Chapter 2 - The Time of the Great Armies: Mercenaries 1418-1429

The summer of 1418 found both parties in the Burgundian-Armagnac confrontation looking for foreign aid and reinforcement. Perhaps predictably the first potential source of this aid to be looked to was that traditional ally of France, Scotland. Both Armagnac and Burgundian embassies crossed the seas in 1418 (1) and, while the Armagnac one was to be crowned with success, this did not mean that contacts between the Regent Albany, uncle of the captive James I, who was at that point still in English hands, and Burgundy were automatically broken off. Indeed it was by no means a foregone conclusion that Scotland would support the claims of the Dauphin to be the true head of the French kingdom; one should not forget that until the disastrous assassination of Duke John at Montereau in the late summer of 1419 there was no Burgundian alliance with England to simplify the issue and the royal family itself was totally split on the question. It is even possible that the Scots made some effort to encourage the French factions to patch up their differences in the face of English attack; the truce negotiated in the summer of 1419 may have had as one aim the easing of Scottish military intervention.

The Armagnac embassy, however, did yield immediate results. Not much is known about it or its composition beyond the presence of the governor of La Rochelle, the Sieur de Plusquallec on it (2) or about the arguments and inducements used to persuade the Regent and the Scottish Estates to agree to the requested aid. Perhaps they were fairly similar to those used by the parallel embassy which went to Castile on a similar errand in September 1419(3). Here the French ambassadors asked for an army to be sent against the English, ancient enemies of France and Castile as soon as possible "for the great honour of the King of Castile" under a commander of the highest rank. The troops thus requested would be paid for six months. The ambassadors were to go on to give a full account of the needs of France and remind the Castilians of past French aid to Castile. One could imagine a fairly similar line being used in Scotland; apparently the appeals to honour and gratitude were more appreciated in Scotland since, while the Scots responded, Castile remained deaf to entreaty. Before we consider the forces voted by the Estates, however, it is worth looking at what may well have been a parallel activity of the ambassadors. This was the recruitment of companies which were prepared to set out for France straight away to bolster the Dauphin's forces in the lands which were coming to be known as the Kingdom of Bourges. Certainly Scottish forces begin to appear in quite substantial numbers in this period, and it seems logical to assume that the ambassadors in Scotland were largely responsible.

In this summer of 1418, the Dauphin was fully occupied consolidating his hold on a kingdom riddled with dissension and doubtful loyalties. It is doubtful if Charles, as Dauphin or king was ever to draw fully on the potential military resources of the areas which remained nominally loyal to him in the dark days of the 1420's, and at this period his hold over much of the country was highly uncertain. Foreign troops were badly needed to fill the gaps and recruitment from all quarters proceeded rapidly. Traditional companies of Italian crossbowmen were still recruited (Guillaume Rain and Luquin Brisol both from Piedmont with a combined force of some 146 men were retained at Villeneuf-les-Avignon on the 11^th November 1418 (4))but more and more they yield place to the Scots in increasing numbers. Michel de Normanville, Captain of a hundred Scottish archers was retained at Loches on 22nd November and elements of his company to the number of 29 moved on to take part in the siege of Burgundian-held Tours in December (5). One Jehan Stewart, also captain of a hundred archers was retained from the 7th October at Niort, which suggests that he had arrived at La Rochelle or another port loyal to the Dauphin in that area shortly before. (6). Other Scottish troops were sent to reinforce garrisons. On 3rd November Loys d'Escrouilles, commander of the Scots in the garrison of Melun, issued a receipt for no less than 102 tuns of wine from the Sieur de Milly out of a total of 200 in his possession (7). These were to be distributed, it would seem, amongst the troops under his command.

The following year, well before the much-awaited Scottish army reached France, this process continued. Their numbers were sufficiently noticeable for Jean Juvenal des Ursins to note the arrival and activities of two Scottish knights, Thomas Quelsatry and Guillaume du Glas (8) at this time. They are no doubt to be identified with Guillaume Douglas and his chief lieutenant Thomas Kilpatrick who appear at the head of 150 men at arms and 300 archers on 27th May at Mehun-sur-Yevre (9). A full list of subordinate commanders is given, but the totals of troops fall short by about a third of the stated total company strength; perhaps several of the "chambres" or subordinate sub-divisions of these companies were posted elsewhere and missed review at that point. They reappear at Puiset-en-Beauce in August 1419 after a summer of heavy fighting at the western end of the line of English advance in Lower Normandy and Mainrcentring on the Sarthe round Fresnay-le-Vicomte which Jean Juvenal recorded (10). This may form the basis of Francisque–Michel's typically garbled account of the flight and loss of banner of a Douglas of Drumlanrig at Fresnay (11). Certainly we find Douglas and his men passing review at Montereau fault Yonne on 4th September 1419; no doubt they formed part of the forces covering the Dauphinist side of the fatal bridge before, during and after the meeting (12). Several other Scottish companies enter the Dauphinist forces during 1419; Guillaume Bel, captain of 30 men at arms and 80 archers entered service at Sancerre on 22nd February and moved to Gien with 13 of his Esquires (men at arms) in March, while Thomas du Seton with 38 men at arms and 120 archers and another Guillaume Douglas (there were two men of that name in France; they lie buried together in Orleans Cathedral) with 100 and 200 respectively recently come from Scotland appear in the accounts of Mace Heron, one of the Tresoriers des Guerres for the period 18th August 1418 - 20th October 1419 (13). Seton is presumably to be identified with the Thomas Deston, captain of slightly smaller forces in May and June of the year (14). In May, too, Jehan of Liborne (perhaps Lorne) was paid for the services of his company of 18 men at arms and 56 archers fighting in Normandy, Maine and Perche under the Vicomte de Narbonne (15); an interesting example of Scottish forces being mixed with French ones in action (and indeed with other foreigners, since at the end of the same month Emilio de Plaisence (Piacenza) and his 19 men at arms are paid for their service in the same company)(16). There is even an ancestor to the later Scots bodyguard of the king in the form of the company of James Colbourne and his 38 mounted archers in the Dauphin's own company in September (17). Perhaps he can be identified with one Jehan Kocbourg (Cockburn?) reviewed at Bourges in October (18).

By October, however, the situation was to alter drastically. The days of piecemeal reinforcement by the almost random arrival of individual Scottish companies to be plunged into the fighting in Lower Normandy and the west were to be superseded by intervention on a very different scale. The Armagnac embassy in Scotland, which we left in the summer of 1418 organising the passage of the companies we have been discussing, were looking for something much grander. This they obtained from the Scottish Estates, which assented to the sending of a force of some 6,000 men under the. Earl of Buchan, Chamberlain of Scotland and son of the Regent by his second marriage (19) and the Earl of Wigtown eldest son of the Earl of Douglas and Buchan's brother-in-law. How many Scots actually went to France is very hard to say. The Dauphin claimed that 6,000 men had actually gone (20) but this seems an improbably high figure given the resources of Scotland (a subject to which I shall return later) and the probability of exaggeration in morale-boosting letters. Whatever the numbers, such a substantial force posed transport problems which could only be solved by Castilian help. Negotiations for this began on 22nd March 1419 and were successfully completed on 28th June; Castile was to provide a fleet of forty ships, each of at least 150 tons and manned by 4,000 sailors and crossbowmen and 200 men at arms to repel English attempts at interception on the way to Scotland. Wages of 119,000 francs d'or were paid in advance. The fleet was to assemble off Belle Isle and wait there ten days before sailing on to Scotland (21). Amazingly, Daumet believed that the fleet never sailed; in the light of events an incredible blunder. Preparations on this scale were impossible to conceal and by August the government of John, Duke of Bedford in England was becoming seriously concerned. On the 12th the Earls of Devon and Cornwall were instructed to set out to intercept with their own fleet of twelve ships and "balingers" (smaller, barge-like vessels). When it became obvious that these forces were likely to be inadequate, one John Hunt was ordered to requisition ships all over the south-western ports if necessary (22). By 5th September, with the Spanish fleet off Belle Isle, Henry V, campaigning in France, was concerned about the possibility of a combined Franco-Castilian attack on Bayonne and other parts of English Gascony (23). In fact the fleet went north as planned, evading interception and loading its cargo of troops in September (One of the Scottish commanders, John Stewart of Darnley, was still in Scotland on the 21st of the month)(24). The return voyage was less peaceful; off La Rochelle, the English did manage to make an interception but were defeated and the fleet came safely to harbour late in October (25). The Spanish ships remained in the area for some time; on 19th November the town council of St. Jean d'Angely found itself having to entertain a Spanish knight come to seek provisions for the fleet. These were not necessarily always forthcoming, since two more Spaniards came back later with a letter from the admiral complaining that supplies had not been delivered. There were other comings and goings between the town and the fleet; the admiral's minstrel and his companion had also to be entertained (26). News of the victory reached far; in Lyons on the 1st January 1420 the Dauphin himself ordered payment to "Sauce de Saudry" a Spanish squire for his services in the defeat of the English and the damage done to his ship (27). It is possible that some of the troops who served on the fleet may have been tempted into more permanent service; certainly, despite the lack of formal Castilian aid, Spanish troops can be found in France at this time. The inevitable crossbowmen appear in large numbers in 1418 with four companies some 1260 strong passing review at Nanteuil on 3rd September and some passing from there to take part in the siege of Tours (28). Alongside them one finds Rodrigo de Alarice and 17 men at arms in the company of the Count of Vertus (29) and through the summer of 1419 a steady drift of smallish Spanish companies parallel to that of the Scots (though much less numerous) can be observed. Jehan d'Avila, knight batchelor, and four men at arms entered service on 13th November at Mehun-sur-Yevre (30). Some Italians can also be found in addition to the one alluded to above fighting in Normandy; Bartelmy le Lombart and his 18 men at arms passed review at St. Brisson on 24th February 1419 (31) and Luqin Ris, already a veteran of French warfare, with 19 men at arms was near Le Mons on 24th October 1418 (32) after leaving his crossbowmen in Melun.

