McGeer cover

De Re Militari | Book Reviews

Eric McGeer

Sowing the Dragon’s Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century

Dumbarton Oaks Studies Series 33. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection 1995, 2008. xx+405pp. $29.95/£22.95/ €27.00. ISBN 978 0884 02224 4.

The conduct of war has never been a simple affair and Eric McGeer’s erudite investigation of Byzantine military thinking amply confirms this point. The tome details the painstaking efforts and detailed planning which Byzantium undertook for the preparation, conduct, and completion of its military campaigns. The fact that McGeer’s books is going into its second edition attests to its quality. At the same time, it reflects the ongoing interest among scholars and commentators in the strategic culture of the Byzantine Empire.

The volume is divided into two parts. The first one includes both the original texts and the translations of the Praecepta militaria of the Emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963-969) and chapters 56 through 65 of the Taktika of Nikephoros Ouranos (c.980–c.1010), who was a general during the reign of Emperor Basil II. The obvious reason for including both treatises is that the excerpt from Ouranos’ Taktika merely paraphrases Phokas’ Praecepta. In this respect, the parallel assessment of both treatises provides an opportunity for uncovering context-specific nuances that each which goes beyond the mere comparative analysis of two fairly similar texts. More importantly however the inclusion of both treatises reveals the complex interaction between continuity and change in Byzantine strategic thought. For instance, it is believed that the Praecepta is a compilation of earlier military texts that have long disappeared and which have been enhanced by Phokas’ own observations. The Taktika confirms the vitality of this tradition in which Ouranos expands on Phokas’ precepts by adding insights from his own military experience.

The second part of the volume provides McGeer’s historical commentary to both treatises. This section includes five chapters detailing different aspects of the military campaigns conducted by the Byzantine Empire. It outlines the different relations between the infantry, the cavalry, and the heavy cavalry, the distinct deployments and tactics employed by these forces, the significance of pre-deployment preparations and precautions, as well as the significance of the military camp to Byzantine warfare conduct. McGeer’s commentary provides an apt and much-needed context for the historiographic engagement with the military strategy of Byzantium. Such an account provides thoughtful consideration of the significance of the Praecepta and the Taktika. At the same time, it also assists the understanding of the concerns preoccupying Byzantine generals--and, by extension, medieval strategists--in preparation, during, and after the battle. Such ability to relate the issues consuming Byzantine military planners endows the volume with immediacy that will be appreciated not only by historians, but also by many in the armed forces confronting not too dissimilar problems in contemporary battlefields.

Both parts of the volume emphasize the premium placed by Byzantine strategists to adaptation. As McGeer insists, the insistence on “adapting themselves appropriately” (225) provides the cornerstone of Byzantine military thinking. Thus, while both the Praecepta and the Taktika reveal their authors’ preoccupation with order, discipline, and predictability, the treatises also reveal a profound awareness of the unpredictability of warfare. In this setting unintended consequences can become a significant constitutive feature of any battle. That is why, both Phokas and Ouranos place special significance on the preparedness of the individual soldier and his readiness to respond appropriately to any contingency. For Byzantine strategists, appropriate response is associated with the training of the troops, their armament and welfare, intimate knowledge of the terrain, and maintaining discipline regardless of the circumstances. In this setting, the ability of the individual soldier to adapt to changing circumstances emerges as a central feature in the ability of the Byzantine army to succeed in battle.

The volume therefore reveals that the need for adaptation leads Byzantine strategists to adopt qualitatively different tactics depending on the enemy. As McGeer demonstrates the Arab campaigns of Byzantium were conducted differently from the Balkan campaigns. In this respect, both the Praecepta and the Taktika demonstrate an intimate knowledge of the ways in which the different adversaries of the Byzantine Empire fight and how can such idiosyncrasies be used to the advantage of Byzantium. At the same time, the treatises reveal peculiarities of the Byzantine forces as well. For instance, Phokas’ Praecepta insists that soldiers need to “fast for three days before the battle” (59) in order to purify themselves. This instruction draws attention to the significant role played by religion in the Byzantine way of war.

In this setting, McGeer’s volume brings to life not only the strategies of the Byzantine Empire, but also the people engaged in its warfare. His account also demonstrates that the success of the Byzantine military effort was underpinned by the constant strive for adaptation to changing circumstances. Yet, whenever their strategists stopped paying heed to the potential unintended effects of their actions, Byzantium’s forces became maladapted to the shifting circumstances. In this setting they were often routed or destroyed. Thus, according to both Phokas and Ouranos the failure of on the battlefield is the result of three mutually-reinforcing factors: (i) “lack of foresight and investigation [of the enemy];” (ii) “failure to secure the route homewards;” and (iii) “overconfidence induced by the deceptive actions of a clever foe.” (345-347) In other words, these are mistakes emanating either from the inability to maintain the appropriate military conduct as scripted by the treatises or from the failure to provide decisive leadership prepared to adapt in the face of unpredictable contingency.

In this respect, it is expected that the new edition of McGeer’s book will be invaluable for understanding the military thinking behind the campaigns of the Byzantine Empire. At the same time, the prescient commentaries provided in the second part of the volume offer meaningful explanation of the specific context and circumstances to which the Praecepta and the Taktika were applied. Thus, while the volume will be of interest both to students and scholars of Byzantine military history and strategy, McGeer has also produced the kind of examination that is bound to trigger debate and invite (if not beckon) its readers to pursue further the propositions made on its pages.

Emilian Kavalski

Lecturer in Politics and International Relations,
University of Western Sydney
<[email protected]>

Page Added: July 2010