The
Organisation and Support of an Expeditionary Force: Manpower and Logistics
in the Middle Byzantine Period
By John Haldon
From:
Byzantium at War (1997)
It is generally recognised that the maintenance of its armies and the
recruitment and equipping of its military expeditions constituted one of the
heaviest burdens on the finances of the East Roman state[1]. But for much of the period from the seventh to
the twelfth century we have very little detailed and direct evidence for how
this was managed at a general level, hence the still unresolved debates on the
origins of the so-called theme system; still less direct evidence survives on
the structure of campaigns undertaken against particular enemies.
There is virtually no contemporary evidence, for example, of the means
through which the armies of the emperor Constantine V were raised and supplied
in his numerous campaigns into Bulgaria or against the caliphate in the East,
except what we can glean from the hazy reports of the Chronographia
of Theophanes, or the Brief History of
the patriarch Nikephoros. Yet the methods adopted for equipping and supplying
armies crucially affect their fighting ability and potential, the planning and
execution of campaign strategy, and the speed with which soldiers can be
mobilised and then marched to meet the enemy.
The nature of the communications and transport infrastructure and the
ways in which a central government is able to maintain or extend it is thus also
a crucial element which affects a state's ability to respond defensively to
external threat or to act offensively against a neighbouring power.
Byzantines themselves were clearly aware of these factors and the key
role they played, as the Tactica of the emperor Leo VI, compiled in the late ninth or early
tenth century, in two brief sections 'On Logistics', makes clear[2].
By the ninth century, it is clear that the system of recruiting and
maintaining soldiers in what had been the field armies of the late Roman state
had undergone a radical transformation, producing the pattern of
provincially-based and recruited forces referred to as themata.
We cannot go into the debate on the military lands here, nor pursue the
question of the extent to which the themata,
as a term for military forces based in the provinces, were effective[3]. But
methods of recruitment were not just limited to a hereditary obligation related
in some way to an independent (usually landed) income, an impression sometimes
given by some of the modern literature.
On the contrary, the state always made use of a range of options, and it
is the question of why one particular option dominated at a given moment that
should concern us. At the
height of the process of provincialised recruitment and maintenance of troops,
for example, during the eighth and first half of the ninth centuries, there is
plenty of evidence to show that voluntary recruitment to both elite and
provincial forces, compulsory levies in the provinces, and the attraction of
non-Byzantine mercenaries co-existed, and were invoked according to the
requirements of the moment. And
this sort of question immediately raises other, related issues, about the nature
of power-relations between central power-elite and provinces, for example, or
about the systems for the extraction, re-distribution and consumption of
resources in men and materials. It
is to these latter issues that I now wish to turn[4].
Throughout the period in question the state continued to be able to raise
substantial expeditionary forces. Armies
led by the emperors of the ninth and tenth centuries - Basil I, Nikephoros II,
John Tzimiskes, for example - may have numbered on occasion as many as 50,000
soldiers, perhaps more, although such figures seem to be exceptions, and there
is a great deal of disagreement among historians on the issue, given the often
contradictory and partial sources. On
the whole, Byzantine and Arab armies were really quite small compared with the
armies mustered in late medieval and early modern times, and all the exact
figures we can derive from the sources confirm this impression[5]. But while the question of the numbers of the individual
units, as well as that of the total of soldiers available for active service at
any given time remains debated, there is no doubt that large numbers of men and
materials could be mobilised fairly rapidly, and that this involved a major
administrative effort and a complex process which the central government had to
manage and to co-ordinate[6].
Military activities and expeditions can be very crudely divided into
defensive and offensive operations. But
the differences in scale between a major imperial attack against enemy
territory, and a small-scale defensive operation or a raid require very
different levels of organisation and can be supported through vastly different
means. In the following, we
will examine briefly the basic processes in both cases.
We are fortunate in that an important text, or group of texts, survives
from a tenth-century compilation, which throws a good deal of light on the
expeditionary practices of the second half of the ninth and the tenth centuries.
These documents, which seem to incorporate material from the reign of
Basil I, as well as from the middle of the tenth century, were incorporated
eventually into the manuscript of what is now known as the De
Caerimoniis or the Ekthesis tês
Basileiou taxeôs, probably by accident by a later compiler; and concern
aspects of the organisation of an imperial expedition, which is to say, one in
which the emperor himself participates.
Two of the documents are based on an earlier treatise ascribed to the magistros
Leo Katakylas, and supposedly commissioned by Leo VI.
While it is dangerous to generalise from a context in which an emperor
might be involved, the documents nevertheless provide a wealth of valuable
information[7]. In addition to these texts, there survive also a
further group of documents which appear to originate in the stratiôtikon logothesion, namely those relating to a series of
military expeditions to Italy and to Crete in the period between 911 and 949.
These provide statistical data and details of equipment, expenses,
methods of raising manpower, as well as of the complements of warships and
transports. While the figures
given in the texts are clearly corrupted in one or two cases, and the whole must
be used with considerable caution, they again provide invaluable information on
the administrative arrangements and structure of expeditionary forces at this
period. In addition to this
material, a number of practical handbooks or stratêgika
survive from the tenth century, which include important information about armies
on campaign[8]. Together with incidental references in histories and
hagiographies, as well as the evidence from letters and from sigillographical
material, it is possible to piece together a picture of how the middle Byzantine
state set about organising, funding and equipping a major campaign army.
But there is additional evidence which can be drawn upon, for it is clear
from this middle Byzantine material that the fundamental constraints operating
in the ninth to eleventh centuries were very similar to those operating in the
fifth and sixth centuries; and that it is, in consequence, possible to use the
evidence from the Codex Iustinianus
and the Novels of emperors from this
earlier period to help reconstruct the structures of the later period.
We shall deal with the various aspects in the formation of a military
expedition under several separate headings: first, the means whereby a campaign
was supplied and supported; second, the methods through which soldiers were
recruited and equipped; and third, the relationship between the armies and the
provincial populations.
First, then, the process whereby an expedition was supplied with
provisions, materials and shelter. According
to the treatise on military expeditions compiled by the magistros
Leo Katakylas, and referring almost certainly to the campaign practice of the
emperor Basil I[9],
it is noted that the prôtonotarios of
each thema through which the imperial
force passes must provide certain supplies in kind from the aerikon and the synônê.