It was, however, the hour of the Scots. The Dauphin informed his supporters of their arrival with joy and issued their leaders with gifts. The stable accounts illustrate this; on 31st November three coursers were bought and one given later to the Earl of Wigtown. Thomas Seton received a similar present shortly afterwards (33). By no means all the French nobles were totally convinced of the real military utility of the Scots and the Scottish chroniclers record some sneers behind their backs (34). The Dauphin, who needed them too badly to be able to afford to heed this criticism ignored it, and indeed before the end of the year was preparing the ground for further recruitment in Scotland. As early as 27th December he was considering sending Buchan and Wigtown back to recruit further and two days later, another letter was sent to the Earl of Mar who had expressed an interest in joining the expedition to encourage him to come himself and recruit as many other lords as he could for the same purpose (35).

The Scottish forces now available first had to be deployed, however. The army was split up; one portion went into the garrisons facing the Anglo-Burgundians in the Seine valley upstream of Paris and in Maine and Anjou in the west (36) while another, perhaps larger, set off with the Dauphin on a tour of Languedoc in early spring 1420 aimed at neutralising the last flickers of Burgundian support in the south and assuring the loyalty of the towns and nobility of the region (37). Traces of these men can be found in the surviving re–cords; Marc Balize with his trumpeter, 17 men at arms and 78 archers at Carcassonne on the 12th March (38) and Andro Banantin with a company which fluctuates between 15 and 25 archers moving from Le Puy on 16th May to Toulouse on 16th June to finish at Chateauneuf-sur-Loire on 25th July (39). He is referred to at times as forming part of the Dauphin's bodyguard (40), and he remained in this function at least until September, serving alongside other foreign forces in this unit. Christin Chambre, a man with a long career before him received the substantial sum of 1066 livres 4 sols tournois for the services of his company in the same role for April 1420 (41) and Jehan Gonsalle was paid for his company of 24 mounted crossbowmen in February and March (42).

On the whole, however, the Scottish forces who formed the bulk of the foreign troops in France remained inactive in 1420.  The fact that their commanders were absent for much of the campaigning season in search of reinforcements may have contributed to this. Buchan and Wigtown, in obedience to the orders of December, went home some time in 1420. The dating is rather uncertain; Buchan was probably still in France at the end of May when he was given a horse out of a group purchased on the 27th of the month (43). By the 28th July he was back in Scotland where he presented his accounts as chamberlain in person rather than by deputy (44), only to be back in France by the end of August when he, with Wigtown and Darnley were again given horses, this time from a batch purchased on 12th August (45). How many men this brief visit produced and the exact date of their arrival is uncertain; Beaucourt places the number at 4-5,000 and makes them arrive in 1421 (46) but there is very little documentary evidence to back this up. Beyond noting that the embassy did take place, and accepting that some reinforcements may have followed from it, however, there is very little that one can say with certainty about it. Even before this reinforcement, however, some of the Scottish forces were involved in action; those in the garrisons of the river towns upstream of Paris. Henry V with his new Burgundian allies laid siege to Melun which had quantities of Scots in its garrison. That Henry was aware of the Scottish role in the French armies opposing him is apparent from his production of the rather sad figure of the captive King of Scots at Melun in an attempt to persuade the Scots to surrender (47). The stratagem was a failure; the Scots fought on and when the town surrendered on the 17th of September, the surrender treaty specifically handed English deserters and Scots over to the mercy of the English king (48) (a clause to be repeated at all later surrenders even when it is less certain that any such were present) (49). Henry's reaction was simple and brutal; he hanged twenty Scots out of hand as traitors to King James (50). There are other signs that the English king was becoming concerned about the reinforcement of the French army by Scots; the flurry of safe conducts granted to Scottish nobles wishing to see their king from this time on testifies to a hope that James could influence them against taking French service (51) and even perhaps divert some to the English side. Indeed, on 30th May 1421 the Earl of Douglas (Wigtown's father) was to swear on the gospels to serve Henry from the following Easter with 200 men at arms and the same number of archers (52), and it is possible to argue that the negotiations for James' ransom were only begun seriously at this time in the same hope of stemming the flow of Scottish aid to France. The surprising thing is, perhaps, that such a supposedly brilliant strategist as Henry V never attempted to cut off the supply in the most concrete way by attempting to take La Rochelle, by then the only port safely in French hands instead of resorting to such doubtfully effective diplomatic means. The failure of his efforts to open an effective front in the south-west no doubt militated against such a move, but it is also likely that his forces were at full stretch in the Seine valley already; hardly a good augury for the future strength of English rule in France.

Certainly, these diplomatic moves in London did not affect the Scottish troops in France. The loyalty of their commanders had been fortified by a generous distribution of lands by the Dauphin; Chatillon-sur-Indre to Buchan, Langeais to Seton (who appears thus titled in an undated quittance of the period)(53), Dun le Roi to Wigtown and Concressault to Darnley (54). The army itself had been reorganised too, it seems, with the birth of what the French were to refer to as the "Army of Scotland". By August 1420, Darnley is referred to in the Stable accounts as Constable of Scot–land (55) which means constable of the Scottish army in France. Other signs of this improved internal organisation are evident as well. On 12th September, the two William Douglases and Thomas "Corpatrick", the latter now called Marshal of the Army of Scotland appear in the accounts being paid for their services (56). This also illustrates the integration of the men who crossed earlier into the main Scottish army. The administrative consequences of this reorganisation were considerable, and, for the historian trying to trace the activities of the army, very annoying since the Army of Scotland, which presumably had its own administration was kept almost totally separate from the rest of the French military administration. While not all Scots belonged to the Army of Scotland, and the central administration was in a state of some chaos at this point anyway (57), the effective separation of the Scots from the rest of the army means that all records have vanished long ago. The records of some of Buchan's recruiting ventures, which survived until the 18th century would have cast some light on the actual organisation of the Scottish army, but they, like so much of the archival material of this period went up in flames at the Revolution(58) Given this detached position, it was perhaps predictable that the Scottish commanders were given privileges with regard to payment of their troops. In November 1422, John Stewart of Darnley as Constable in command of all Scottish forces was paid various monies for his men "non obstant que le nombre des gens d'armes et de trait...ne soit declaree es dittes lettres" and indeed in early 1423 when he was ordered to take his men to the Nivernais and Auxerrois against the Burgundians, in order to be sure that his men would march he was paid 30,000 livres tournois in advance for two months wages "sans ce que de lui ne des Ecossois il feust tenu de faire... aucunes montres ni revues". (59) This obviously left much scope for embezzlement on the part of the commanders; it also means a desperate shortage of documentary evidence about the strength and movements of the Scottish forces in France for most of their life as an independent unit.

            For 1421, however, one has little trouble in following their progress from the chronicles, for this was to be the year of their greatest victory. Henry V had left France early in the new year, leaving his brother, the Duke of Clarence to campaign in the west, where the Army of Scotland was operating along with French forces under the Sieur de Lafayette. In March the armies faced each other near Bauge. With Easter coming on, a truce was apparently arranged until this holiest weekend was past (60), though the English had issued a formal challenge to battle (61). Clarence, however, breaking the truce, decided to surprise the allied army (that, at least is what the Scottish chroniclers claim) on the Saturday before Easter and advanced with such rapidity to accomplish this that he left his archers behind (62) and caught the unsuspecting Scots playing ball on the banks of a stream behind which their main army lay (63). A hastily assembled group of some hundred Scots archers held the only bridge under the command of Sir Hugh Kennedy and Robert Stewart of Railston against the full weight of the English assault until the main Franco-Scottish army had time to organise. When Clarence and his men broke through, it was only to find themselves faced with even harder fighting against the dismounted allied army. The English slowly crumpled under mounting pressure and the death of the Duke of Clarence, which the Scottish chroniclers try to make the result of a single combat with Buchan, though in a rather confused form, which perhaps suggests the real confusion of the duke's death, with several Scots (and others - Chastellain has him killed by a Frenchman) hacking at him before he died, turned defeat into disaster. The defeated English had to pretend to be French to cross the Sarthe safely (64). It was a disaster for the English - a windfall for the Scots. The Earl of Somerset was taken by Laurence Vernon, the Earl of Huntingdon by Sir John Sibbald and other noble captives were made. The Scottish commanders, writing to the Dauphin on the evening after the battle, sent Clarence's banner with their dispatch and his coronet passed from hand to hand in the Scottish army to settle debts (65). English losses were heavy (Cousinot's estimate of 1050 dead and 600 captured seems reasonable)(66) and the news of French victory spread widely; in Italy Antonio Morosini received garbled reports which claimed that the English had lost 6,000 men (67).

For the Dauphin, it was a vindication of his recruitment of the Scots. If the Scottish chronicles are to be believed, the French tried to steal the glory of victory from the Scots and were only found out when it became clear that the latter had the majority of the prisoners; Charles is reputed to have scolded his nobles for having described the Scots as "Mangeurs de moutons et sacs de vin" in the past. Certainly the profits flowed to the Scottish leaders.  Vernon sold the Earl of Somerset to the Dauphin for 40,000 ecus and, in addition to receiving the lordship of Montreuil-Bonin in Poitou, was still being paid on money owed thirty years later (69).  In more immediate terms, he and Sibbald were treated to a meal by the Dauphin (70). Buchan too, reaped his rewards, being made Constable, the highest military officer in France, at some time in the year (clothing for the ceremony was ordered in May)(71). Victory even called the Dauphin forth to take the field in person.  With the army's staff work improved by the posting of the distinguished astrologer Germain de Tibouville to Buchan's military household (72), the combined forces struck into Perche, taking Montmirail on the way (73). According to Chastellain, the army, six thousand strong attacked Alencon. The garrison, hard pressed, called for relief from the Earl of Salisbury, the senior English commander in France at that moment. He raised an army only by dint of calling out all the garrison troops in Normandy and even then when the armies actually faced each other he did not feel strong enough to offer battle and withdrew northwards losing some 300 men from his rearguard as it was harassed by the advancing Franco-Scottish army; hardly an encouraging sign for the English if one defeat left them too weak to risk battle (74). The process of mopping up now isolated towns continued. Gaillardon was stormed with great slaughter as the advance towards Chartres continued; in this town, while English prisoners were spared for ransom, Burgundian supporters were murdered (75). The anonymous Bourgeois of Paris complains of Scots raiding round the city in this period (76). In this campaign too, one finds a receipt issued by Wigtown, now elevated to Count of Longueville as his reward for victory, for a linen banner and a four wheeled cart from the master of the artillery (perhaps to carry his share of the plunder?)(77). These days of easy campaigning were to end abruptly before Chartres was reached with the return of Henry from England with fresh troops. He pushed down as far as Chartres but the allied armies evaded battle and Henry settled down to recapture positions lost in the course of the disastrous summer. By 15th August he in his turn was besieging Dreux and the feudal landholders of the Dauphine as well as the town militias were called out to relieve the place. They were ordered to assemble at Blois, with the Lords of Scotland and other captains assembling at Vendome(78). There is no record as to whether any such expedition took place, though the Scottish army was apparently engaged on successful campaigning around Beaugency in September which was reported by royal letters to the Consuls of Lyons (79). By the winter of 1421, as the Scots settled into winter quarters (Darnley's brother with 17 men at arms at Rochefoucault, for instance (80)) the Dauphin was yet again casting around for further foreign reinforcement.

