The Mongol Art of War

Recently there has been an increased interest in Mongols and Chinggis Khan in particular. This has led to a flurry of publications on Central Asia, Mongol history and culture, and a closer examination of Chinggis Khan’s legacy.

As the title suggests, May’s book focuses on primarily on exploring the details of Mongol warfare. The first chapter is a brief historical narrative on the rise, apogee and decline of the Mongol empire. These eighty years chronicle the times from Changgis Khan to Khubilai Khan and give readers some sense of the tribal alliances and Mongol customs and traditions. Rational of going to war is generally understood within a socio-economical framework, and the intent of this work is not to explore the rational, but to analyze the tactical aspects employed by the Mongol armies. Hence the patrilineal social structure, or the economic basis for the Mongol conquest, or the reasons why the Mongols razed the cities they conquered to the ground, or even why the Mongols embarked on long campaigns or waged war are peripherally addressed. Genghis was a great organizer. He took the best of steppe warfare methods and incorporated additional techniques from different cultures. He imposed strict discipline, tamed his warrior aristocrats and increased social mobility.

Chapter two discusses the recruitment and organization of the army. As the Steppe nomads were accustomed to riding and archery, their skills matched with those essential to the Mongol army. While the discussion on recruitment focuses primarily on soldiers, recruitment of other support personnel (mainly engineers and artisans) is also mentioned. Next organization of the army is discussed. Here the changes that Changgis instituted, which made the army better suited for military campaign, are outlined. The discussion also describes two elite units, namely the keshik and tamma. Both units level of discipline approached fanaticism, and their loyalty was forged to their units rather than their clans.

Chapter three describes the skills that steppe nomads acquired for daily living, such as hunting, archery and riding – transferable skills for those who became soldiers. Additional training was the discipline instilled as part of Chinggis’ military reforms. Before Chinggis, the Mongol army was loosely disciplined; the main objective of campaigns was booty. Hence, recruits were inclined to desert a campaign if booty were sufficient or if the campaign prolonged too long. One of Chinggis’s reforms was to distribute booty after the battle, and those who tried to take booty before decisive victory were punished. Chinggis organized his soldiers into units that were answerable for one another’s conduct. This eradicated individuality and encouraged teamwork. Each soldier was supported by fellow soldiers in his unit, and as an army, the Mongols could accomplish much more than they could before. The remainder of the chapter discusses Mongol weapons (specifically the compound bow) and armor. Horses are discussed towards the end of the chapter.

A good army without a strong support organization is effective only for short periods. Chinggis knew the value of secure supply lines, spare mounts, and good pasture. He organized a support structure that would provide for the fighting men. Chapter four focuses on caring for the army while it was campaigning. Hence, the major themes of the chapter are food supplies, rations, supply of weapons, armor, and siege engines, medical care, logistics and communications. The Mongols had good archers; they also had good quartermasters.

The Mongol army used a range of maneuvers that gave it tactical advantage on the battlefield. These included fast cavalry skirmishes, showers of arrows from the fearsome composite bows (archers could be mounted or on foot), feigned retreats, ambushes, siege warfare, and excellent communications. The Mongol army also drafted foreign military specialist (such as Persian siege engineers and Chinese riverboat captains) to expand its range of battlefield tactics. Chapter five delves into the “real action” on the battlefield. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to battlefield tactics, not only those indigenous to the Steppe warrior, but also those that the Mongols learned through contact with other cultures. For example, they adopted siege engines, explosives and even learned how to run a navy, mostly from the Chinese. The chapter also discusses intelligence gathering and strategy, but these two areas are only marginally discussed.

Chapter six is titled “Leadership” and states as its objective to explore military leadership. This chapter makes the point that Mongol military leaders were chosen based on merit rather than social status (although access to leadership was easier for the nobility). Another point this chapter makes is that the Mongols consistently produced good military leaders unlike their other medieval counterparts. Military leaders were groomed from the keshik (an elite unit discussed in Chapter two), and through a system of apprentices. Under this system, experienced generals (although lower in rank than the princes) had final say in the campaign, and could send princes back to the Khan if they felt it necessary. Imperial decision-making (quriltai) is also described. The chapter ends by profiling five military leaders who served Chinggis Khan. Curiously, this chapter does not have a “conclusion” section as the other substantive chapters do.

Chapter seven looks at the Mongol’s opponents. A one-paragraph overview of an opponent is followed by a section describing its organization, another section describes its methods used in warfare and the last section outlines how the Mongols adapted to that foe. This format introduces the reader to the Mongol’s seven main opponents. The Mongols defeated all of them save the Mamluks. The structure of this chapter does not readily lend itself to a “conclusion” section as do the earlier chapters.

Probably the objective of chapter eight is to tie in the various themes discussed earlier into a coherent whole. This chapter provides an overview of prominent campaigns, battles and sieges (two in each category are covered) that the Mongols carried out. Aspects of discipline, tactics, planning and leadership are covered where relevant. A post-analysis of possible options the Mongols could have used based on the battlefield tactics they or their adversaries deployed in previous encounters would have been useful here to understand the depth and complexity of their decision-making.

Chapter nine goes beyond the Mongol empire by exploring how some of the tactics that the Mongols used inspired later military strategists. The chapter starts by listing the strengths and weaknesses of Mongol warfare and attempts to uncover Mongol influences on Eastern European warfare. It also tries to draw parallels between Mongol tactics and tank warfare as well as similarities between Mongol tactics and Blitzkrieg (made famous by the Germans during World War II). Whether one agrees if these tactics are indeed parallel to Mongol ones is an open question. What May claims is that the battle tactics developed were inspired (through military theorists like Fuller and Hart and commanders like Guderain) from Mongol tactics.

The summary above hardly does justice to a work as detailed as May’s. The text does have some grammatical errors, but these do not distract from the overall meaning or flow of the text. The substantive chapters have a Conclusion at the end of each chapter that outlines the major points discussed in the relevant chapter. Strangely, chapter six does not have such a section.

As the Mongols fought on several fronts simultaneously, they acquired new tactics that were incorporated in later field tactics. From what is known about their battlefield tactics, they used traditional steppe warfare that allowed them to advance as far as Russia. Their campaigns against the Song and Jin dynasties deployed traditional Chinese ways. A section describing how their battlefield tactics evolved would have been useful.
The book’s dust jacket describes Mongol scholarship as “contemporary descriptions” of the Mongols as “an undisciplined horde of terrifying horsemen who swept over opponents by sheer force of number.” Unfortunately, readers have no such misconceptions. The stratagem and discipline of the Mongols has long been well understood. This book has helped expand and refine our view of the Mongols.