If this is not sufficient, then the prôtonotarios
should obtain the necessary produce from the eidikon[10]. The passage is compressed and by itself difficult to
interpret in more than a very general sense.
But this account is supplemented by a slightly different version of the
process in a much extended and re-worked version of the treatise compiled at the
behest of Constantine VII himself, perhaps in the 950s[11].
These two passages describe in effect a process very close indeed to that
set out in Novel 130 of the emperor Justinian. According to these sixth-century regulations, the provincial
officials are to be given advance notice of the army's requirements in
foodstuffs and other goods, which are to be deposited at named sites along the
route of march. The materials, food
supplies and other requirements demanded by the provincial authorities on behalf
of the central government were referred to as embolê,
and meant simply that part of the regular tax assessment owed by each tax-payer
(whether an estate, an individual peasant freeholder, or whatever) not paid in
coin. Exact
records of the produce supplied by the tax-payers as embolê,
were to be kept and reckoned up against the annual tax owed in this form; if
more supplies were provided than were due in tax, then the extra was to be
supplied by the tax-payers, but this was then to be paid for, at a fixed
rate established by the appropriate state officials, out of the cash
revenues already collected in the regular yearly assessment of that particular
province. In other words what was
known as a coemptio
in Latin, or synônê in Greek, was
applied. If the provincial
treasuries in question had insufficient local cash revenues left over to pay for
these extra supplies, then they were to be paid for instead either from the general bank of the praetorian prefecture, in other
words, the coemptio was still applied;
or they were to be collected anyway and then their value (at the prices fixed by
the state) deducted from the following year's assessment in kind[12].
The account in the two versions of the treatise on expeditions, which
describes the situation in the ninth and tenth centuries, is similar: the
thematic prôtonotarios is to be
informed in advance as to the army's requirements, which are to be provided from
the land-tax in kind and the cash revenues of the thema and stored at appropriate points along the route of march.
An exact account of the supplies is to be kept, so that (where the
thematic tax-payers provided more than their yearly assessment demands) the
amount can be deducted (from the assessment for the following year).
Both passages note that, where supplies cannot be paid for out of the
local fiscal revenues, the cash (or the supplies - the text does not specify
which, although the former would be far more likely) is to be taken from the
bureau of the eidikon, just as in the
sixth century the cash was taken from the general bank of the prefecture.
The second text notes that the final accounts are worked out, after the
expedition has been stood down, in the eidikon[13].
It is clear from these texts that the basic fiscal mechanisms in the
sixth and the ninth centuries were almost identical: the terminology had changed, and the administrative
relationships between the different departments responsible for the procedure
was slightly different, but in essentials the later system was very obviously
derived from the earlier. The
process by which the evolution of the later process out of the earlier occurred
nicely illustrates the degree of systemic continuity between late Roman and
middle Byzantine practices. In
fact, there are a number of other issues which are connected with these
developments, notably the change in meaning
of the word synônê, although
I will not pursue that issue here[14]. The question of the thematic prôtonotarioi
is worth attention, however, for this official appears only during the first
half of the ninth century (or possibly in the last years of the eighth)[15]. His role in the later ninth century, as a thematic
representative of the sakellion, has
been discussed already; but he seems to have replaced earlier officials, eparchai,
who were the successors of the ad hoc praetorian prefects despatched by the
department of the Praetorian Prefect in the fifth and sixth centuries,
responsible for liaising between the army and its demands, on the one hand, and
the provincial fiscal officials in whose area the army was operating, on the
other[16]. These officials seem still to have been functioning in
the 840s, although it is clear that they were being replaced by the prôtonotarioi by that time[17]. Whatever the exact details of the administrative
changes - one of which certainly involved an extension of the supervisory
authority of the thematic stratêgoi -
the continuity in the structures of supplying field forces between the sixth and
ninth-century is undeniable, and we may reasonably assume that they applied also
to the earlier ninth and eighth centuries.
The documents dealing with the preparations for the expeditions to Crete
and Italy can now be used to fill in some of the details of the system I have
just outlined. Fragments of
four documents survive, incorporated into the second part of the De
Caerimoniis, probably intended originally for a separate dossier on military
expeditions, perhaps that which would also originally have included the three
documents on imperial expeditions noted already.
Document 1 is a list of the troops and armaments for the expedition to
Crete under Himerios in 911[18]. Documents 2 and 3 deal briefly with the vessels and
troops sent under the prôtospatharios
Epiphanios to the thema of Lombardy by
Romanos I in the 8th year of the indiction (i.e. 935)[19];
and the gifts sent to the King of the Lombards to encourage his support against
rebels in the theme of Lombardy[20]. Document 4 presents a detailed, if jumbled account, of
the armaments, costs and troops sent on the expedition to Crete in 949[21].
Documents 1, 2 and 4, and especially 1 and 4, provide an enormous wealth
of information, and a proper analysis of their contents, the internal
contradictions they contain, and the technical language in which they are
written would far surpass the limits of this paper. But it is possible to summarise briefly what they tell us
about the organisation of an expedition. In
the first place, it is clear that in addition to the regular supplies to be
provided by the thematic prôtonotarioi,
extra supplies in foodstuffs and in kind had to be raised.
The large amounts of coined gold and silver required seem to have been
supplied through the eidikon, for the fitting out of the ships involved, and from the
other revenue-producing departments through the sakellarios, whose supervisory capacity permitted him to exercise a
general control over expenditures[22]; the theme prôtonotarioi
were made responsible for raising additional supplies for the expedition,
working presumably with officials of the genikon,
a point supported by evidence from the earlier ninth century[23]. In certain circumstances, imperial officials were
despatched to the themata to assist in
collecting and transporting the supplies: an imperial officer - described simply
as 'a certain basilikos' - was sent to
the Anatolikon region in 910/911 to raise barley, biscuit, corn and flour for
the Kibyrrhaiot forces. Specific
directions were given for the route by which it was to be transported[24]. The military officers, through their own officials,
were commissioned with raising the necessary extra weapons and military
equipment[25]; and the departments of the eidikon
and the vestiarion appear as major
repositories and suppliers of a whole range of requirements for the fleet and
the army[26]. Armies were usually accompanied by a
supply-train; the late
tenth-century treatise on campaign organisation stipulates a basic supply of 24
days' rations of barley for the horses, which according to other sources was
similarly to be put aside by the thematic prôtonotarios
for collection by the army en route[27];
and historians' accounts of campaigns frequently mention the baggage-train or
the supplies and fodder it carried[28]. Not all these supplies were derived from the regular
land-tax, however: depending on the local circumstances, much of it must also
have been raised through compulsory exactions, as in the late Roman period.