            Certainly, more troops had been acquired during the course of 1420-1.  In autumn 1420, the Spanish in the Burgundian army had deserted to the Dauphin en bloc, including Villandrando. In his case the transfer of allegiance could be more nominal than real; in February 1421 he was to help his old commander L'Isle-Adam to escape from the Vicomte de Narbonne in the Gatinais (81). This did his career with the Dauphin no apparent harm since on 2nd April he and his 19 men-at-arms were paid 320 1t as part of Amaury de Severac's company (82). Other Spaniards flit through the fragmentary records; Diego de Sales with 19 men at arms in Jehan de Torcy's company at Beaugency on 12th September 1420 and Pierre de Seville with 14 in the same place on 10th October of the same year (83).

In the winter of 1421, however, the Dauphin was looking over the Alps for more substantial aid than these Burgundian deserters could give. He wanted Italian troops from his Visconti ally in Milan to break the stalemate which was in some danger of developing with neither side strong enough to win outright victory. Already in 1421 a contingent under "Le Borgne Caqueran" (his real name is hopelessly lost in the mists of French mispronounciation) had come into his service and been used against the Burgundians threatening the communications with Lyon and the south-east; on 20th June he had taken La Charite sur Loire from the independent commander in the Burgundian pay Perrinet Gressart, and followed this by the capture of Cosne on 20th August. These successes brought him due rewards; he was made captain of Queyras and Lord of St. Georges 1'Esperanche in the Dauphine (84). Now he was to be reinforced; if 1419-21 had been. the time of the Scots, 1422 was to be the year of the "Lombards" (so-called, it would appear, more from their recruiting ground than necessarily their area of origin within Italy). On 26th November the Dauphin was to be found pawning or selling crown lands to raise the 6,000 ecus needed to pay for infantry (targons) and heavily armoured cavalry from Lombardy. These were to be recruited by Bertrand de St. Aust and Philippe de Grimault (perhaps a Grimaldi in French disguise) (85). On March 31st the entire revenues of the Dauphine were devoted entirely to the war effort, with more lands to be placed on sale or otherwise used to raise the money necessary to pay the army, both native and foreign (Scottish and Lombard contingents) (86). In 1422 the promised Lombards had duly come; while Theaulde de Valpergue, another man with a long French career before him, brought his 250 men at arms over the Alps, another French embassy of Jean Cateran and Antoine Dosuen, sent over the Alps in their turn to look for men in Lombardy succeeded in hiring a number of captains with an indeterminate number of lances for one year. These lances were arranged according to Italian custom with three men in them (one man at arms, one "valet", less armoured who could be used as a light cavalryman and a page) and were to be paid 461 ecus per lance for the year (87). Imbert de Groslee, Bailli de Macon and Senechal of Lyon was given pay for his 200 crossbowmen and targons defending Lyonswhile Jean Van of Lombardy received money for his 130 "enfans a pied" in the garrison of La Charite (88). The general impression is one of great bustle in the south-east and Dauphine; by 5th June the Consuls of Lyons, men with a healthy fear of all troops in passage were in negotiation with Valpergue over allowing his men through the town, stating that they would only let them through in groups of fifty at a time, each following a prearranged route. The Seneschal, de Groslee, intervened on the 8th to settle matters and the Lombards duly passed through the town (89).

In the end these much-heralded reinforcements did comparatively little of note (or at least enough note to reach chroniclers' ears). 1422 was a fairly quiet year in military terms. Henry V remained in the Seine valley concentrating on the reduction of remaining Dauphinist strongholds south of Paris. The Scottish army remained in the west where Buchan was to take Avranches (90), while the Lombards seem to have remained in the east opposing the comparatively quiescent Burgundians. Some at least, however, did reach Bourges where they were added to the immediate military household of Charles (91) who, with the death of his mad father had now become Charles VII. The more important death, however, had come earlier; that of the old man's newly designated heir, Henry V of England. The Scottish chroniclers record his final days with some relish; struck down with dysentry (or St. Fiacres's disease) after his troops had pillaged a monastery dedicated to the saint, who was also known as St. Fergus and was the son of a Scottish king, he expired raving about Scots "That is an accursed nation. Wherever I go I find them under my nose. No wonder they are savage and revenge–ful in life when they wreak such cruel vengeance after death"(92).

Despite this morale-boosting event, and the consequent political reorganisation on the English side to cope with a king who was a child under a year old with John, Duke of Bedford taking over as Regent in France, the beginning of 1423 brought disturbing weaknesses in the position of the new king Charles to light. To break up the continuing English siege operations in the Seine Basin, a large combined force of French, Scots and Lombards was assembled under Buchan in February; on 26th January the Sieur de Fontaines was paid for moving his men up to join Buchan (93). On the road north, however, the operation collapsed in confusion and acrimony. According to Cousinot, the army broke up because it was unpaid (94) and the admittedly pro-Burgundian Bourgeois of Paris reports a furious Buchan saying that he had been betrayed by Tanguy du Chastel (95) and returning to Scotland in annoyance. On the other hand, the anonymous Chronicle des Cordeliers and Monstrelet report a bitter dispute between Buchan and his subordinate commanders about the order of battle (96). In the light of subsequent events this division at the highest levels of command has a ring of truth about it; one suspects that the French never fully accepted the idea of a foreigner as supreme commander of their armies and did their best to make his life difficult. The question of pay, too, sounds likely, especially since we know that as far back as 25th May 1422 Tanguy du Chastel was lending the king 5415 ecus to cover part of the wages of the Army of Scotland (97). With the slow disintegration of the French military administration throughout this period was combined the chronic financial weakness of the Dauphin compelled to run a full-scale administration on the revenues of only part of France. In theory he could hope to extract around half a million livres or more from the lands under his control (and indeed in 1424 was to be voted a total of 1.3 million); the problems of collection were however no doubt severe and his ability to enforce payment limited by the need to maintain loyalty. Military expenses were taking up a vast proportion of the available finance; the accounts of the Tresoriers des Guerres in Languedoil alone (and they were, in this confused period far from being the only people paying military expenses) for the period December 1422-3 show outgoings of 219,412 lt (98). How much of this went to foreign troops is uncertain, though we know that the Army of Scotland was paid 30,000 lt as the wages for two months which would mean that it was eating up a huge proportion of available funds. The general impression is of severe financial problems and pay often in arrears being supplemented by irregular levies, but this general question will be dealt with in more detail in the second half of this work. Certainly a lack of pay and the collapse of the Seine operations did not mean a break-up of the foreign forces; the Scots helped to chase Salisbury out of Vendome later in the year (99) and another Scottish force under Darnley helped to repel an English thrust towards Bourges at Issodun (100) in the early summer. Nevertheless worrying cracks were beginning to appear in the French military structure and the relationship with its foreign auxiliaries.

Almost from the beginning, for instance, the Scots had shown a distressing tendency to indiscipline. As early as 31st December 1420 the tax officials of the Tours area were paying twelve livres to a deputation sent to the Dauphin's chancellor at Chinon seeking orders which would make Scottish troops pillaging the area round the city move on (101); the beginning of a theme which was to run like a repeated motto through the deliberations of the town administration for the next fifteen years or so one could count the costs involved in the entertainment of passing Scottish military dignitaries as useful and necessary expenditure to keep them on good terms with the town (and both Tours and Orleans were generous in their gifts); both Darnley's brother and Buchan received gifts from Orleans in 1421 while to improve the reception of certain requests made to Buchan in May 1422 he was presented with wine, armour and plate (102). Other presentations followed more severe pressure and reflect a less pleasant reality. The Countess of Buchan was given the equivalent of a civic reception at Tours in June 1422 with twelve torches burning at her entry as she brought news that her husband was gathering up Scots pillaging Touraine; these stragglers from the army had already occasioned another trip to the court at Chinon to complain (103). It would appear that Buchan was not unduly successful; by the following month Scots were to be found laying siege to Montricharr and pillaging in the countryside. Another pair of Scottish commanders, Guille Bell and Colin Desterville were sent to try their powers of persuasion, the latter prodded by his wife who lived in Tours herself and received visits from the councillors (as well, no doubt, as a part of the 300 It which this apparently successful operation cost the town) (104). By 1423 the Tourangeaux had few illusions; when three Scottish commanders visited the town on 7th March they were well entertained in the hope that they could be persuaded to keep their men upstream of the town and move on as soon as possible (105). The expense seems to have been worthwhile; there are no reports of pillage on this occasion.

