The
term condottiere (plural: condottieri) derives from the Italian word “condotta”
referring to a contract of the sort signed between a mercenary leader and
the government or city that he agreed to serve. Although the earliest
condottieri made their appearance around the late thirteenth century, it
was the following two hundred years that witnessed their rise to prominence
and eventual triumph on the Italian military scene. During most of
the fourteenth century, the major companies were overwhelmingly composed
of foreigners who had entered Italy from northern Europe, many, but not
all of them refugees from the Hundred Years War. These companies
tended to be multinational in their composition. By contrast, starting
in the late fourteenth century and continuing into the sixteenth, the makeup
of condottieri armies changed radically as native Italians came to dominate
the system that increasingly supplied the peninsula with a preponderant part
of its military force. Unlike the earlier, foreign mercenaries, some
of these home grow condottieri, most notably the Sforza family of Milan,
used their military muscle to achieve political domination over the cities
that had hired them.
These
men who exercised extensive influence over Italian warfare throughout
the period we refer to as the Renaissance—men who were despised
by the period’s greatest political and military theorist, Niccolò Machiavelli—are
the subject of David Murphy’s volume in the Warrior Series, one
of several military series published by Osprey. Like other such
volumes, this short and heavily-illustrated book is meant to provide
readers with a useful introduction, a goal it accomplishes with a fair
degree of success. Not only does Murphy acquaint his reader with
many of the colorful condottieri leaders, he also treats their lifestyle,
both in peace and at war, their organization, tactics, armor, and weapons,
their dealings with one another and with civilian populations, the medical
treatment available to them, their beliefs (or lack thereof), etc. Most
readers, including most military historians, will come away with a greater
knowledge of those men who dominated the military affairs of Italy for
over two centuries.
As
Murphy indicates, there are two ways in which the term condottieri can
be used: either in reference to the mercenary leaders or to their
companies as a whole. In either sense of the word, a condottiere
was a “contractor” who sold his military services to the
civil powers. In the business-like atmosphere of Renaissance Italy,
the contract or condotta spelling out mutual obligations between
employer and employee tended to be a highly detailed document, one which
by the fifteenth century, had achieved a considerable degree of uniformity. Among
other things, it specified the size of the mercenary force to be supplied,
the rate of pay and manner of payment (soldiers might receive their money
directly or alternatively through their captain), the conditions of employment,
the time period the agreement would remain in force, even the compensation
paid individuals for catastrophic injury. Despite this specificity,
contracts were not infrequently
“honored in the breech” with one or both of the parties violating
their agreements. For example, condottieri were (in)famous for switching
sides in the middle of a campaign while city governments on occasion lured
to their deaths “employees” whom they had come to fear or distrust.
Murphy
argues that in general condottieri had more respect for their own kind,
even those against whom they fought, than for the civilian population,
including those who paid their bill. They were, after all, members
of the same fraternity who could easily be victors one day, defeated
prisoners of war the next. As a result, they tended to treat prisoners
with considerable leniency, not only ransoming leaders, but also turning
loose common soldiers unable to provide ransom after having disarmed
them. By contrast, treatment meted out to enemy civilians tended
to be far less humane, while even civilians whose state had employed
them not infrequently suffered at their hands.
Murphy
discusses the critical issue of just how militarily effective condottieri
armies really were when they faced one another in the field. This is
an issue raised centuries ago by Machiavelli in his signature work, The
Prince, where he heaps criticism upon the condottieri for their ineffectiveness
and duplicity. Murphy adopts a more balanced view of the system. While
acknowledging that there were indeed battles in which opposing condottieri
at the very least displayed an extreme reluctance to inflict or sustain
casualties and may even have conspired with one another, he argues that
other encounters proved to be bloody affairs, producing very respectable
butcher’s bills, in several of which whole units died to a man. Unfortunately,
little light is shed on why some condottieri battles played out so differently
than others. Nor is any attempt made to examine which of the two
outcomes was the more common one.
One
particular strength of this book lies in the author’s selection
of illustrations. He has gathered numerous photographs of statues,
paintings, prints, line drawings, weapon and armor, etc. that depict
condottieri life during the two centuries when the system was at its
height. Unfortunately, given the limitations of an Osprey volume,
with the exception of several line drawings and the original artwork
done for the volume, most of these illustrations are neither large enough
or clear enough to be reproduced for classroom teaching or use in other
volumes. Nevertheless, they are identified sufficiently for the
researcher to track down copies that may be more easily reproduced for
these purposes. In short, the author not only acquaints the reader
with the leading artistic representations of condottieri, but also their
location.