This was certainly the case when the emperor was present[29]. Similarly, the prôtonotarioi
of the affected themes had to provide supplies which could be transported by
wagon or mule to the army on enemy territory, if the surrounding districts had
been devastated. But smaller units
clearly foraged for their own fodder and supplies, whether in enemy territory or
on Roman soil, which must have caused some hardship to the communities affected;
while once on hostile terrain the commander must either have arranged to keep
his supply-lines open by detaching small units to hold key passes and roads[30],
or let the army forage for all its requirements once the supplies had run out[31]. Some incidental evidence from the contemporary
historians illustrates these methods in operation[32].
The burden of supporting soldiers passing through on campaign had always
been onerous, as a number of sources from the later Roman period through to the
tenth century testify. This
was not just because of the demands made by the army on local productive
capacity, but reflected also the fact that state intervention into local
exchange relations on such a large scale could adversely affect the economic
equilibrium of an area. In
the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries there is very clear evidence of the
distortion of prices by these means: either through the state's fixing
artificially low prices for the sale of produce to the army, thus harming the
producers; or by sudden heavy demand driving prices, for non-state purchasers,
upwards. Even more telling is the evidence of the sixth-century
legislation on the situation in Thrace and the combined effects of barbarian
inroads and military supply demands on the economy of the region.
The establishment of the quaestura
exercitus was aimed at resolving one element of this problem, for through
the administrative linkage between the Aegean islands and coastal regions
concerned with the Danube zone the troops in that theatre could be supplied from
relatively wealthy productive areas by sea and river transport.
Yet the problem remained acute enough for Maurice to attempt to have his
armies winter on the non-Roman side of the river in 593 and 602[33]. Leo VI advised generals to carry sufficient supplies
with the army and to forage on enemy territory rather than prey upon the
citizens of the empire[34]; the need to avoid harming the provincials by permitting the
army to forage and extract supplies without proper administrative controls is
often repeated - although even where such controls were established, the
presence of a large force of soldiers, their animals and their followers will
rarely have been welcome[35]. The provincial administrators do seem to have tried to
minimise the effects of passing military forces, and one should not
over-exaggerate the problem. But
several letters of the ninth-tenth centuries appeal to state officials against
the burden imposed upon them, or their clients, through the imposition of mitaton and related expenses; these are on several occasions related
explicitly to the effects of the presence of soldiers on campaign.
And while we must allow for some degree of hyperbole on the part of the
more privileged and literate elements in society, some of the complaints are on
behalf of those less fortunate than the writers themselves[36].
II
One of the factors rarely discussed in this context is the rate of march
of Byzantine forces[37],
the amount of supplies that would be needed, the carrying capacity of the
pack-animals accompanying an expedition, and the feed and fodder required in
turn for the baggage train. Although
one obvious reason is the relative dearth of hard evidence, it is possible to
arrive at some fairly reliable figures in respect of some of these questions,
and on this basis to obtain some idea of the effects on the regions through
which the armies passed.
Nikephoros Phokas considered a march of 16 miles (approx. 24km.) to be
both long and tiring for men and horses[38],
and although this rate could have been maintained as an average in some cases,
terrain, weather and the quality of the roads, tracks or paths used by the army
will all have played a role, so that very considerable variations must have been
usual[39]. The average length of a day's march for infantry or
combined forces was probably rarely more than twelve - fourteen miles, which has
been an average for most infantry forces throughout recorded history; and this
figure would more often than not be reduced if very large numbers, which had to
be kept together, were involved[40]. The average can be increased when no accompanying baggage
train is present[41];
and increased yet again for forced marches, although there is an inverse
relationship between the length and speed of such marches and the loss of
manpower and animals through exhaustion[42]. The distances at which supply dumps could be
established or stops made to feed and water men and animals was also directly
related to the distance covered in a day's march and how much provisions and
water could be carried before re-supply was necessary[43].
In hostile territory, light cavalry scouts were sent ahead to spy out the
army's line of march, the position of enemy forces and fortifications, the
availability of wood and water, fodder and food, and were responsible for
providing the commanders of the Roman forces with sufficient information for
them to plan their route and the marching camps[44]. In Roman territory, in contrast, the route of
march for large forces was generally prepared in advance and supplies provided
through the activities of the local prôtonotarios
of each district affected. Large
concentrations of provisions seem to have been deposited at a few key locations,
in granaries or storehopuses according to the ninth-century report of Ibn
Khurradadhbih, from which they were collected by the army and loaded onto
pack-animals, carts and the soldiers themselves as they passed through[45]. This is clearly the system described in one of the
tenth-century treatises on imperial military expeditions.
We will return to this question below[46].
In the fifth century, it was recommended that soldiers be trained to
carry a load of up to sixty Roman pounds (about 42.3 lbs./19.6 kilos)[47]. This presumably included the traditional seventeen
days' worth of rations[48],
although regulations in the Codex
Theodosianus state that soldiers on the march should carry twenty days'
worth of rations with them. But
there is some question as to whether this amount was regularly carried by the
troops, except when rapid movement was required in hostile territory; in Roman
territory the greater part was probably transported by accompanying pack-animals[49],
a point borne out in the late sixth century Stratêgikon,
which also recommends that cavalry soldiers carry three to four days' supply
with them in their saddle bags[50].
Rations were consumed on a three-day rotation in the late Roman period: bucellatum
(hard tack) for 2 days in 3, bread for 1 day in 3, salt pork for 1 day in 3,
mutton for 2 days in 3, wine and sour wine on alternate days; as well as a
number of additional substances such as fish, cheese and oil, depending on
context and availability[51].