Nobody was safe from the depredations of the Scots; the Dauphin's household accounts for the first half of 1421 record the loss by the maitre de la chambre des deniers of 527 livres parisis stolen by the Earl of Buchan's men operating from his lands at Ghatillon-sur-Indre as well as a trip by one of the royal household in early March with one Jehan de Crenat (could he perhaps be the Bishop-elect of Caithness much used in embassies to Scotland at this period and who seems to have acted as some kind of recruiting-agent in Scotland?) to retrieve the accounts and archives of the household stolen along with a horseload of silver. The accounts were recovered, but the money had to be left to Buchan to enable him to buy a hose; presumably this was his reward for helping in the recovery of the rest (106). Not surprisingly Scots archers of the boydguard seem to have been much used on escort duties when money was being transferred (107). At the other end of the social scale, a partridge-hunter called Jean de Pons of Grand Musnet near Vierzon in Berry was taken along with six other men working in the fields by a party of Scots (who probably belonged to Darnley's army fight–ing the English around Bourges) on 6th June 1423 and hanged from the nearest tree because the Scots had been having trouble with the local people. Jean, however, prayed to St. Katherine of Fierboys and was saved by her when the rope broke (108).

The trouble which these auxiliaries might cause and the problems posed by their payment did not discourage Charles from wanting to recruit still more. The Scottish archers of his bodyguard were retained: Jehan du Cygne was paid for his 26 men from 3rd January 1423, and recruitment continued (109). Caqueran was sent back to Lombardy in search of more men from there (110). Further efforts were made to tap Castilian resources on an organised basis; the Archbishop of Tours had gone in January 1420 to visit the king and other great nobles to discuss the "great affairs" of the Dauphin (111), while in 1421 efforts were even made to persuade the Castilians to pay some of the costs of the Scottish army (112). Instructions for Ambassadors to Castile were issued in November 1422 which dealt with attempts to hire Castilian galleys, to tempt the Castilians into an attack on English-held Guienne, which they claimed was weakly held, with an army of 5-600 men-at-arms and 2,000 archers. Nothing came of these approaches either. In the end, it was again to Scotland that Charles was forced to look. In the rather confusing entries to Dom Bevy's genealogical compilation (113), one Andrew Kainzie, noted in 1419 as one of Darnley's men is paid 1,000 livres in 1422 to go and do recruiting in Scotland (114). It is probable that a steady trickle of small groups found their way to France throughout this period, but something rather grander was in the air from late 1422 onwards. On 20th October of that year we find the king making financial arrangements for the transport, feeding and wages of up to 8,000 men with some 9,300 ecus and a portion of one of the crowns to be pawned for extra money. Some of this was to go to Scotland with an embassy; the rest was scattered around twenty small depositaries in La Rochelle, Niort and other towns in the west (115). Perhaps the appointment of Darnley's brother as captain of the Tower of the "chesne" in La Rochelle generally in control of the harbour area (116) in the same part of late 1422 is connected with this. Certainly the departure of the Earl of Buchan in 1423 was not simply due to annoyance at the failure of his operations; he was to head the embassy to Scotland. On 17th May, the king stated that the Lords of Scotland "de leur grant liberalite se soit gracieusement offers et presentes nous aider et secourir moyennant que nous leur deussions envoyer certaine somme d'argent, navires, vivres et autres choses". To expedite the organisation of this expedition, the king intended to send an embassy over, and this was to be given the fullest powers to deal with shippers in all matters concerning timing, costs, hiring and all other relevant matters. These powers are backed with repeated promises not to query any costs they might incur in any way, resounding orders to the Chambre des Comptes to pass all bills without any dispute, and if all else failed, "plain pouvoir, auctorite et mandement especial de y obliger et submettre tous et chacuns de nos biens, meuble et immeubles, presents et avenir" (117). Backed by these promises (in themselves a considerable commentary on the operations of the financial office and the dubious nature and effectiveness of royal promises of payment under more normal circumstances), the earl and his fellow ambassadors set forth for Scotland in early summer 1423.

The absence of Buchan certainly did not condemn the Army of Scotland to an inactive role in the summer of 1423. After the operations in Berry, Darnley (now rewarded further for his loyal services by the gift of Aubigny-sur-Nere in Berry, given to aid him in maintaining his estate) on 22nd March 1423 (118) moved into Champagne against the Burgundians. According to Berry Herald, he was supposed to be moving to the relief of Mousson but disobeyed orders to exploit an opportunity which had arisen (119). A Savoy and in Burgundian service, the Bastard of Baume had defected to the French side with some of his men, and after a summer of betrayal and counter-betrayal, was besieging the rest of his former company in Cravant in the Morvannais (120). Darnley linked up with him despite a lack of cannon which was never remedied (121) and the move seems to have been supported by the king since he was reinforced by a mixture of Spaniards and other more or less undisciplined routier forces under Severac and Ventadour (122) to the number of 400 men at arms. The garrison were at the limits of their resistance when relief arrived with Anglo-Burgundian military co-operation actually being effective for once. To proceed to the relief they had, however, to force a passage of the Yonne against a French army well positioned on a hill overlooking the main bridge. It was a grim battle, the best description of which is to be found in the anonymous chronicle known as the "Livre des Trahisons" written by a man whom I am strongly inclined to take as an eye-witness (123). The Earl of Salisbury, commander of the English army, had his men assail the French across the bridge while other sections of his army sought another crossing-point upstream (124); some of them went into the river to wade across in the teeth of Scottish archery, aided by a Lombard contingent "tous armes en harness complet" in holding the bridge against the English. The combination of English archery and cannonfire pushed the Scots back far enough to aid the Burgundians in crossing and to expose the Lombard flank to English archery at closer range which began to expose weaknesses in their armour until they fled for the horses (it was noted by all the chroniclers that the French fought on foot in this battle "tous a piet comme les Engles"as the Livre des Trahisons puts it) to the loud curses and insults of the Scots thus left to their fate. The French, now assailed on three sides as the forces which had crossed upstream came into the fight and the garrison sallied out to help, crumpled and collapsed. Their losses in dead and captured were heavy and variously estimated; Martial d'Auvergne puts them at 1,000 while the official English list of enemy slain and taken comes up with the optimistic figure of 8,000 (125). The bulk, both from this list and other chronicle accounts seem to have been Scots (126), perhaps as Waurin says because they were in the vanguard and had the hardest fighting (127). Darnley himself was captured and lost an eye (128) and lengthy lists of more or less recognisable Scottish names can be found in all the accounts (129) as having been killed or captured. Not only the noble and notable suffered; the occasional ferocity which could erupt even among combatants from time to time can be guessed at from the entry in the French accounts concerning the payment of ransoms of twenty Scots archers by the king to save them from hanging (130) and another ordinary Scottish soldier, a 17 year old archer called Peter Forest who was probably captured at this battle lay for two years in an English prison unable to find any way of paying a ransom until, fearing he would die there, he joined the English army (131). Another Scot carried an arrowhead about in his head for 8 years from Cravant until St. Katherine appeared to him in a dream and extracted it for him (132). The king on the other hand did his best to minimise the defeat; in a letter which speaks volumes about the ambiguous situation of foreign troops written to the Consuls of Lyon he says "Tous voyes n'y avoit il au dit siege que tres peu et comme rien des nobles de nostre royaume mais seulement Escoz, Espaignaulx et autre gens estrangiers qui avoient accoustume de vivre sur le pays. et par quoy le dommage n'en est pas si grant" (133)

However scornful Charles might choose to be, he could hardly do without these same foreigners. Whether the Lombards who played such an inglorious role at Cravant were part of the reinforcement brought by Caqueran is uncertain; if they were, they were to redeem themselves in September at La Bussiere in the Maconnais when, under the command of Imbert de Groslee, they defeated the Burgundian forces threatening Lyon. The 5-600 Lombard men at arms under Caqueran and Valpergue played a major part in the victory with their heavy armour and their habit of armouring their horses giving them a big advan–tage (134). The Marshal of Burgundy was captured and traded for Darnley (135) (though there must have been a cash ransom as well, since he was given 500 It towards it in 1425 (136) and as late as 26th January 1427 was writing to the Lyonnais asking for financial help in repaying 6,000 ecus borrowed from Tanguy du Chastel for the same purpose (137)). The victory brought the Lombards profit in their turn; on 2nd October the king was to write sternly reminding the Consuls of Lyon that half of the 2,500 livres to be raised in taxes in the town was earmarked for new armour for the Lombard troops and demanding that they cease to hold up payment (138). It is no doubt these men who figure in another set of accounts as having entered service on 26th July under the Count of Valpergue and pass review at St. Laurent de Baigny near Lyon on 1st October with the "Count" (in fact, if this is Theaulde, his claim to the title is highly dubious) and his nine lieutenants named at the head of a force of 200 lances (139). At some time, probably in the following spring the full Lombard force of 600 cavalry and 1,000 infantry (140) moved into the Nivernais and captured Cufy and La Guierche, aided in the former enterprise at least by none other than Villandrando and the Spaniards of his company (141).

