidence of his complicity in
Richard's usurpation, one might note that he probably accompanied the mob to
Westminster in his official capacity as the administrator of Edward IV's will,
in which, if Mancini is to be believed it was specified that the duke of
Gloucester should govern ... and because by law the government ought to devolve
on him [6]. Perhaps the Bishop's presence at Westminster on 16 June also helps
to explain the accuracy of the chronicle's account of the events: they could
have been described by Russell or an eyewitness in his entourage.
Professor Thomson notes that
Russell, who was confirmed as chancellor on the day of the new king's accession
"clearly acquiesced" in the manoeuvres before Richard's usurpation.
What the Cely letter gives is the impression that even on the 24th June, some
people felt he was not altogether happy about it. Professor Thomson is, of
course, correct to state that "there is certainly no clear evidence that
... his loyalty was suspect". There may be, however, some circumstantial
evidence that his loyalty was ultimately considered questionable by Richard: at
two crisis points in Richard III's reign, during Buckingham's rebellion and
before Buckingham's defeat and death in 1485, Russell, claiming illness,
surrendered the great seal. Perhaps the most interesting point here, is that it
was restored to him in November 1483.
In Stallworth's letter too [7], it
is said that Russell is busy, with myche besynes and more then he is content
with all, yf any other ways wold be tayn. This last phrase: yf any other ways
wold be tayn, in the context of the
previous sentence, about the XX thousand of my lord protectour, who would come
ostensibly to kepe the peas clearly means that the Bishop of Lincoln did not
want the troops to do anything but to keep the peace; he feared that they would
be used to smooth the process of usurpation. Given the Crowland passage's
emphasis on the number of armed men, and the use which the protector made of
them, it does not seem unlikely that there may have been a Russell connection
with the Crowland author.
If, as has been postulated,
Russell was either the author (unlikely) or was associated with the author of
the Crowland chronicle, then the Cely appraisal of events, the Stallworth letter
to Stonor and the Chronicle's account of the usurpation may have a source in
common, and this would certainly help to explain the anti-Ricardian slant which
characterises much of Crowland's analysis, and why Richard might demur from
fully trusting Russell in times of obvious military crisis. At any rate, if, as
Mancini says, Russell replaced Rotherham because Richard wanted a chancellor who
would be less likely to be faithful to Edward's heirs come what might [8] the
combined evidence of Crowland, and the Cely paper suggests that Richard may well
have felt that he had not been altogether successful.
A further indication that Crowland
may well have been written by an associate of the bishop of Lincoln is that
there are numerous instances in which Edward's will is referred to. In the
Crowland account, to give only one example, Lord Hastings dies even whilst
asserting that nothing had so far been done except to transfer the government of
the kingdom from two blood relatives of the queen to two nobles of the blood
royal. That is, he dies for asserting the letter of the law as it was perhaps
contained in Edward's will. In the most recent lengthy account of politics in
England, it has been written:
"The author of the Croyland
Continuation, the other main narrative source for [Richard III's] reign, who was
very close to the centre of affairs, implies that Edward's will, whatever it
was, was carried out" [9]. As a man responsible for carrying out the will,
the chancellor, if he were giving an account of the events of the usurpation
would certainly incorporate details of the will of the late king.
There is nothing in this passage
of the chronicle which definitely associates the bishop of Lincoln with Crowland.
But there are, I think, some indications that he was affiliated with its author,
and there are certainly no pieces of evidence which suggest that such a
connection would be impossible. All that can be said is that, if the Crowland
passage was written by an associate of the chancellor, then it helps to explain
both its bias and its accuracy. Admittedly, I have nothing new to add about the
probable circumstances of its writing, although, the point is worth stressing,
that if it was written whilst Russell was at Crowland, obviously he would have
been too busy to write, although an associate may have had time on his hands.

Notes to Part One
[1] Alison Hanham: Richard III, Lord Hastings
and the Hisorians, English Historical Review [subs. cit. EHR], vol. 87
(1972), pp. 233 - 248
[2] Christine Carpenter (ed.) Kingsford's Stonor Letters
and Papers 1290 - 1483 [subs. cit. Stonor], (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1996) pp. 416-7
[3] EHR 1974, p.836
[4] EHR 1976, p.819
[5] EHR 1974, p.844
[6] York Civic Records, vol. 1 [subs. cit. YCR],
Angelo Raine (ed.) (Yorkshire Archaeological Society, Record Series,
xcviii, 1938) p.73
[7] Robert Fabyan: New Chronicles of England and France
[subs. cit. Fabyan], ed. H. Ellis (London, 1858) p.669
[8] The Great Chronicle of London [subs. cit. Great
Chronicle], A.H. Thomas and I.D. Thornley (eds.) (London, 1938) p.230, says that
there were 500 Common Londoners dressed in violet, but it does not say how many
troops Richard brought with him, although the clear impression is that there
were a lot more than five hundred of the king's and Gloucester's men, all
dressed in black.