The amount (weight) of such rations varied, but the figure of 1 lb. (11.28
oz/327 g) of meat and/or 2 - 3 lbs (1.41 lbs/654 g - 2.1 lbs/981 g) of bread per diem per man given in one document for stationary troops seems
to have been standard into the seventh century in Egypt; and there is no reason
to doubt that, however it was actually made up (and whether or not the rotation
of provisions was maintained beyond the first half of the seventh century), this
figure represented a constant in the preceding and following periods[52]. Given that the meat element would be reduced to a
minimum or to nothing under most campaigning conditions, this may seem too
little to provide adequate nutrition, in view of the relatively low protein
element in grain. But ancient
strains of wheat and barley had considerably higher protein content than modern
strains, so that - regardless of the protein loss inevitable in the process of
baking milled grain to produce bread or biscuit - the bread ration of soldiers
in ancient and medieval times provided adequate nutrition even without meat[53].
This campaign ration would give the maximum sixty-(Roman) pound load per
man for about twenty days; although under normal marching conditions much of the
individuals' supplies would be transported by pack-animal or wagon, as noted
above[54]. A fifteen-thousand man army would thus require a
minimum of some 900,000 (Roman) lbs. (i.e. 634,500 lbs or 288,400 kilos) of
provisions, excluding drinking water/wine and necessary 'extras', such as lard
and/or oil, cheese or fish, and so on, and not including fodder for the horses
and the pack-animals, for a period of between two and, in exceptional cases,
three weeks.
Assuming an average rate of march for infantry and cavalry together of
between twelve and fourteen miles per day in good conditions (an optimistically
high figure compared with the majority of known military marches from
pre-industrial contexts)[55], such a force could thus travel some 240-280 miles in a
three-week march, which provides a very crude guide to the distances at which
supply dumps would have had to be established in advance.
This figure is confirmed by the tenth-century treatise on campaign
organisation, which notes that 'it is not feasible, in turn, for an army to
transport more than a twenty-four days' supply of barley from its own country
for its horses', which suggests the recognised maximum period for a cavalry
force[56].
Such a rate of march, of course, excludes wheeled vehicles, so that the
amount of fodder required by pack-animals would itself add enormously to the
supply problem. Horses and
mules require considerably more in weight of provisions than soldiers, and are
relatively economically inefficient animals, requiring proportional to their
carrying capacity a much greater weight of supplies than men. Roman military mounts required something in the order
of 20 lbs (9 kg) of fodder per day under non-campaign conditions: some 5-6 lbs
(2.2 - 2.7 kg) barley and a further 10-15 lbs (4.5 - 6.8 kg) hay or grazing[57]. The area required for grazing depended on several factors -
quality of pasturage, seasonal variations, and so forth.
Horses need at least four - five hours' grazing per day, and it has been
calculated that twenty horses would graze one acre of medium-quality pasture; on
campaign, they were probably fed less. They
require an average of 5 - 8 (UK) gallons (22.75 - 36.4 ltr) of water (the amount
varying according to heat, intensity of work etc.)[58]. The availability of grazing obviously depends upon regional
and seasonal variations: where
fodder had to be transported in addition to grain,
mobility would be drastically limited and transport costs increased.
The mules and pack-horses of the expeditionary armies of the tenth
century had to carry their own grain rations as well as the equipment or
provisions for the soldiers, although the loads seem to have been strictly
controlled[59]. Three categories of load are specified: (a)
saddle-horses carrying a man and their own barley were loaded with four modioi each; (b)
unridden saddle-horses carried eight modioi;
(c) pack-animals loaded with barley carried ten modioi each. But it is
unclear what the weight of the modios
in this context should be. As
we have seen, there were several modioi,
the two most relevant for the purposes of the present calculations being the
standard ‘imperial’ basilikos modios,
of 40 Roman pounds (28.2 lbs/12.8 kg); and the smaller annonikos modios (the modius
castrensis), assessed at two-thirds the weight of the former, i.e. 26.5
Roman pounds (18.6 lbs/8.5 kg). If
we take the larger modios, we get the
following results (excluding weights for riders, saddles and pack-saddles):
for group (a) of animals: a load of
160 Roman pounds = 112.8 lbs (51.2 kg);
for group (b) a load of 320 Roman pounds = 225.6 lbs (102.5 kg); and
for group (c) 400 Roman pounds = 282 lbs (128.18 kg).
Taking
the smaller figure, the same loads would be:
for group (a) 106 Roman pounds = 75 lbs (34 kg);
for group (b) 212 Roman pounds = 150 lbs (68 kg); and
for group (c) 265 Roman pounds = 187 lbs (85 kg)[60].
Now
the approximate maximum weight a horse or mule can carry over any distance is
about 250 lbs (114 kg), or in Roman/Byzantine measures, 282 pounds i.e. 7
‘imperial’ modioi, or 10.5 annonikoi
modioi . Given that the sagma
or pack-saddle and associated harness weighed between 50 and 60 Roman pounds (35
- 42 lbs/16 - 19 kg)[61],
this would permit loads of up to about 200 lbs (91 kg), which is to say 225
Roman pounds (i.e. 5.6 basilikoi modioi
or 8.5 annonikoi modioi).
Bearing in mind the totals thus suggested by the figures in the
tenth-century treatise on imperial expeditions, we may reasonably conclude that
the measure used for loading pack-animals and, therefore, for assessing the tax
collected in kind by the thematic prôtonotarioi,
was indeed the annonikos modios,
equivalent to the older modius castrensis,
the lesser volume, rather than the larger ‘imperial’ modios,
which would have impossibly overloaded the animals (and thus illustrating once
again the degree of continuity in fiscal administrative practice from the late
Roman period). Animals in
each of the three categories in question would, in consequence, be carrying as
follows (weights in modern measures):
for group (a) load: 75 lbs (34 kg), plus saddle: 40 lbs (18 kg), plus
rider: 140 lbs (64 kg) = 255 lbs (116 kg);
for group (b) load: 150 lbs (68 kg), plus pack saddle: 40 lbs (18 kg) =
190 lbs (86.3 kg); and
for group (c) load: 187 lbs (84 kg), plus pack-saddle: 40 lbs (18 kg) =
227 lbs. (103.2 kg).