During this summer of 1423, the Earl of Buchan was fully occupied in Scotland raising yet another army to support the French cause. His mission gained an added urgency with the start of negotiations with the English over the ransom of King James. One of the main English demands as contained in the instructions to the English ambassadors of 6th July was that the Scottish troops in France be withdrawn as well as an assurance that no more would go there (142) and it was a Scottish negotiating triumph that the final treaty contained no such demands when it was signed in December (143). By then, however, the arrangements for the army were well underway. Agreement had been reached at Stirling on 6th October; the French as usual agreed to provide the transports while the Scots allowed French recruitment in Scotland and promised not to aid the English or Burgundians in any way. Scots were to be given full rights in France (144). Arrangements for the hire of ships were well in hand. An agreement With Perruche de la Sau which has survived gives some idea of the terms; Perruche, master of the balinger Sainte Marie, a Castilian Captain, agrees to remain at Dumbarton (where he was apparently moored when the contract was drawn up) or Greenock from the 6th November for a month. He was to be paid 1½ ecus per ton of his 140 ton ship, half to be paid in Scotland and half at La Rochelle a month after the Scots had been landed. A bonus of a thousand crowns was to be split among the twelve Spanish captains involved in ratio to their tonnage, and sundry other clauses covered compensation for the loss of the ship or extra expenses caused by bad weather. The ambassadors solemnly engaged royal property to ensure that he would be paid in time, promised to press the king to honour his debts to Perruche and his fellow-captains and, in the final analysis, agreed to pay themselves out of their own resources if all else failed; at the head of the group of ambassadors we find the Earl of Douglas who had agreed to cross to France and replace Wigtown, who had returned to Scotland with the embassy (145). All these transactions are dated 26th October. Perhaps predictably, payment was late and probably never made in full; a full list of captains, including Perruche, has survived. In this, the king asks for more time to pay the debts in full following a partial distribution (146). Perruche clearly had little faith in the assignments of local tax revenues distributed in this partial repayment; his misfortunes are known to us because he gave all the documents (including the assignment of 433 crowns) to the Abbey of Orbestier as security for a loan of 347 crowns. (147). The very considerable discount which the abbey charged indicates the problematical nature of their chances of obtaining repayment from royal officials. The overstretched nature of royal finances is apparent elsewhere; Henri de Plusquallpc as governor of La Rochelle, was forced to plunge himself deep into debt to local merchants to finance the transport of the Scottish army. He had to cross to Scotland personally on the king's behalf: unable to repay him, Charles granted him the lands of Taillebourg in February 1424 in the hope that this would enable him to repay some of the debts (148). Indeed the financial situation was so serious that in January, Charles disbanded all the companies of men at arms in the kingdom apart from the Scots, the Lombards and a few others due to the cost of paying them. Under the circumstances, however, this desperate manoeuvre was never effectively carried out (149). Despite these problems, the Scots sailed for France; the fleet was split up by storms with some landing at St. Mahe-de–Fine-Posterne (150) as well as La Rochelle. St. Jean d'Angely, after giving a dinner of fish to a Scottish esquire called Thomas Onel and his five companions in February, found itself called upon to give "good cheer" to Buchan and Douglas in the shape of wine, fish and a torchlit entry with the mayor going out to meet them with the best accompaniment possible (151) on 27th March.

The Scottish army marched towards Bourges immediately. Doug–las in his turn was lavishly rewarded for his adhesion to the French cause. He was first named "Lieutenant-General sur le fait de guerre pour tout le Royaume dc le France" - an unusual title whose precise significance is far from clear. It seems possible to me that it was intended to give him some kind of equal status with Buchan - perhaps as commander of the Army of Scotland - while Buchan as Constable commanded the French forces in some kind of joint command. Following this elevation he was also given the Duchy of Touraine. This had been Charles' duchy before his accession to the throne. The donation included the towns of Tours and Loches and was given in hereditary right as much for the past services of Wigtown as for those which Douglas was expected to perform (152). Donation was made at Bourges on 19th April; the news provoked a flurry of activity in Tours which sent a messenger on the 24th to find out the truth of rumours concerning the donation (153) and proceeded to begin preparations for the entry of the new Duke (154). In Bourges, the Scottish army was reviewed on the 24th and its numbers put at 2,500 men at arms and 4,000 archers, while Darnley had his own contingent of 150 men at arms (by this point he was out of captivity and had not gone on the pilgrimage sometimes attributed to him in this period (155), although he drops out of the records for most of the year and could have been almost anywhere). In comparison, Arthur of Richemont, the Breton recently deserted from the English camp, had 2,000 men at arms and 1,500 archers (156). Even allowing for some exaggeration, the size of the Scottish army is amazing (especially since there may well have been Scottish companies not included in this review), considering that the population of Scotland for this period was in the half million range and her greatest military efforts rarely produced armies of much above 20,000 men.

            This done, Douglas set off to make formal entry to his new duchy. On 3rd May, one of his councillors visited the council of Tours; the next day a deputation set off to meet him at Loches to conduct him to the city which he entered on the 7th at 3 o'clock in afternoon, receiving the keys of the city at the Porte de la Roche professions of joy and fidelity of the notables of the city (which the previous winter had been buying torches and lanterns to patrol the streets effectively at night for fear of the Scots) could be is another matter (158). Certainly the honeymoon was brief; by 19th June the council was sending deputations to Douglas to complain about the behaviour of his men and to ask him to move them out of the town, an errand repeated on 5th July (159). Matters probably only really improved when the army marched out to fight the English on 4th August (160); all the gifts distributed to Douglas' son James, Buchan or Adam Douglas, the captain of the town for his namesake, seem to have made little difference (161).

In the meantime, Charles was still looking for extra troops from Milan. On 29th June Francesco Maria Visconti agreed to a treaty at Abiate by which he promised to send whatever troops Milan could spare in four months. How many troops actually came is uncertain; perhaps very few given that Visconti was at war with Venice at this time (although he did inform the captains of the quarters of Milan of the alliance in February 1425 (162)). The discipline of the Italians already in France left much to be desired in any case; the Abbey of Selles-sur-Cher suffered the visitation of the king and his men in this period during which the Lombards particularly distinguished themselves in their damage to the monastic lands and properties. The king had to give 1,500 lt in compensation to the abbey (163).

In August the armies came into action in an attempt to raise the siege of Ivry under siege of Bedford. The Scots left Tours on 4th August to meet up with Narbonne who had most of the Spanish troops and some Lombards in his company (164), while Caqueran and his Lombards passed through Tours on the 13th on the way to the scene of action (165). The army was unable to relieve Ivry but gained something from the expedition by tricking Verneuil into surrender; this was achieved by the ruse of marching past the walls a group of Scots who claimed to be Englishmen captured in a great defeat inflicted on Befford (166). There was an expectation of battle in the air; the notaries of Chateaudun had done brisk business on the march north drawing up the wills of Scottish soldiers and taking their property into safe keeping (167). Bedford moved to face the combined army amid a flurry of chivalric challenges and responses; Buchan challenged Salisbury to single combat which Bedford refused to allow him to accept, then suggested that the two commanders should mediate peace between their respective kings (168). Bedford not to be outdone, sent a herald to invite Douglas for a drink; he replied that he would be delighted since he had been unable to find him in England and had come to France to find him (169).

The battle which was joined on the 17th, however, had little of these chivalric niceties about it. It was one of the greatest and least known of the Hundred Years War, and no adequate modern account has been put together from the confused narration of the chroniclers; a confusion which seems to me to reflect a fundamental confusion about the organisation and planning on the French side. It seems certain that there was dispute amongst the French commanders about how the battle should be fought. Whether, as Berry Herald suggests, a reluctant Douglas who wished to stand on the defensive, was pulled into battle by Narbonne (170) who simply began marching with his "battle", or whether it was the Scots in their over-confidence who forced the issue (171) is uncertain and probably lost forever in the recriminations after defeat. The English, drawn up all dismounted with wings composed of archers and baggage and horses in the rear, faced a French army with two cavalry wings, one on the right composed of 500 lances of Lombards with armoured horses (172). It seems probable that the French centre, with the Scots (largely dismounted) and Narbonne's men attacked out of synchronisation and probably out of breath (173) whilst the cavalry wings unleashed their charge. The Lombards certainly seem to have smashed through the English archers opposed to them (one can, I think, discount Cousinot's claim that they fled without coming to grips, since all other sources are unanimous on this at least) (174) but instead of remaining to break up the English reserves they scattered to pillage the English baggage (175) slaughtering horses and servants and sending fugitives fleeing far and wide, whose tales of disaster provoked a minor revolt in part of Normandy (176). What exactly the cavalry on the other wing achieved is obscure (though Cousinot gives them credit for the success of the Lombards); in the centre the battle rapidly became a grim slaughtering match with no prisoners taken on the orders of Douglas (177). In the end it seems that Narbonne's Tien broke as the English deployed their reserves to leave the unsupported Scots to bear the brunt of the defeat as the night fell (178). It was one of the bloodiest battles of the war; Waurin said it was the greatest he had ever seen and estimated the French dead at 6,000 while the English had lost 1,600 (179). Buchan and Douglas were dead on the field with large numbers of their compatriots (180) (Raoulet estimated 4,000, which seems more reasonable than the 7,000 of Pluscarden (181)). After the battle was over, with the English in possession of the field, the Lombards returned expecting to find the battle won by the French and had to struggle back across a stream under English archery to escape, losing a banner in the process - (since a squire from the Dauphine was killed at this point, one suspects that the other cavalry had reacted in the same way). The following day Bedford advanced to the recapture of Verneuil where the garrison was captured, including 3-400 Scots, some of whom he gave safe conducts to Scotland (183). He at least had not been impressed with the Lombards, whom he accused of killing servants and horses rather than fighting (184).

The only effective French field army was now broken, but the English had themselves been too badly mauled to follow up their advantage. Thomas Basin consoled himself with the thought that the Scots had been planning to take over wide areas of central France for themselves (185); this apparently echoed the feelings of the citizens of Tours who, on hearing of the death of Douglas on the 19th from a Scottish "varlet" had acted by the 22nd to pay the wages of the lieutenant of the now-dead captain to make sure that his Scottish garrison moved out after the castle had been blockaded to make sure that no Scots entered to take over the town (186). Similar methods were used to clear Scottish garrisons out of other castles in Touraine which they had held for Douglas (187). Messengers galloped to and fro along the Loire valley to inform the king (188), who on 21st October granted Touraine to Isabel of Anjou, his sister-in-law (189) (despite the claims of Douglas' widow to a share (190)).

Despite Bedford's expressed confidence that the majority of the Scots had been wiped out (191), the Army of Scotland was far from finished as a serious force. On the other hand, the debacle of Verneuil more or less marked the end of large-scale recruitment abroad. Charles might try to hearten his faithful subjects with the news of fresh reinforcements from Scotland under the Earl of Mar or Italy under the Marquis of Ferrara (192) but none of them ever appeared in France. Nor was there much real likelihood of this happening with Italy full of its own wars and Scotland, exhausted by its efforts, ruled by a newly-freed king walking a difficult tightrope between England and France. Efforts were made to involve Castile more closely again, with embassies in 1426 and again in 1428. The first sought 2,000 men-at-arms, including some two to three hundred light horsemen (homes a la genete), or at least a few hundred men at arms, to be paid for six months by the Castilians themselves when they entered service in spring of 1427. The embassies of 1428 repeat the now-familiar tale; 2-3,000 men-at-arms and 5-6,000 infantry paid by the Castilian crown with French promises of eventual repayment aided by the Castilian fleet which would operate out of La Rochelle where provisions had been laid in (193). In neither case did the Castilians produce any more than vague promises for the future. In practice, the type of recruitment done in Spain was probably more accurately typified by the surviving contracts concerning Bernard Albert, an Aragonese squire who served under the Count of Foix in Languedoc in 1426-7 with 100 men at arms and the same number of infantry ("saquements"). He had a written contract by which he agreed to serve with these forces for four months, being paid 14,100 moutons for this period. He was paid, though the governor of Montpellier had to borrow from local merchants to satisfy him (194); the exact number and importance of such short-term contracts for troops is unknown and probably impossible to discover.

