Agincourt 1415
In grading this trim text the reviewer employs the question solicited by Matthew Strickland. The University of Glasgow professor provides just the litmus test in his three–page foreword. The History tutor asks, “How was it that such a powerful army, led by princes of blood, which had intercepted Henry’s army on its weary march to the safety of Calais and which had drawn up with such confidence that fateful morning between the woods of Tramecourt and Agincourt, was then so utterly vanquished by a smaller force, tired, bedraggled and ridden with dysentery?” Well, in rejoinder–Michael Jones’ pamphlet is a tour d’horizon of why men fought coupled with Henry’s psychology in thawing “cold fear” (p.49). The pocket–size manual is rich in illustrations with over 80 in all (including dazzling stills from the 1944 Olivier motion picture). The final chapter: The Battlefield Today is of immeasurable merit to the reader–a supplementary addition that only a battlefield tour guide could confidently afford. The seven “vantage points” alone make this book advisable and a trip their almost obligatory.
From the very outset of the opening chapter–Rediscovering Agincourt–the reader is made aware of the analogy of a boy David defeating a giant Goliath with that of England and France in the annus mirabilis of 1415 (pp.1, 3). Interlinked with the traditional interpretation of a “picture of the valiant few overcoming vastly superior opponents” is Anne Curry’s (often cited) conflicting thesis (debunking the cozy). Five pages in and the reader is introduced to what they will undergo throughout the next 150 pages–that of unearthing the actual compass of Henry’s standing army with that of Charles VI’s. This contestation and its “implications… are enormous” to the book’s ethos (p.5). Equally, the acrobatically elegant prose of Shakespeare intermittently pops up during the paperback. The independent scholar interchangeably narrates the battle with the playwright flanking the intoxicating primary sources that place the reader in the heart of hostilities. What is more, the author highlights the disparity between England and France whilst conversely comparing Henry V with his illustrious predecessor Edward III (and Edward I: pp. 19, 46) which scholarly runs throughout (pp.32–33, 38). The most noteworthy and humorous parallel is the sending of a provocative letter of challenge to his (respective) adversary (p.66–67). But why the perpetual parallel? Well, Jones more than satisfactorily affords the unfamiliar reader why this is so (pp. 32, 34, 36). The reader would deduce from this text that Henry was Edward engorged (pp. 38, 47). However, Jones appropriately pauses for a moment to stress that the comparison with Edward III is a double–edged sword (in relation to chevauchee: p.71).
Jones succinctly clarifies in two and a half pages as to why Henry–extraordinarily–annexed two French saints in “Sts Crispin and Crispisan” when honouring a fantastic English victory (pp.26–27). Jones fittingly praises Henry’s tactic of venerating “the slain archers of Soissons”–the corollary of which deterred desertion, pusillanimity and total and utter capitulation in the face of an implacable antagonist. Jones’ thesis runs that Henry’s “motivational skills paid off handsomely” (pp.41, 92). However, Jones is not averse to laying stain upon Henry’s character; for he exposes an archaic Abu Ghraib scenario where “inhabitants [are] stripped naked and humiliated with halters and nooses around their necks” (pp.62, 82). However, Jones is above simple–minded denouncement of breaking the “chivalric convention” (p.122) pragmatically situating the resolution to execute prisoners “within the realities of medieval warfare” (p.120).
The second chapter, A King Goes to War is a tour de force. Jones presents an original interpretation of Henry’s language (pp. 31, 41), “man–management” skills (p.31) and social attitudes (pp.39, 51) where upon which he escorts the reader to the conclusion that Henry was a “modern” King (p.41). In fact, the author later states that, “there is a modernity, even radicalism, about Henry’s approach” (p.90). Students of the Hundred Years’ War are conscious of Henry’s raison d'être for Agincourt, though here Jones logically illuminates the geist of the “common folk” (p.39). With Jones’ tripartite of rationale supplied the reviewer then labels this the axis of allegiance: by reburying Richard II, providing a monopoly of medics and glorifying St. George the morale of each soldier must have been untold (p.44–51).
Boxing Henry’s contemporary strategy with his unrivalled ability to spur on his soldiers the author intelligibly inscribes Henry’s “five steps” (pp.90–94) in chapter five: The Battle. Additionally, Jones’ “five features of the audacious ploy” expound battle psychology with ritual provocation that would have been on display at Agincourt some six–centuries ago (pp.104–123). An erudite analogy to a repertoire of chivalric sport and hunting methods provides for agreeable reading. Furthermore, the twenty plus illustrations are a welcome insertion.
Jones amasses a cerebral conclusion in chapter 6: The Legacy. Without plagiarizing at some considerable length Michael Jones the reviewer simply could not do justice to the scholar’s bravura finale (p.134). This is the zenith of the manuscript. Yet, there is simply one way to wrap up this review and that is by citing John Stow (also refereed to by Jones: p.133) who wrote in his Annals of England:
Agincourt, Agincourt!
Know ye not Agincourt?
Never to be forgot
Or known to no men?
Where England cloth yard arrows
Killed the French like tame sparrows
Slain by our bowmen (p.133).
Affix to this the heady concoction of language as the Bard lets rip with the enlivening speech before Harfleur, “Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once more” (p.52) or the spine tingling “Band of brothers” (p.89) address ahead of the onslaught of French multitudes and you will find that Jones has manufactured a magnum opus for both students and scholars alike. This little gem of clarity and coherence is sure to have a long shelf life. Shakespeare helps us in today’s climate. Quoting John Lewis Gaddis from his Surprise, Security, And The American Experience (2004), like Henry V, George Bush understands “the psychological value of victory–of defeating an adversary sufficiently thoroughly that you shatter the confidence of others, so that they'll roll over themselves before you have to roll over them” (p.92)
Furthermore, when discussing the early days of the Iraq invasion, the Yale historian terms the toppling of the giant statue of Saddam Hussein in central Baghdad an “Agincourt moment” (p.98).
[1] The link below will direct you to the BBC Radio 4 programme In Our Time (2004). Contributors: Michael Jones, Anne Curry and John Watts:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/history/inourtime/inourtime_20040916.shtml