Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500
This is a very serious attempt to produce a history of naval warfare in the Middle Ages. Any such effort faces grave problems, as the author clearly states in her Introduction: ‘For the greater part of our period there was little if any structural difference between ships primarily engaged in warlike activities and those engaged in trade (p.1).’ Standing fleets, like standing armies, were almost unknown in the period, and at best constituted only a small core when substantial fleets were needed. The bulk of such forces were drawn, inevitably, from merchant vessels. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that scholars interested in this subject have usually chosen a wider focus for their books – ‘maritime history’ perhaps, or ‘trade and shipping’ or even the history of a particular maritime power. So this book is an attempt to concentrate, to examine ‘activity at sea which seems to have as its purpose the promotion of the interests of a state or ruler and which usually involved some kind of conflict between ships (p.1).’ It is to be noted that, on the face of it, this excludes the crusades, though they are dealt with in Chapter 3(34-56). This focus is tightened even further by the author in her preface in which she excludes substantial discussion of construction and design of ships and states that ‘the concern here is the way in which ships and mariners were drawn into the service of rulers, to serve their ends in war (p.xv-xvi).’ These unaccustomed exclusions result in a very short book, but one that has a great deal to say within these limits. There is enough on general matters maritime to set the context. Ship types are usually sufficiently explained to enable the reader to recognise their characteristics. There is, however, one exception: the carrack is not described anywhere, though it is mentioned in several places. Moreover, there is a hidden paradox never explained, and perhaps unexplainable: specialist fleets could not be supported, yet the galley, a pure warship, survived from the Ancient World. On the other hand Rose has a gift for explaining technical matters rather well, and her discussions of the problems of handling ships are good, but might have been improved by a section on ship design and engineering. It is unsurprising that the book should lean heavily to the later Middle Ages because there is much more evidence available than for the early Middle Ages. Moreover, most of the author’s work has been in that field and she is able to bring out very interesting material, notably on the Clos des galées at Rouen. Indeed, one of the most interesting themes in the book is the importance of galleys even in northern waters. Rose is good on the reasons for this – she suggests it was the expertise of the Mediterranean mariners who enjoyed great prestige which rubbed off on their vessels. This exemplifies an important theme in the book – the extent to which naval success depended on finding seasoned crews. It is not for nothing that we speak of the ‘Art of Warfare’ in the Middle Ages because skills were vital and were transmitted in haphazard ways. War at sea and war on land were craft activities and keeping such craftsmen together was a major problem in the absence of standing forces. Sheer expense prohibited keeping ‘fleets in being’ throughout this period. In this respect fleets replicated the problems of keeping ‘armies in being’ but on a much larger scale. We have, too, parallel consequences: in France the Clos des galées languished under the impact of royal parsimony. Even more striking was the fondness for the expedient of hiring corsairs, the maritime equivalent of the mercenary captains loosely retained by the English kings to ravage France during the ‘Hundred Years War.’ One of the great strengths of the book is that Rose recognises the problems of logistics and provides thorough discussion of them. The history of the Venetian Arsenale is given in some detail. It was only under the pressures of the bitter war with Genoa that this rose to its dominant position, because even the Venetian state hesitated at such a commitment. However, this state assumption of responsibility for naval power provided the institutional motor for the great maritime power of Venice in the later Middle Ages. Rose displays a very sensible caution in her discussion of the uses of sea power which arises from this perceptive view of naval logistics and the technical limitations of contemporary ships. When fleets were such passing creations made up of relatively fragile units which were so subject to the vagaries of wind and wave, it is, as she says, very difficult to speak of maritime supremacy. Blockade was almost impossible to maintain for the same reasons. Rose is good on the nature of naval battles and shows how they arise from the limitations of ships, almost invariably taking place in coastal waters. She is often sceptical of the worth of accounts which all too often emanate from authors who were not present and had little knowledge of naval realities. Moreover, she thinks that they were often influenced by classical models, and she suggests that stories of the tying together of galleys and the throwing of lime (she finds no evidence of lime in ship’s manifests) may derive from that source. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the book is the relatively limited treatment of the crusades and sea-power which is centred on the Saladin’s revival of the Egyptian fleet and the Third Crusade. It might have been improved by reference to S.M.Foster, Some Aspects of Maritime Activity and the Use of Sea Power in Relation to the Crusading States (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford,1978). This book is a major contribution to our understanding of war at sea, particularly because Rose has a keen sense of the limitations of medieval naval power. Only gradually did ships evolve to the point where blockade was possible and battles could be fought out on the high seas. This grand theme is exceptionally well expounded by Rose. Her sense of the reality of medieval sea-power pervades the book and represents a major contribution to our perception of war.
UNIVERSITY OF WALES SWANSEA
John France