This
is not the place to go into the question of the breeds and types of horse
available in the middle Byzantine period[62]. But these are substantial burdens in view of the mean
carrying capacity of the animals in question.
And while horses and mules of the breeds most probably available in the
late Roman and Byzantine world can carry up to 300 lbs (136.4 kg) for short
distances, the figures given in our text represent loads for long journeys, and
the concern expressed in the document regarding overloading, and punishments
meted out for overloading, are not surprising, echoing similar sentiments in the
late Roman legislation on the loads for animals of the cursus publicus[63]. It is probable that the imperial saddle horses were not
constantly ridden, but led, and that when they were ridden their loads were
removed. Their better ration - they
received a triple ration, in contrast to the double ration issued to the other
animals - may also have enabled them to bear a somewhat heavier load for short
distances[64].
Since a horse will consume between 15 - 25 lbs per day (6.81 - 11.36 kg),
as noted above (the lower figure being an absolute minimum requirement, the mean
- 20 lbs (9.09 kg) - representing the figures derived from late Roman sources,
and the higher representing the feed of cavalry horses in the European theatre
during the early nineteenth century)[65],
of which at least 5 lbs (2.27 kg) was barley or 'hard feed', the 75 lbs (34.09
kg) barley feed carried by the higher-quality horses for their own consumption
will have been sufficient for a march of about fifteen days (75 ÷5). The treatise (C) on imperial expeditions is quite
explicit that it is barley which is to be carried, rather than hay or other
fodder, as is the tenth-century treatise on campaign organisation (which
reflected an interest particularly in the Balkan theatre) and it is to be
supplied by the various prôtonotarioi
of the different themata through which
the army passes, deposited in advance according to the route planned by the
commander[66]. From the descriptions in both the treatises and the
historians' accounts it is clear that the normal campaigning seasons were in the
spring or late summer, when pasturage would be available for the horses' grazing
requirements. Special
arrangements were made for the grazing of the animals of the baggage train and
for the imperial riding horses[67]. In Roman territory, security was less important,
although grazing horses and pack-animals were supervised. In enemy territory, the perimeter of the camp was laid
out to accommodate and protect all the animals.
The epeiktês, an official on
the staff of the komês and the chartoularios
of the stable, was responsible for the pasturage as well as for the feed of the
animals[68]. We may conclude that major supply dumps were needed at
stages of approximately 200 - 250 miles, although under very good conditions and
with smaller numbers imperial forces may have moved more rapidly than this and
needed re-supplying less frequently; fast-moving cavalry forces will have been
even less demanding, although ample fodder and water will have been essential.
On the basis of these admittedly somewhat approximate calculations, the
1086 pack-animals of the imperial household baggage described in the
tenth-century treatise we have referred to[69]
will have required a basic 5,430 gals
(1,133 ltr) of water, 543 acres (280 ha) of pasture, and 5,430 lbs (2,468
kg) of barley feed per day. In
practice, the amount of green fodder acreage - grazing - required will have
fluctuated fairly sharply acording to local conditions; while water-consumption
will likewise have varied according to temperature, size of load, speed of
movement and similar factors. Nevertheless,
these averages give some idea of the quantities of supplies involved.
A cavalry force of similar strength will have required about the same for
the horses of each soldier; but we must then add supplies for re-mounts and
pack-animals, so that the total provisions necessary for the animals of a
fast-moving cavalry force of 1,000 men will have amounted to at least half as
much again, expanded exponentially as the distance over which supplies had to be
transported increased, along with the number of pack-animals thus entailed: the
greater the number of pack-animals, the greater the total amount of fodder,
since they will themselves have consumed a portion of their loads; the longer
the journey, the greater the relative rate of consumption, until the expedition
becomes a logistical impossibility[70]. Multiply these figures by (at least) fifteen for
the imperial cortège alone, and the amount of provisions which each prôtonotarios will have had to arrange at the appropriate
re-supplying points can be deduced. Where
barley feed was not available for short periods, the amount of pasturage
required will have increased substantially. And an expedition which set off in seasons when pasturage was
not available will have needed to carry dry fodder with it, thus enormously
increasing the overall demand for pack-animals exponentially.
With these quantities in mind, and bearing in mind also the very
problematic nature of many of the figures and statistics offered above, the
magnitude of the administrative and logistical task facing thematic officials in
filling the storehouses referred to by Ibn Khurradadhbih is nevertheless very
apparent.
But travelling across Anatolia presented a number of difficulties, even
before entering hostile territory. From
Constantinople as far as Dorylaion, which at 792 m above sea-level is situated
near the northern limit of the Anatolian plateau, fodder will have been
relatively easily obtained. Thereafter,
as Crusader accounts make clear, armies will have had to carry much of their
provisions and fodder with them until they reached the more fertile region
around Ikonion, passing through only occasional and small cultivated areas in
more sheltered minor river valleys. Similar
considerations apply to forces moving south-west from Koloneia towards Kaisareia,
and then beyond either south-west or south-east; and then for those forces
moving south-east from Ikonion towards Cilicia.
These were the districts in which the role of the prôtonotarioi
of the themata will have been most
crucial, for without their support - and as the Crusading forces found in 1097 -
the collecting and organising of supplies sufficient for a middling-sized force
of some 5 - 10,000 will have been exceedingly difficult[71]. It is worth noting, in passing, that the main imperial aplêkta
as they are listed in a garbled list of the tenth century and as confirmed by
historical accounts of ninth-century campaigns, form an arc running across the
north-western and northern edges of the central Anatolian plateau - at Malagina,
Dorylaion and Kaborkin for the westerly route towards Amorion and then on to
Ikonion; at Dazimon, Koloneia and Kaisareia for the northern route.
Bathys Ryax, south-west of Koloneia and south of Dazimon was established
as a base near Sebasteia for the march towards either Kaisareia or Tephrike,
further to the East[72]. This arc marks the limits of what has been
identified as the area most exposed to Arab raiding and attacks during the
second half of the seventh and the eighth centuries, and would appear in
consequence to represent a logical response to the needs of both defending the
areas beyond it, to north and west, as well as to the needs of counter-attacking
forces[73]. Thereafter, fodder and supplies will have had to be
transported or collected at camps established en route, which will necessarily
have been situated at the distances appropriate for the troops concerned -
cavalry only, infantry only, mixed forces, and so on.