The
best illustrative material consists of eight brilliantly-colored, highly-detailed
plates by artist, Graham Turner, accompanied by a lengthy commentary
on each drawing, explaining exactly what it depicts. These are
so well-rendered in the volume that they can be easily reproduced for
classroom use. Three of Turner’s illustrations, in particular,
stand out. The first and last of the eight depict what a well-armored
condottieri would wear in the early fourteenth and late fifteenth centuries;
the third pictures a late fourteenth century lance, the five-man tactical
unit into which many condottieri companies were divided. That the
publishers of the volume also hold Turner’s drawing in high regard
is demonstrated by the fact that one of them replaced a sixteenth century
painting as the cover illustration.
Despite
its overall value as an introduction to this subject, Murphy’s
volume is not without faults. To begin with, there is a degree
of repetitiveness on the part of the author, as not infrequently, the
same point is made several times using much the same wording. Although
the visual material is well-chosen, Murphy often refers to illustrations
on pages of the text where those illustrations do not actually appear. As
a result, if a reader wishes to view an illustration at the time the
author mentions it, he or she will have little choice but to thumb through
the volume in order to find it. In this reviewer’s opinion,
placing brief parenthetical cross references (e.g. “see page...)
into the text would have considerably facilitated the readers’ task. Even
Turner’s superb illustrations suffer from a similar drawback: they
themselves have been grouped together near the middle of the volume,
while their descriptions are collected at the end, again necessitating
flipping back and forth.
Another
problem is characteristic of Osprey books in general: since they
eschew the use of footnotes, short of contacting the author, there is
no way to discover his own source for various assertions found in the
text. While this is probably not very important to the general
reader, it can pose a problem for scholars using the volume. For example,
Murphy alleges that the earliest gunpowder weapons in the west date to
the late thirteenth century (p. 27). Historians have long singled
out two items from the year 1326 as the first verifiable pieces of evidence
for the existence of such weaponry. Is the author referring to
an earlier solid example of gunpowder weaponry than those of 1326? Or
is he simply following various other historians in arguing that the 1326
evidence suggests such weapons had already existed for several decades? The
absence of footnotes leaves this and several other issues in doubt.
Finally,
Murphy makes some statements that appear to be either erroneous or contradictory,
necessitating correction or further clarification. For example,
if Roger de Flor, characterized as the first condottieri, was born around
the mid-thirteenth century (as Murphy indicates that he was) (p. 8),
then he would have been extremely hard put to begin his active career
in the service of Emperor Frederick II, a man who died in the year 1250. The
great fourteenth century mercenary leader, a hero from Brittany who
rose to be constable of France, Bertrand du Guesclin, would be surprised
to find himself identified as “a Norman knight.” (p. 47) And
for Murphy to identify the treaty of Brétigny (1360) in a chronological
summary of the period as having ended the Hundred Years War (1337-1453)
is extremely misleading; though on this issue, he redeems himself elsewhere
in the volume by indicating (correctly) that the treaty ended only the
first phase of this conflict.
What
appear to be contradictory statements on the treatment of mercenaries
by the city of Florence supply very different pictures of that city’s
involvement in the system. At one point, Murphy identifies Florence
as the highest paying employer of mercenaries (p. 11); several pages
later, however, he depicts the city as being extremely stingy in making
available sustenance to its military employees (p. 15). Although
both statements might be true, no attempt has been to reconcile them. Or
again, what is one to make of the following two statements: on
page 22, the author indicates that “the 14th century was the era
of the great condottieri companies”; on the next page, he
states “in the 14th century, condottieri companies were
smaller and perhaps more self-contained.” At least to this
reader, these appear to be contradictory assertions calling for clarification.
One
of the most serious inconsistencies involves Murphy’s use of the
significant term “collaterale.” The collaterale are
originally introduced into the text as city officials appointed to keep
track of the hired help (pp. 10-11); in other words, men delegated by
a city employing condottieri to be certain that the city got its
money’s worth. In this capacity, they were charged with fining
condottieri leaders who did not provide the forces specified in the contract. In
almost the same breath, however, collaterale are identified as officials
appointed by condottieri leaders [in both cases, my italics] to
look after the financial and logistical considerations of the group. On
the basis of Murphy’s divergent definitions, such officials seem
to be serving two masters with highly divergent interests. Or were
there two different kinds of collaterale? Whatever the case may
be, this demands a far clearer explanation than one finds in the text.
In
the opinion of this reviewer, the text of Condottiere would have
profited from one final editing, supplied either by the author or the
publisher. Nevertheless, on the whole, the volume does deliver
a useful and readable account of the Italian condottieri system, accompanied
by well-chosen illustrations and a brief biography.