[9] Dominic Mancini, The Usurpation of Richard III [subs.
cit. Mancini] C.A.J. Armstrong (ed.) (Alan Sutton, Gloucester, 1989) p.79
[10] Great Chronicle p.230
[11] Thomas More: History of King Richrd the Third and
Selections from the English and Latin Poems [subs. cit. More] R.S. Sylvester
(ed.) (Yale University Press, Newhaven and London, 1976) p.25
[12] Great Chronicle p.230
[13] Mancini, p.75
[14] Mancini p.75 and p.79
[15] Crowland Chronicle [subs. cit. Crowland],
Pronay and Cox (eds.), p.157
[16] See note [2]
[17] W.H. Dunham, Lord Hastings' Indentured Retainers,
1461-1483 (USA, Archon Books, 1970), p.26. For the breakdown of these retainers'
ranks, see p.28. It is unclear, however, how many of these retainers were still
active in 1483. The point is, that Hastings had the potential to call large
numbers of loyal men to arms.
[18] Crowland p.157
[19] Mancini p.71
[20] Mancini, p.91
[21] J.R. Lander, Government and Community, England
1450-1509, p.315
[22] See note [2]
[23] Great Chronicle, p.233
[24] Mancini, p.91
[25] EHR 1972, pp. 245-6
[26] More p. 45-6
[27] More p.46
[28] More p.47
[29] Polydore Vergil, Three Books of Polydore Vergil's
English History [subs. cit. Vergil], H. Ellis (ed.) (Camden Society, London,
1844), p.182
[30] The Cely Letters 1472-1488 [subs. cit. Cely], Alison
Hanham (ed.), (Oxford Univesity Press, Early English Text Society, vol. 273,
1975) pp. 184-5.
Notes to Part Two
[1] Crowland
p.159
[2] Stonor, pp. 415-6
[3] The date when the duchess of Gloucester arrived in
London, reported in the letter.
[4] Although Mancini gets the sequence of events wrong,
placing the removal of the duke of York before the execution of Hastings, his
actual report of the events at Westminster seems broadly accurate, once the
obvious problems which his confused chronology present are untangled.
[5] The Crowland account gets the details correct: it's
assertion that the protector's company came by boat is probably borne out by an
unusual entry in the Howard household books [6], which notes payments made for
the hire of a large number of boats, and specifies that they were for transport
to Westminster.
[6] Household Books of John, duke of Norfolk and Thomas,
earl of Surrey, 1481-90, J.P. Collier (ed.) (Roxburghe Club, London, 1844),
p.402
[7] Mancini, p.89
[8] Mancini, p.97
[9] Mancini, p.89
[10] Vergil p.177
[11] More p.26
[12] The only account which does not suggest that the
protector announced a pretext for his removal of the duke from Westminster is
that in the Great Chronicle. Of course, since one might not expect that the
writer of the Chronicle should have known what pretext was offered in council
for breaching sanctuary, this does not mean that no pretext was given.
[13] Great Chronicle, pp. 230-1
[14] Mancini, p.89
[15] cogentes
is the Latin.
[16] Whereas the Great Chronicle says that the protector
himself persuaded the queen to release the prince, none of the other sources say
that this was so. Indeed, the letter of Stallworth to Stonor of 21 June, and
More [17] says that the protector received the prince at the star chamber door
with many lovynge wordys. It therefore seems likely that the Crowland account's
statement to the effect that the dukes compelled the cardinal to enter the
sanctuary with many others is accurate, but probably means that the protector
himself did not go into Westminster.
[17] More, p.42
[18] Vergil, p.178
[19] Mancini, p.89
[20] Mancini, p.77
[21] Vergil, p.173
[22] Crowland, p.155
[23] More, p.42
[24] Mancini, p.95
[25] Mancini, p.91
[26] Cely, pp. 184-5. The note of events written by George
Cely has traditionally been assumed to be undated and unsigned. The four words
at the end of the letter: de movnsewr sent jonys have been understood variously
as evidence of the employment of a code, an attempt to disguise someone else's
name, and a cryptic, but unfathomable phrase. However, it seems plain that de
movnsewr means from George Cely, and Sent Jonys, means on St John's day. This
was 24 June, the Nativity of St. John the Baptist, and a saint's day Cely would
have known, as it was commonly used for reference between creditor and debtor,
when rents or other payments were due.
The letter is evidently an
important message from Cely to someone who knew him as monsieur (possibly a
servant of some description), and is perhaps a follow up note after an earlier
one which probably included details of the infiltration of London by Gloucester
and Buckingham's men. It was apparently scribbled in haste, to let its
recipients know the state of affairs in the political world. The language of the
notes on the dorse leave room for speculation about the whereabouts of Cely at
this time. It is possible that he may have been abroad at Calais or thereabouts.
This would also explain the date of the letter: he may have had his information
from someone who was in London on the 13th, and who he met on the 24th at
Calais.