And once into hostile or devastated territory, twenty-four days' supplies
was the standard limit before foraging will have become unavoidable.
Such logistical factors set very specific limits to the possibilities for
mounting military operations.
III
Horses and mules were raised from a variety of different sources.
If the imperial household was involved, then all the main state
departments, the leading civil and military officers, the metropolitanates and
the monastic houses of the empire had to provide a certain number of mules or
other pack-animals to transport the household and its requirements[74]. For regular non-imperial campaigns the main sources for
the army were imperial stud-farms in Asia Minor[75];
requisitions from the estates of the Church[76], requisitions from secular landholders (ekthesis or epidosis monoprosôpôn,
which may also have included the animals provided by the Church)[77];
and the soldiers themselves, who either brought their own animals or were
required to purchase their requirements on the market using their salaries and
campaign payments[78].
The soldiers themselves came from an equally wide range of sources, and
for the period from the early ninth until the later tenth century may briefly be
classified as follows. First, the
regular thematikoi, soldiers entered
on the kôdikes held in each theme and
in the military logothesion.
These seem to have been further classified into (a) those who could
actually afford to appear for duty with the requisite equipment and supplies;
(b) those who could afford to pay for their service, but preferred not to serve
in a personal capacity: in their case, they had to provide the equipment,
provisions and the soldier (or, as an alternative, the equivalent value in cash)
to send to the muster, or adnoumion[79];
and (c) those who could not, and had to be maintained by the thematic
administration. This seems to
have been done in one of three ways (or a combination thereof): through what was
termed syndosis, whereby a number of
tax-payers were grouped together and made responsible for the cost of equipping
and supplying the soldier; or by making a wealthy but unwilling stratiôtês
(from among those in category (b) mentioned already) responsible for their
equipment and provisions; as well as by paying and equipping the soldiers
directly through thematic or centrally-raised taxes[80]. In addition, by the middle of the tenth century, it is
clear that considerable numbers of landed properties which had earlier been
classified as adequate to maintain and provide a soldier had been split up due
to inheritance, and that the various parcels into which the registered holding
had since been subdivided were now responsible for a proportional burden, paid
to the local military administration to support an outsider recruited for the
campaign in question. This
procedure overlaps with that described under the term syndosis
already mentioned. Most of
these regular thematic troops seem to have served on a seasonal basis[81].
This system of raising and equipping soldiers evolved fairly quickly
during the tenth century as the pressures on the state's resources increased in
parallel to the demands of the wars of reconquest, particularly from the time of
Romanos II and Nikephoros II. The
Arab chronicler Ibn Hawkal describes the methods of raising troops for
expeditionary forces from an outsider's perspective during the reign of
Nikephoros II, which accords with much of what we can extract from the documents
dealing with the Cretan expedition, and with references to earlier precedents,
for example, in the provinces of the West and the Peloponnese in the time of
Romanos I: each household pays a
certain rate according to the type of service it has to support, the resources
thus extracted going to the maintenance of a soldier or sailor.
Ibn Hawkal records that from the wealthy, a mounted soldier with all his
equipment was required[82]. But the central government could vary the demand: a
particular cash sum from each registered household, or a contribution in
livestock, cavalry mounts and equipment, and so on, could also be required[83]. This has in turn been connected with the more
generalised fiscalisation of the strateia
which seems to have been especially stimulated by the policies of Nikephoros II,
and as reported by Zonaras[84].
Secondly, there were the full-time, core troops based in each thema,
in key fortresses and with the stratêgos
in his headquarters. These
are the standing units of the thematic armies, presumably made up from
registered holders of a strateia who
were able to (or wished to) serve on a permanent basis, and from other less
well-off persons in each thema subject
to the strateia and registered on the
military rolls, but supported by the state on a full-time basis from the income
derived from the fiscalised strateia.
All these different categories of soldier enjoyed the same privileges of
military status. By the early eleventh century such regular thematic
units were often also called tagmata
(of such-and-such a district or theme)[85]. There is some debate as to how numerous these
were in the eighth and ninth centuries; they may always have been paid through
the methods for fiscalising strateia
referred to already, but there was probably always an element of their pay from
central resources: the tariff of pay described by Ibn Khurradadhbih[86],
the fact that the state seems regularly to have despatched officers from
Constantinople with the salaries of the thematic forces[87],
and the fact that this was done in the later ninth century at least on a three-
or four-yearly rotational basis makes this clear[88]. The relationship between these standing contingents and the
thematic militias, for that is in effect what they were, remains unclear[89]. What is clear is that as the tenth century progressed the
state increasingly preferred to raise cash from the commutation of military
service which it could then invest in the more professional and permanent units
of the themes - units which will have included the heavy cavalry referred to in
the legislation of the emperor Nikephoros II[90]. It was these core elements of the thematic forces which
became the tagmata, or permanent
units, of the provinces and themes of the later tenth and eleventh centuries.
Finally, there were the troops which may broadly be defined as
'mercenary' units, although these may again be subdivided into several
categories, the first of which overlaps to a large extent with the previous
category: (a) units made up of individual Romans and non-Romans attracted to
serve for a particular length of time or particular campaign, at specific rates,
and equipped by the state, drawn both from the regular registered stratiôtai
and others: the four imperial tagmata
may be seen in this light[91],
as well as the units occasionally recruited by emperors for special service,
such as the special naval troops raised by Michael II, the Tessarakontarioi,
or the Athanatoi established under
John Tzimiskes; as well as the numerous other special tagmata referred to for the later tenth and eleventh century[92];
and (b) units made up of non-Romans from a particular ethnic group or region -
some sections of the Hetaireia, for
example, the Chazars and Pharganoi serving at court, or the Ethiopian unit
raised during the reign of Theophilos. These
seem normally to have come under Roman command[93].