Negotiations with Scotland continued as well, and led to some piecemeal reinforcement. In 1428 a grand French Embassy headed by Darnley went to Scotland to negotiate a marriage treaty between the Dauphin Louis and James I's daughter Margaret (it seems to me that the Scotichronicon account of an embassy in 1425 can be discounted since there is no other reference to it and the few details given fit the 1428 one equally well (195)). During this embassy Alain Chartier made a speech lauding the courage and fidelity of the Scots to the skies and made much of the alliance between the nations (196). The negotiations are well documented; the marriage was agreed in principle on 17th July, with the provision of an escort of 6,000 men for Margaret while she was crossing to France (197); in return the Duchy of Saintonge was given to James on 10th November (198). While in Scotland where the embassy was lodged at Linlithgow, Darnley received the lands of Torbolton from King James (199) and probably made the gift of ornaments to Glasgow Cathedral which survives in French sources (200). A return Scottish embassy went to France to finalise the agreements; the English prepared to intercept it thinking that the 6,000 troops were on board (201) but they failed and it seems unlikely that there were so many soldiers with the embassy. One of the Scottish ambassadors, Patrick Ogilvy of Auchterhouse, Sheriff of Angus and justiciar north of the Forth drops out of the Exchequer accounts in 1428 and remained in France to fight (202).

Very little of this diplomatic activity affected the situation of the troops already in France (except in so far as their commanders were involved as ambassadors). In fact, the period between Verneuil and the siege of Orleans was a notably uneventful one with little real fighting. English attention was drawn away by the strange episode of Humphrey of Gloucester's war in Holland against the Duke of Burgundy while the French had their own internal dissensions to worry about. The appointment of the Breton, Arthur of Richemont was to lead to a severe struggle for influence at court, which spilled over into armed conflict at times (for instance the attack on Bourges by sections of Richemont's army in 1425). Inevitably the foreigners were drawn in; if Richemont's 19th-century biographer Cosneau claims that the Scots were with him (203) there seems to be ample evidence that the majority of Scots and Lombards remained loyal to the king first (204) and Richemont himself in a letter to Lyons lamented that his enemies at court had been recruiting men of "etrange langue" against him (205). No doubt in these troubled times the importance of the Scottish bodyguard grew considerably. Jehan du Cygne appears in the accounts as first squire of the body in the accounts from July 1425-6 (206), while by 1427 his position has been taken over by Christin Chambre, who also figures in the earlier accounts, but is stated to be captain of the bodyguard in a lawsuit in this year concerning various lands which had belonged to Buchan (207). It seems possible that some at least of the smallish Scottish companies which figure in the accounts (such as that of Gilbert de la Haye at Bourges) at about this time could have had similar functions (208). Certainly none of the commanders lost their favour at court. Darnley was in this period in steady receipt of money and other favours; a payment in November 1425 (209) was followed in February by 300 It to buy armour for his men. In the end, the money which he owed Tanguy du Chastel for his ransom was repaid by the king by allowing him to draw on the mint profits of St. Andre-les-Avignon in February 1427, and he was even well enough off to lend money to the king in his turn, as a receipt dated 25th July 1428 shows (210). He was further rewarded for his services in March 1427 by the gift of the county of Evreux (a doubtful honour since it was wholly under English occupation); the king could, if he so wished buy it back for 50,000 ecus (211). His final reward came in February 1428 with the privilege of quartering the arms of France with his own ones (212).

The Lombards too remained in favour; November 1425 found Valpergue in La Marche being paid to keep his men from foraging there, while the following month he was paid for a good horse (213). In 1430 he even had the honour of being selected to represent France in a kind of five-a-side jousting international against Burgundy at Arras (214). His colleague, Caqueran, who remained more on his estates in Dauphin was also in receipt of royal favour in the shape of payments from the Lyon taille revenue. It is significant that he won this after a lengthy tug-of-war for revenues which may well have been assigned twice over, his main opponent being the Parlement of Poitiers (with Richemont himself another possible contender). The payment of the 1270 francs due took several months from August 1425 to May the following year, but he was paid in full; a striking con–trast with the fate of the ship-owners mentioned earlier (215). The implication is that, to be paid in this period, it helped to be a soldier, especially one reasonably near at hand and with links with the town meant to raise the money (Caqueran had some sort of business factor in Lyon, who was involved with the raising of the money; it is possible that he had money invested in the town (216)).

As far as actual fighting in this period was concerned, the only serious campaigning seems to have been in the west, with an English advance in Maine and on the frontiers of Brittany. In March 1427 Darnley and his men assembled at Mehun-sur-Yevre for the relief of St. James de Beuvron; in April he was paid 1700 lt at Angers for his services at Pontorson (217). The campaign was largely successful with the dismounted Scottish troops being of considerable use against the English (218), though it was plagued by disputes between Richemont and Darnley's lieutenant Jehan Oulchart (219). The garrison of Pontorson was left in the joint hands of Guillaume Hamilton and Bernard de Comminge (220) and the army advanced as far as Le Mans (221) before having to move back eastwards to raise the English siege of Montargis. There, the English lines of investment were assaulted by the Scottish infantry under Hugh Kennedy (at night according to Raoulet, at lunchtime claims Cousinot) and, after heavy fighting in which the English encampment was burned, the English withdrew before all the siege–works had been taken (222). Darnley himself played little part in the fighting, remaining with Richemont at Jargeau (223).

The armies in the field were not the only troops active in France at this point. It seems likely that the large armies were beginning to split up into smaller companies; certainly the surviv–ing accounts give that impression for the Scottish companies. It is, for instance, in this period that the Scottish company of Thomas Moras first appears in the south (224); this uniquely well-documented company I shall deal with in more detail in the next chapter. Other wandering groups were rather more formidable. The deliberations of the council of Tours take on an air of near paranoid fear of Scots from this time on. When a group of 100-120 Scots were sent to bolster the garrisons of Touraine in November 1424, a frantic council got the local commanders together to work out the best way of splitting them up to keep them under control (225). In October of that year they had had to delay the departure of their delegation to the Estates at Poitiers until a large enough convoy could be put together for fear of the Scots on the road (226). To tell the full tale of the protracted lamentation which makes up the deliberations for this period would be long and tedious; hardly year passed without complaint about depradations of the Scots. These took all kinds of forms; straightforward pillage like that conducted by the Lord of "Polloc" (Pollock?) early in 1425 (227), payments to move Scots out of castles in the Touraine area (228) and to stop garrisons plundering (one of the worst offenders in this matter was one Albaron Sabbate, who may have been Italian (229)), extortion of money from the town by a Scottish captain called Tourneboeuf in repayment of damages he claimed had been done to him by people from Tours (230) and straightforward capture of castles which the area had to buy back with extra taxes, as in the case of Langeais in 1428 (231).  (It should be remembered that Langeais had had a Scottish lord at one point and the pillagers may have considered themselves as defending the legitimate interests of his descendants). In addition, the council of Tours was for much of the 1420's engaged on the lengthy and complex process of persuading somebody to pay the debts left by Douglas and his son, James. Despite all their petitioning both Charles and their new lady Isabel of Anjou, it seems probable that they were never repaid in full (232) (they came to the considerable sum of 2540 lt). The fear of the Scots reached such a pitch that when Richemont's men approached the walls with their lady in July 1425, the prospect of companies full of "grant numbre de gens darmes et detrait estranges coe escossays lombars et autres qui pairroient faire moult demaulx en lad ville si ilz y entroient ou pais denviron" (233) was so frightening that they ordered a census of all Scots within the walls to be taken and all of them, even including a friar, expelled from the town while the emergency lasted. (The list drawn up runs to eight–een names and shows that the same Lord of Polloc had a house in the town).

The Loire valley was the favourite area of Scottish depradation, from the western end where in March 1427 the agents of the captive Charles d'Orleans gathering his belongings for his captivity in England from Saumur were compelled to hire a military escort for fear of the Scots on the road (234), across to the centre where it was said that none dared travel from Orleans to Blois for fear of them in 1428 (235). They were not the only foreign soldiers in the area; a couple of Florentines in the garrison of Montilz near Blois passed their time in 1428 carrying off a local girl who happened to be the mistress of a Parisian merchant whom they killed when he next came to the area (236). Other parts of France were equally affected by pillage. Villandrando, for instance, was operating in the south on behalf of the Bourbon family and the Counts of Pardiac in private warfare (237). In September 1428 he took St. Andre-des-Ribes in Languedoc (238); by late October he was near Lyon and pressing the town for money. His demands were too high for the council who showed unexpected fight and were prepared to use the money to hire troops of their own for the Bailli to lead against him. The latter, however, was markedly unenthusiastic about the idea (he may have been an old acquaintance of Villandrando) and in the end the town was forced to let him negotiate the cheapest withdrawal he could manage, with a gift of 80 ecus to help him in his task (239). The pillagers did not always have things their own way, however, as the story of Michel Ambilton, a Scot who came to Fierboys in May 1429, illustrates; he and a group of his fellow Scots had been on the frontiers of Brittany the previous Easter and, near Clisson the local Bretons had ambushed them and hanged him. He had been saved by the saint after hanging from Good Friday afternoon until after Mass on Sunday (240).