[27] Mancini, p.95
Notes to Part Three
[1] An unpublished entry in the City of London Journal,
dated 17 June, states that the city rescinded the gift it had made for the
king's coronation, as this had already been postponed until 9 November.
[2] YCR, p.75. One writ of supersedeas reached York on 21
June.
[3] Mancini, p.95
[4] Crowland does say that:
It was put forward, by means of a supplication in a certain
parchment roll
but it does not say where the scene took place, that it was
the duke of Buckingham who petitioned, that he was accompanied by lords, knights
and gentlemen, as well as the mayor, aldermen and chief commoners of the city.
[5] Parliament Rolls Vol. 6, pp. 240-242, January 1484
[6] Unlike Crowland, it includes the details that Edward
IV's marriage was clandestine, no bans were published, it took place in a
profane place, and not openly in the face of the church, without the assent of
the lords of the land, and contrary to the laudable custom of the church in
England. It says that the marriage was made by the witchcraft of Elizabeth and
her mother Jacquetta - a common allegation in political intrigue, but not one
reported by Crowland.
[7] Great Chronicle, pp. 231-2; Fabyan, p.669; More, pp.
67-9; Chronicles of London [subs. cit. London], ed. C.L. Kingsford (Oxford,
1905) p190; Vergil, pp. 183-4.
Vergil says:
ther ys a common report that king Edwards chyldren wer
caulyd basterdes, and not king Edward, which is voyd of all truthe; for Cecyly
king Edwards mother ... being falsely accusyd of adultery, complayned afterward.
[p.184]
[8] Great Chronicle, p.232; Fabyan, p.669; More, pp. 70-9;
Vergil, pp. 185-6
[9] Harley 433, Vol. 2, p.2
[10] More, p.84
Notes to the Conclusion
[1] Crowland, p.183
Notes to the Appendix
[1] Cely, pp. 184-5
[2] ibid. p. 286
[3] Here I rely on the philological expertise of Dr Jeremy
Smith, of the English language department in Glasgow university. cf Middle
English Dictionary, 1966, T.L. Roach (ed.) pp. 1026-7.
[4] Forthcoming New Dictionary of National Biography entry
for John Russell.
[5] He was presiding over the part of the council that met
at Westminster.
[6] Mancini, p. 71
[7] Stonor, pp. 416-7
[8] Mancini, p.85
[9] Christine Carpenter: The Wars of the Roses - Politics
and the Constitution in England c. 1437 - 1509, (Cambridge U.P., 1997) p. 206.
Bibliography
Primary Sources:
1. The Crowland Chronicle Continuations: 1459-86; N. Pronay and J. Cox (eds.)
2. British Library Harleian manuscript 433; Rosemary Horrox and P.W. Hammond (eds.)
3.Calendar of Patent Rolls preserved in the PRO: Edward IV, Edward V,Richard III 1476-85.
4. Cely Letters 1472-88; Alison Hanham (ed.)
5. Chronicles of London; C.L. Kingsford (ed.)
6. Philippe de Comines: Mémoires; J. Calmette and G. Durville (eds.)
7. Robert Fabyan: New Chronicles of England and France; H. Ellis (ed.)
8. Great Chronicle of London; A.H. Thomas and I.D. Thornley (eds.)
9. Household Books of John, duke of Norfolk and Thomas, earl of Surrey, 1481-90; J.P. Collier (ed.)
10. Dominic Mancini: Usurpation of Richard III; C.A.J. Armstrong (ed.)
11. St. Thomas More: The History of King Richard III and Selections from the English and Latin Poems; R.S. Sylvester (ed.)
12. Stonor Letters and Papers; Christine Carpenter (ed.)
13. Polydore Vergil: Three Books of Polydore Vergil's English History; H. Ellis (ed.)
14. York Civic Records vol.1; A. Raine (ed.)
Books and Articles:
1. Attreed, Lorraine, "Hanham Redivivus" Ricardian, vol. 5, no. 65 (1979)
2. Coleman, C.H.D., "The Execution of Hastings, a Neglected Source" Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research [subs. cit. BIHR], vol. 53 (1980), pp. 244-7
3. Hanham, Alison, "Hastings Redivivus", EHR, vol. 90 (1975), pp. 821-7
4. Hanham, Alison, "Richard III, Lord Hastings and the Historians" English Historical Review [subs. cit. EHR], vol. 87
5. Hanham, Alison, Richard III and His Early Historians
6. Sutton, Anne and Hammond, P.W., "The problems of dating and the dangers of redating: the Acts of Court of the Mercers Co. of London 1453-1527" Journal of the Society of Archivists, vol. 6 (1978), pp. 87-91.
7. Thomson, J.A.F., "Richard III and Lord Hastings: A Problematical Case Reviewed" BIHR vol. 48 (1975), pp. 22-30
8. Wolffe, B.P., "When and why did Hastings lose his head?" EHR, vol. 89 (1974), pp. 835-44
9. Wolffe, B.P., "Hastings Reinterred" EHR, vol. 91 (1976), pp. 813-24

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