Last of all, the various foreign units serving under their own leaders
for a particular length of time or campaign become a standard element of the
military establishment - the Rus or
Varangians with their boats in the campaigns of 935 to Italy, and 949 and 965
against Crete, for example[94]. Their numbers increased dramatically during the
eleventh century as the provincial soldiery was neglected and the strateia fiscalised; although it should be emphasised that the use
of mercenaries in large numbers need not in itself be an indicator of 'decline',
political or economic: as has recently been pointed out, they continued to be
employed throughout the twelfth century and well after the stabilisation of
finances and political arrangements achieved by Alexios I and his immediate
successors[95].
Once in hostile territory, it was assumed that the army would encamp and
entrench, and several treatises refer, in one case in considerable detail, to
the procedures to be adopted in establishing a suitable position, in laying out
and in fortifying the encampment. Details
also survive of the order in which the tents of the different units were to be
laid out, the distances between them, the system employed for establishing
watches and picket lines, passwords and camp security, and so forth[96]. To what extent these theories were put into practice
clearly varied according to circumstances, but the evidence of the tenth- and
eleventh-century historians suggests that the standard precautions were indeed
taken when in enemy territory. The
accounts of Leo the Deacon for the campaigns of Nikephoros Phokas, John
Tzimiskes and the young Basil II, of John Skylitzes and Michael Attaleiates for
the same period and for Romanos IV both before and during the Mantzikert
campaign, make this very clear[97]. Some of these encampments were obviously substantial,
able to ward off major attacks by the enemy at times; while the army needed to
be able to set up such an encampment under the most difficult conditions[98]. Anna Comnena feels the need to explain why on one
occasion her father did not entrench and fortify his encampment; so that we may
assume that the practice was generally followed[99]. By the same token, Byzantine writers note occasions
when careless or ignorant commanders failed either to establish a secure camp
or, having done so, fail to ensure adequate supplies in the locality or maintain
adequate guards and piquets to warn of hostile attack[100]. In Roman territory, in contrast, the army could be
housed either in marching camps of this sort, or in the several military base
camps, or aplêkta, situated at key
points along various major military routes[101]. Alternatively, soldiers and officers could also take
lodgings with the civilian population, as the evidence from tenth- and
eleventh-century documents makes clear (the imposition of mitaton
and aplêkton on local populations),
and as at least one ninth-century hagiography, describing how a soldier was
billeted in an inn, testifies[102].
The order of march varied according to the size of the army and the
nature of the terrain, of course, as well as whether or not the emperor was
present. Instructions for
camps and the order of march are much more carefully set out in the latter case.
When the imperial tagmata were present they were given specific positions in camp and
on the march[103];
when they were not present, commanders were recommended to pay attention to the
relative disposition of mounted and infantry units.
Again, the order of march for large forces was very different from that
for smaller detachments or raiding parties, clearly set out for the latter in
the treatise on skirmishing warfare[104]. All the treatises agree that only the minimum of
baggage should accompany the force into hostile regions; the greater part was to
be left in home territory, and the prôtonotarios
of the theme from which the army enters the lands of the enemy should take
charge of it[105].
In the document dealing with imperial military campaigns, most of the
information from which probably dates from the time of Basil I, the army
consists entirely of thematic units and the imperial tagmata. By
the time of the Cretan expeditions, and partly reflecting social changes in the
rural population of the empire, it is clearly quite normal to raise extra units
on a mercenary and short-term basis to make up the deficit in numbers and in
professional esprit in the thematic
militia forces - an imperial officer was despatched to the district of the
so-called Plataniatai, in the Anatolikon
region, for example, to raise 500 selected soldiers, to be equipped from their
salaries or from requisitions in the thema[106]. Unlike the provision of foodstuffs, which could be
taken as part of, or an advance on, the regular land-tax, such requisitions do
not appear to have been compensated, and were especially burdensome.
From the later tenth century and at an increasing rate through the first
half of the eleventh century, the balance between thematic militias on the one
hand and their core professional units and other 'tagmata'
shifted decisively in favour of the latter, which in turn had important
consequences, not just for the ways in which armies were supplied and
maintained, and for the relationship between military units and the provincial
populations; but also for the whole fiscal administration of the state.
The basic structure which had evolved from the late Roman system
described in the fifth and sixth-century evidence, continued to develop and to
respond to the demands and pressures placed upon it during the period of
imperial expansion and reconquest after the middle of the tenth century.
Two points can be emphasised at the outset.
First, the considerable increase in the number of mercenary units
maintained on a full-time basis, both indigenous and foreign, seems also to have
increased the economic pressures on the rural population who had to support
them. Second, one of the
results of this is an increase in the number of requests for exemptions from the
extra burdens which accompanied the presence of such troops in the provinces,
with the consequence that the evidence from documents throwing some light on the
actual mechanisms of extracting supplies and support for the soldiers becomes a
little clearer[107].
IV
There is no evidence to suggest that the pattern of administration of
expeditionary forces changed very markedly between the later tenth and later
eleventh centuries. We can
assume that preparations were made as before, informing thematic officials of
the necessary requirements, which had to be prepared in advance ready for the
army to collect, and that supplies provided were set against the annual tax
demand for the region in question. On
the other hand, the majority of the soldiers were no longer stood down for much
of the year and called up only for such expeditions, or when an attack
threatened, a system which had the obvious advantage, from the point of view of
the management and distribution of resources, that soldiers thus supported
themselves and constituted no extra burden on the tax-payers.
Under the changes which have been referred to, the presence of soldiers
all year round must more often have been the case, and such soldiers would need
to be fed, housed, their animals catered for, and so on, throughout the year.
The lists of impositions in imperial grants of exemption give some idea
of what sort of demands were made. These
burdens were, in themselves, not new: the imposition of billeting and feeding
soldiers and officers, grinding corn and baking bread, and providing extra
supplies for units passing through or based in a district, providing craftsmen
and artisans for public and military works, burning charcoal, providing labour
for the maintenance or construction of roads and bridges, had existed from Roman
times and are still found, sometimes under slightly different names, in the
eleventh century[108]. But in addition, from the middle of the seventh century
and certainly by the tenth and eleventh centuries a group of new impositions had
evolved, including the provision or fabrication of weapons and items of military
equipment, a reflection of the break-down of the late Roman system of fabricae
or state arms factories. After
the period of the initial Arab conquests in the 630s and 640s, most of the late
Roman workshops were outside the imperial frontier; of those that remained
within the state - at Sardis, Nicomedia, Adrianople, Caesarea, Thessaloniki -
virtually nothing is known. But
some evidence of continuity is provided by the reference to exkoussatoi
of an imperial armamenton at Caesarea
in the tenth century, noted already, which may suggest that other establishments
did survive[109]. Arms workshops continued to exist in Constantinople;
but whether the official in charge of these - the archôn
tou armamentou - was in charge of the provincial establishments as well as
these is unclear[110].