By then, however, momentous events had occurred. The English armies, reinforced from home and aided by the Burgundians moved to besiege Orleans in October 1428. They were never strong enough to blockade the town totally, and it is possible that the garrison outnumbered the attackers considerably. At the time of the English attack, there were already foreign troops in the town; an Aragonese knight called Messire Mathias helped in the defence of the Tourelles (241). The first reinforcement on the 25th after the fall of the Tourelles included Valpergue with Lombard infantry carrying big shields (242) and the billeting arrangements made on the 27th include payments for taking on the Scots of La Hire (243). Already there were Scottish casualties; William Douglas of Drumlanrig and his namesake of "Kyrros" were killed in the fighting round the town on the 21st and buried in the cathedral to which they had given cloth and money; perhaps the Scottish bishop John Carmichael conducted the service (244). The relief forces being gathered had a strong foreign element; a group of Scottish captains with combined forces of 169 men at arms and 400 archers were paid in September at Orleans and Chateaudun; for one at least, Jehan Wishart, we can work out his progress to the siege (245). Paid at Chinon in October, he was given armour at Blois and reached Orleans in November (246). Valpergue was involved in a sortie on 6th January 1429 (247); perhaps it was in this that one of his men lost the horse replaced by the king (248). Another Aragonese knight fought in the next sortie on the 30th (249), whilst both Valpergue and another Spaniard, Fernando da Civile (Seville ?) were sent on embassies to the king to hasten relief forces (250). Out beyond Orleans the armies were rallying. Ogilvy was paid 600 It to assemble his men for the coming battle in January and Darnley was paid 3,900 on the final day of the month to gather his men in all haste to cross the Loire to link up with other captains (251). On 8th February, his brother William entered the town with a portion of the army, only to march out on the 11th to join up with Darnley and the other French captains in their attempt to intercept the English provision-convoy at Rouvray on the 12th (252). The result was a predictable piece of botched staff-work on the part of the combined army, with a bitter dispute over whether to attack on foot or mounted. In the end it appears that Darnley went in on foot with his men supported by a section of the French forces, to assault the English drawn up behind their waggons and went down to bloody defeat (253). The anonymous author of the mystery play of the siege was in no doubt as to who was to blame; his stage directions state that the majority of the French under the Count of Clermont left. the Scots and Dunois who supported them to their fate (“n’ont point de secours des Francais du Conte de Clermont ne de ses gens, mai, les regardent sans coup ferie”) (254).

Darnley and his brother, the last of the major commanders of the original Army of Scotland, lay dead. Darnley, ever-popular in Orleans which he had once promised to aid in case of dispute with the king as if he were speaking on behalf of his own countrymen (255), was buried in the cathedral, followed by his wife, and a special service of remembrance was said for them to the Revolution (256). The Mystery gives him a splendid eulogy spoken by Dunois, himself one of the heroes of the play (257). His death marked the effective end of a period in the employment of foreign troops in France, that of the large, coherent armies operating as separate large-scale units. Anew period, that in which many small companies drifting in and out of royal service fought as part of larger armies was about to begin.

End Notes

(1) G du Fresne de Beaucourt Histoire de Charles VII Paris 1881‑89, Vol. I p. 306‑8. R Nicholson Scotland in the later Middle Ages Edinburgh 1974 p. 249.

(2) D d'Aussy La Saintonge pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans La Rochelle 1894 p. 31.

(3) FLat 6024 f12

(4) FF 7858 f339ro‑vo.

(5) id. f346vo.

(6) FF 32510 f355ro.

(7) Clairambault 43 no. 138.

(8) Juvenal des Ursins p. 546.

(9) FF 32510 f360ro, 7858 f361ro.

(10) Juvenal des Ursins p. 546.

(11) J Francisque‑Michel Les Ecossais en France, Les Francais en Ecosse London 1862 p. 118.

(12) FF 7858 f361ro.

(13) FF 32510 f362vo.

(15) Clairambault 65 no. 86.

(16) Clairambault 86 no. 103.

(17) FF 24000 p.14.

(18) Clairambault 33 no. 31

(19) The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland ed. G. Burnett Edinburgh 1880 Vol. IV p.L.

(20) FF 25710 no. 3.

(21) d'Aussy p. 31, Daumet p. 73‑4.

(22) Rymer Vol. IX p. 791‑2.

(23) Rymer id p. 794‑5.

(24) A Stuart A Genealogical History of the Stewarts London 1798 p.115.

 (25) d'Aussy p. 32.

(26) Arch. Hist. de la Saintonge et de 1'Aunis t XXXII p. 307-8.

(27) FF 25710 no.5

(28) AN K59 no.20, 12-15, 45-6

(29) FF 7858 348vo.

(30) id 360vo.

(31) id 345ro.

(32) FF 25766 no. 759‑60.

(33) AN KK53 f2,5

(34) Book of Pluscarden ed. F Skene Edinburgh 1890 p. 357, Fordun Scotichronicon with Bower's Continuation ed. E. Goodall Edinburgh 1775 p. 359.

(35) NAF 1001 llro-14vo.

(36) Scotichronicon p. 459 Jean Raoulet 'Chronique' in Jean Chartier Chronique de Charles VII, Roi de France ed. Vallet de Viriville Paris 1858 Vol. III p. 170

(37) Raoulet p. 171.

(38) Clairambault 9 no. 28.

(39) Clairambault 10 nos. 185-9, 11 nos. 1-4, 17 no.16.

(41) Clairambault 28 no. 25.

(42) Clairambault 54 no. 23-4.

(43) AN KK53 f 8vo.

(44) Exchequer Rolls of Scotland Vol. IV p.333.

(45) AN KK53 fllro.

(46) Beaucourt Vol. I p. 335.

(47) Raoulet p. 167-8.

(48) Monstrelet Vol. IV p. 13.

(49) Monstrelet Vol. IV p. 94, Lefevre de St. Remy Vol. II p. 72, Jean de Waurin Recueil des Chroniques et Anciennes Istoires de la Grant Bretaigne a Present Nomme Angleterre ed. Hardy London 1868 (Rolls Series), Vol.I p. 405, Vol.II p.13, FF 23018 f420vo.

(50) Scotichronicon p. 462.

(51) e.g. Rymer Vol.X p.18-9, 99-100, 127-8, 153-4 etc.

(52) id p. 123-4.

(53) Clairambault 103 no. 90.

(54) Pluscarden p. 354 AD Cher C793 17vo.

(55) AN KK53 fllvo.

(56) Clairambault 41 no. 143.

(57) Contamine GES p. 240-53.

(58) L Mirot 'Dom Bevy et les Comptes des Tresoriers des Guerres–Essai de Restitution d'un fonds Disparu de la Chambre des Comptes' Bibliotheque de 1'Ecole des Chartes t82 1925 p. 295.

(60) Pluscarden P. 354.

(61) Juvenal des Ursins p. 564.

(62) Pluscarden p. 354, Perceval de Cagny Chronique ed. If Moranville, Paris 1902 p. 119.

(63) Pluscarden p. 354.

(64) For accounts of the battle; Pluscarden p. 354-6, Scotichronicon p. 461, Georges Chastellain 'Chronique' in Oeuvres ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove Brussels 1863 Vol.I p. 223-5, Juvenal des Ursins p. 564-5.

(65) Pluscarden p. 355-6, Scotichronicon p. 461, Beaucourt Vol.I p. 220-1.

(66) Cousinot de Montreuil 'Gestes des Nobles Francais ' in Chronique de la Pucelle ed. Vallet de Viriville Paris 1859 p. 180

(67) Antonio Morosini Chronique ed. Lefevre-Pontalis Paris 1898 p. 199-203.

(69) For size of ransom, see Arsenal 4522 f18vo. Lordship in Poitou, see H Filleau Dictionnaire des Familles de 1'ancien Poitou Poitiers 1849-54 Vol.II p. 791, for continual payment, FF 32511 f140ro (account for 1451) also AN K168 no. 21.

(70) AN KK50 f 2vo.

(71) id. f9vo.

(72) Simon de Phares Recueil des Plus Celebres Astrologues et Quelques Hommes Doctes ed. Wicket heimer Paris 1929 p. 250-1.

(73) Perceval de Cagny p.121, Juvenal des Ursins p. 566.

(75) Pluscarden p. 358-9, Scotichronicon p. 462, Juvenal des Ursins p. 566.

(76) Journal d'un Bourgeois de Paris ed. Tuetey Paris 1881 p. 139.

(77) Clairambault 41 no. 144.

(78) Ordonnances Vol.XI p. 126.

(79) J Deniau La Commune de Lyon et La Guerre Bourguignonne (1417-35) Paris 1934 p. 405.

(80) Stuart p. 120.

(81) Quicherat p. 12, 18. 

(82) FF 24000 p. 18.

(83) Clairambault 100 no. 119, 103 no‑97.

(84) Deniau p. 409,H de Flamare Le Nivernais pendant La Guerre de Cent Ans Paris 1913-25 Vol. I p. 136.

(85) Ordonnances Vol. XI p. 141-2.

(86) id p. 159.

(88) Arsenal 4522 f17ro.

(89) Deniau p. 411-2, C Guigue Registres Consulaires de la Ville de Lyon Vo1.II Lyon 1926 p.8.

(90) Scotichronicon p. 463.

(91) Stuart p. 11.

(92) Pluscarden p. 358.

(93) FF32510 f365ro.

(94) Cousinot p.189.

(95) Bourgeois de Paris p. 184.

(96) FF23018 f433ro. Monstrelet Vol.IV p. 137.

(97) Arsenal 4522 18vo.

(99) Cousinot p. 190.

(100) Perceval de Cagny p. 129.

(101) AD Indre-et-Loire EE2.

(102) AD Loiret CC 548 7vo. 8vo. 21vo. For similar gifts presented by Tours AD Indre-et-Loire CC 19 83vo.

(103) AD Indre-et-Loire CC 19 f84ro, 86ro-vo.

(104) id 86vo, 87ro.

(106) AN KK50 15ro, 13ro.

(107) id f13vo. 14ro.

108) Miracles d.Q Str. Katherine p. 49 no.95.