The provision of raw materials for weapons had been achieved in the late
Roman period through the regular taxation (iron ore, for example, formed part of
the tax-burden - synteleia - of those
who extracted ore in the Taurus mountain region)[111]
together with compulsory levies in wood and other materials.
The tenth- and eleventh-century evidence suggests that a similar
combination of levies (wood, charcoal etc.) and purchases (or compulsory
purchases) was operated. The
production of different types of weapon was commissioned and passed on to
provincial craftsmen and manufacturers of items such as spears, arrows, bows,
shields and so forth[112]. For other materials, cash could be issued from the eidikon
with which to purchase iron or similar requirements from provincial sources for
the production of specialised items, for example, for
naval construction[113]. During the eleventh century, a number of landlords,
both lay and monastic, succeeded in obtaining exemptions for their estates from
the levy of weapons and other supplies.
Furthermore, since units of mercenary or tagmatic soldiers were often
based permanently in a particular location through the winter season - eis
paracheimasian as it is called in the sources - such demands may have
occurred both more frequently and on a more arbitrary basis, according to the
needs of individual units and their commanders, than hitherto[114].
The earliest extant grants of exemption make no specific mention of
military exactions: that issued by Basil I in 883 simply forbids anyone to 'vex'
the monks of Athos and the monastery of John Kolobos at Hierissos, although this
may have included demands from the military[115]. Leo VI issued a judgement in 908 similarly freeing the
monks from any 'vexation' (or imposition) and 'harm'; and in 934 Romanos I frees
a monastic house near Athos from impositions, corvées and exactions from civil
or episcopal authorities[116]. More explicitly in a document of 945/946 (not extant),
confirmed in a sigillion of 975[117]; and in documents for 957/958, 959/960, 974 and 995, freedom
from explicitly military impositions is granted, including kastroktisia, mêtaton and
chorton (supplying fodder)[118]. In the case of the document of 995, it is worth noting
that it was issued by the military commander of the troops in the region in the
context of the series of Bulgar raids and the presence of large numbers of
Byzantine troops from the Armeniak and Boukellarion
themata, and gives a good idea
of the effects on the local economy of the presence of large bodies of soldiers[119], effects reported in the later account of the wars of the
second half of the tenth century penned by the historian Skylitzes[120]. In the eleventh century Michael Psellos
writes a letter about the weight of the burden of state exactions in the form of
demands for livestock, probably horses, which were needed when the army was
present; and the anonymous author of the Logos
nouthetêtikos is aware of the burden imposed upon the tax-payers when the
imperial cortège and troops pass through a region[121].
In the period before the changes of the later tenth century, it is likely
that the overall burden on the rural population of the provinces was fairly
evenly distributed, and that, although the transit of imperial forces did
involve unusually heavy demands on the communities closest to the routes used by
military detachments, such demands were neither frequent nor regular, the more
so since the emperor's seem to have maximised their use of the system of
base-camps or aplêkta as points for
the concentration of smaller forces from a wide area.
Thus very large armies marching across imperial territory will have been
comparatively unusual - and hence also the much more devastating consequences
when civil strife broke out (as in the war between Michael II and Thomas the
Slav, for example).
The presence of many more full-time units, whether indigenous or foreign,
needing supplies, fodder, housing and other necessities throughout the winter
and possibly all year round, and who could not draw upon their families and
their own resources, must have considerably increased the overall burden on the
rural populations which provided these provisions. The result was, in effect, the extension of the
traditional system for maintaining armies on campaign, which had been in
operation from late Roman times, and which had affected most provinces only
occasionally[122],
into the standard or regular means of maintaining imperial forces.
In contrast to the general situation in the ninth and earlier years of
the tenth century[123],
the bulk of the provincial soldiery could no longer be said to support itself
over the greater part of the year. Furthermore,
unlike the older thematic 'militia', these soldiers will generally have had no
common interest with the provincials who supported them.
Monastic charters and exemptions are particularly instructive for, as
Oikonomidès has shown, the number of groups of foreign mercenaries alone who
were dependent upon rights of billeting and provisioning at the expense of local
communities and landlords increases very sharply from the 1040s[124]. But this process seems already to have got under way
from about 950, so that from that time and with increasing rapidity during the
first half of the eleventh century, the most expensive units and a greater
proportion numerically of the armies had to be maintained at the direct expense
of a rural or sometimes urban population. Of
course, there must have been considerable regional variations, evidence for
which is lacking, so that some districts, especially those from which the
imperial forces conducted operations over several seasons, will have been more
drastically affected. The
amount of state resources extracted by these means was probably considerable, a
development illustrated by the fact that the value of the antikaniskion (the monetised equivalent of the kaniskion, a render of produce to imperial officials in the course
of carrying out their duties) and related demands made on some properties of the
monastery of Vatopedi in the later eleventh century was actually greater than
the rate of land-tax imposed[125].
At the same time, of course, the fiscalised strateia was still collected by state officials as a further source of revenue for the maintenance of the armies[126]; so that it is not correct to suggest that the registers of thematic stratiôtai were entirely neglected - it was from these that the regular tagmata of the themes were recruited, and upon the basis of which the fiscalised strateia was also extracted. By the time of the Mantzikert campaign, however, and as a result of imperial neglect and reductions in military salaries[127], the regular or Roman tagmatic forces recruited from each thema were reduced in number and poorly equipped: emperors had not taken to the field themselves for many years, and the revenues from the strateiai had been employed for other than military expenditures[128]. In some frontier regions where the state had traditionally preferred regular military service for those registered, for example, Constantine IX, as is well known, disbanded many units and extracted the tax equivalent