(109) FF 32510 364ro.

(110) id 364vo.

(111) Clairambault 52 no.78.

(112) Daumet p. 81.

(113) On this, see Mirot, though he makes a much rosier estimate of the completeness and general useability of this than I would.

(114) AN AB XIX 690-3 Vo1.III under Kainzie (the volumes are largely unpaginated).

(115) AN J475 no.98, (3,4).

(117) pf Marchegay quotes this in extenso in 'Documents Relatifs a 1'Histoire Maritime au XVe Siecle' Revue Des Societes Savantes 6th series tII 1875 p. 161-3.

(118) AN K168 no. 20, AD Cher C 1046 39vo-41ro.

(119) Gilles le Bouvier (Herault Berri) 'Chronique de Charles VII' in Godefroy Histoire de Charles VII p. 369.

(120) Waurin VOl.II p. 42-60.

(121) Bouvier p. 369.

(122) id p. 370 'Les Vigilles de Charles VII' in Les Poesies de Martial de Paris dit d'Auvergne ed. Coustelier Paris 1724 Vol.I p. 50-1. (123) 'Livre des Trahisons de France envers la Maison de Bourgogne' in Chroniques Relatives a 1'Histoire de la Belgique sous la Domination des Ducs de Bourgogne ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove Brussels 1870‑6 Vo1.II p. 169-70.

(124) FF 23018 f438vo-9ro.

(125) Martial d'Auvergne p. 51 Letters and Papers Illustrative of the Wars of the English in France during the Reign of Henry VI ed. Rev. J. Stevenson, Rolls Series London 1861 Vo1.II Part II p.385 quoting Harleian Ms 782 f51.

(126) Monstrelet Vol.IV p.161.

(127) Waurin Vol.II p. 68; he puts losses at around 4,000.

(128) id p. 68, Monstrelet p. 62.

(129) id p.62, Waurin p. 69.

(131) AN JJ 179 no. 136.

(132) Miracles dt Ste.Katherine p. 69 no. 113.

(133) L Caillet Etude sur les Relations de la Commune de Lyon avec Charles VII et Louis XI Paris-Lyon 1909 p. 106‑7.

(1.34) Bouvier p. 370, Cousinot p. 221 on armoured Lombard horses, Pluscarden p. 361.

(135) Bouvier p. 370, Cousinot p. 221.

(137) Caillet p. 85-6.

(138) Caillet p. 338-9 (No. XXXVII).

(139) FF 32510 f364vo-5ro.

(140) Bouvier p. 370.

(141) id p. 370, Raoulet p. 183-4, Martial d'Auvergne p. 52, Flamare Vo1.I p. 176.

(142) Rymer Vol. X p. 294-5.

(143) id p.302-7 For the provisions expressly excluding the Scots in France from the truce, see p.331.

(144) AN J 677 no. 20.

(145) Marchegay p. 160-3. On the same day, Douglas formally promis–ed to cross by 6th December - AN J 680 no. 80.

(146) Stevenson Vol.II Part I p. 18-23.

(147) Marchegay p. 163.

(148) AN J 183 no. 136, 141.

(149) Doat 9 p. 279.

(150) Cousinot p. 195.

(151) Arch Hist Saintonge Vol.XXXII p. 342, 345.

(152) AN XIa 8604 f45ro-46vo. AN J680 no. 79, F Lat 10187 f2ro-3vo.

(153) Indre-et-Loire BB 22 (Volume unfoliated) deliberation of 24th April cc 21 85ro.

(154) id BB 22 29th, 30th April.

(155) A Grandilhon, Ville d'Aubigny-sur-Nere - Inventaire Sommaire des Archives Communales Anterieur 'a 1790 Bourges 1931 p. 4.

(156) FF 20684 p. 541-2 for all review strengths.

(157) Indre-et-Loire BB 22 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th May.

(158) id 6th February.

(159) id 19th June, 5th July.

(160) id 4th August.

(161) id CC 21 f94ro-vo.

(162) AN J 505 nos. 5-7.

(163) AD Loire-et-Cher 30 H 32 p. 209.

(164) Cousinot p. 222, Raoulet p. 186.

(165) Indre-et-Loire CC 21 f95ro.

(166) Bourgeois de Paris p. 195-6, Waurin Vol.II p. 105.

(167) ,I Augis 'La Bataille de Verneuil (Jeudi 17 Aou't 1424) vue de Chateaudun' in Bulletin Trimestrielle de la Societe Dunoise p. 117-8.

(168) 'Chronique de Gilles de Roye' in Chroniques rel. a la Dom. des Ducs de Bour. eti Aelgique Vol.I p. 192.

(170) ID

(171) Jean Chartier Vol. I p.42.

(172) Thomas Basin Histoire de Charles VII ed. C Samaran Paris 1933 Vo1.I p. 93, Cousinot p. 224. For the English horses "Tous lies ensemble" in the rear, see Pierre de Fenin Memoires ed. Dupont Paris 1837 p..220-1.

(173) Cousinot p. 225, Bouvier p. 371, Waurin p. 112-3.

(174) Cousinot p. 197-8, 225, as against him see, for instance, Basin p. 95, Bourgeois de Paris p. 197, Bouvier p. 372 etc.

(175) id. On English reserves, see Monstrelet Vo1.IV p. 194.

(176) AN JJ 172 Ro. 629 quoted in Chronique de St. Michel ed. S Luce Paris 18794p: 142-3.

(177) Basin p. 97, Scotichronicon p. 463.

(178) Raoulet p. 187.

(179) Waurin p. 116.

(180) For some kind of "official" English list see Stevenson Vol.II Part II p. 395 (from Harleian ms 782); all chronicles give different lists.

(183) de Roye p. 192-3.

(184). Bouvier p. 372, FF 23018 f450ro.

(185) Basin p. 97-101.

(186) Indre-et-Loire BB 22 19th, 22nd August.

(187) id CC 21 f95vo.

(188) id f86ro.

(189) AN XIa 8604 f69vo-70vo.

(190) F Lat 10187 f4ro-6vo.

(191) FF 23018 f451ro-vo.

(192) Beaucourt Vol.II p.79.

(193) F Lat 6024 nos. 18-9, 24, 26, 28.

(194) Clairambault 136 no. 5, AN K 62 no. 33, Pieces Originales, 20 Dossier Albert no. 3.

(195) Scotichronicon p. 484.

(196) F Lat 8757 f47ro-53vo.

(197) AN J 678 nos. 21-6, Acts of the Parliament of Scotland ed. t Thomson London 1814 Vo1.II p.26-8.

(198) AN J 678 no. 27.

(200) FF 26295 no. 881.

(201) Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England ed. Sir Harris Nicolas London 1834 Vol.II p. 323.

(202) Exchequer Rolls Vol.IV p. 406, 432, Scotichronicon p. 484.

(203) E Cosneau Le Connetable de Richemont Paris 1886 p. 150.

(206) FF 32510 f370vo.

(207) id f371ro, AN X2a 18 f121vo.-4ro.

(208) FF 20684 p. 546.

(209) FF 24000 p. 478.

(210) PO Dossier Stuart nos. 2-4.

(211) AN K 168 no. 682, AN XIa 8604 f100vo, AN J 216 no. 20, Stuart p. 144.

(212) Stuart id, Cust p. 12-14.

(213) PO Dossier Valpergue nos. 2‑3.

(214) Chastellain Vol.II p.21-2.

(215) Guigue Registeres Consulaires  Vol.II p. 145-7, 156-8, 160, 162-3, 171, 177, 179.

(216) Guigue p. 157.

(217) FF 20684 p.548-9.

(218) Guillaume Gruel Chronique d'Arthur de Richemont ed. A le Vavasseur Paris 1890 p. 50-1, Stuart p. 141.

(219) Gruel p. 56.

(220) FF 20684 p. 550.

(221) Cousinot p. 202.

(222) Raoulet p. 192, Gruel p. 58-9, Cousinot p. 245-6.

(223) Bouvier p. 372.

(224) FF 25767 no. 137 etc.

(225) Indre-et-Loire BB 23 3ro-4ro. CC 22 96vo.

(226) id CC 22 114ro-vo.

(227) id BB 23 13vo.

(228) id BB 23 20ro.

(229) id BB 24 22ro. 44ro-45vo.

(230) id BB 24 83ro, 87vo.

(231) id EE 2 dated 4th August 1428.

(232) id B13 23 22ro, 26ro. BB 24 16ro. etc.

(233) id BB 23 37vo.

(234) AN KK 269 f52vo.

(236) AN JJ 180 no. 28.

(237) Quicherat p. 30-4.

(238) C Devic and J.Vaissette Histoire Generale de Languedoc New ed. Toulouse 1885 Vol. IX p. 1101.

(239) Giugue p. 288-91, Deniau p. 544-5, Quicherat p. 35-7.

(240) Miracles de St. Katherine p. 57-60 no. 104.

(241) Proces de Condomnation et de Rehabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc dite La Pucelle ed. J Quicherat 1841 Vo1.IV p. 98 (Journal of the siege).

(242) id p. 101, Waurin Vol.II p. 251.

(243) AD Loiret A 2178 f20ro-vo.

(244) Charles de la Saussey (Carl Sausseyo) Annales Ecclesiae Aureliensis Paris 1615 p. 596.

(245) FF 7858 41vo-42ro. (parallel figures for all references to this source appear in J Loiseleur 'Compte des depenses faites par Charles VII Pour Secourir Orleans Pendant le Siege de 1428' in Memoires de la Societe Archeologique de 1'Orleanais t XI 1868) p. 92-3;  164-209.

(246) id.

(248) FF 7858 f47vo.

(249) Proces p. 116.

(250) id p. 117, FF 7858 f45ro-vo.

(251) FF 7858 f46vo-47ro.

(252) Proces p. 117-20.

(253) Monstrelet Vol. IV p. 311-2, Waurin Vol.II p. 255-8, Cousinot p.268.

(255) Loiret CC 540 fl6ro.

(256) Saussayo p. 596, Francisque-Michel Vol. I p. 161.

(257) Mistere p. 343.

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