

## CHAPTER FIVE

# THE TARTAR INVASION

### 1. *The Engagement at Mohi*

Anno Domini M-o CC-o XLI-o ipso  
Bela regnante Mangali sive Tartari cum  
quinquies centeni milibus armatorum  
regnum Hungarie invaserunt.

*Chronicon pictum, c. 177*

On March 15, 1241, Friday of the Seven Sorrows, the Tartar force was only half a day march away from the town of Pest.<sup>1</sup> About ten thousand Tartars on horse must have moved about in the surroundings of the town, with the aim of trying to prevent the strategic gathering of the royal Hungarian armed force to fight them. This Tartar “vanguard” did not engage in destruction of property, nor in irrationally murdering everyone in sight, and did not burn everything to the ground in the region. It only would have delayed them.<sup>2</sup> The Tartars remained on the lookout, prepared to slow down the foreseen [strategic] formation of the king’s forces. Orders were given to the gathering royal troops that they do not provoke fights with the Tartars must have played into the hands of the latter.<sup>3</sup>

Difficult it was to keep within the bounds of the royal order. Ugrin, archbishop of Kalocsa, who was the first to arrive with his contingent of troops at the designated location at Pest, felt especially insulted in his self-esteem by the king’s directive.<sup>4</sup> Compelled to be temporarily inactive, and most probably concerned about the behavior of his unemployed troops, Ugrin could not passively stand by and watch the devastation of the countryside by the Tartars; nor did he like it that both the monarch and he were regarded as cowards by the public opinion. The archbishop, being a warrior, was not a humble man.

On March 17, he issued orders to engage the Tartar marauders in combat, and since the latter pretended to flee the area, he gave them pursuit. In the heat of the chase, he and his men failed to notice that they had entered marshy ground (that is, pretending to flee, the Tartars had purposefully led them to the area, into a lurch), where the archbishop’s heavy cavalry perished, and the Tartars, in making an about face, blanketed with a hail of arrows the still unengaged

segment of the archbishop's troops. With only the greatest difficulty did the archbishop and the remainder of his men escape from the bloody encounter, and deeply humiliated, return to Pest.<sup>5</sup>

In describing this military confrontation with enemy troops, the chronicler drew the conclusion that the archbishop and his men were militarily and psychologically unprepared for this, and any, encounter with the Tartar forces, and had breached discipline by acting contrary to direct orders from the king - regardless of the archbishop's reasoning that he had to keep his troops occupied, fed and disciplined through such a seemingly low-risk military maneuver. The entire Ugrin-related episode may point to complete lack of discipline and organization among the royal troops assembled at Pest, and creates the impression of a helpless state of unpreparedness, and, as a matter of fact, of uncertainty on the part of the Hungarian royal high command.<sup>6</sup>

It must have been characteristic of the disorders of the time<sup>7</sup> that, on the same day, the Tartars took the town of Vác (north of Pest, on the left bank of the Danube), robbed its churches, and massacred all of its inhabitants.<sup>8</sup> The disorders were further increased by the attitude of Frederick of Austria, who had entered Hungary not because he wanted to aid the Hungarians against the Mongols, but for the reason that he show off his military skills and readiness in front of the Hungarians.<sup>9</sup>

The king's order to the contrary - unless the royal order to avoid hostilities with the enemy without provocation did not pertain to the "foreign" duke - Frederick moved against the Tartar troops, who, taken by surprise, had actually backed away from him. It must have been this "element of surprise" and the better equipment and training [discipline?] of the duke's force that had caused the Tartars to withdraw. Frederick now pursued the fleeing enemy, killed one of their leaders, cut off the arms of another (who died of his wounds shortly thereafter), and the Tartar contingent marauding in the area of Pest disappeared. Frederick had scored a victory, and the Hungarian nobles, not realizing the gravity of their situation - i.e., the seriousness of the Mongol threat - and still angry with their king, celebrated the triumph of Frederick at the expense and personal humiliation of their own monarch.<sup>10</sup>

Was it the victory scored by the Austrian duke? Was it the unnecessary, avoidable, and most disgraceful defeat of Archbishop Ugrin at the hands of a group of Mongol marauders? - but suddenly,

there arose among the Hungarian nobles a vicious outcry of hatred toward the Cumans who had only recently been invited by the king to settle in their midst. The nobles, acting spitefully toward the king, began to identify the Cumans with the Mongols, called the Cuman "king" Kötény a Tartar collaborator who had played an active role in the devastation of their country. The Hungarian nobles still in the process of gathering their troops, without any order-of-battle, or plain military plans as how to cope with the Tartar threat, now demanded from the king that the Cumans be killed, and Béla IV, himself unready and frustrated, gave in to the nobles' demand.<sup>11</sup>

Béla IV probably made the mistake of his life. He gave orders that Kötény appear in front of him in person. But the Cuman leader, fearing for his life, refused to go. It may be that the king by ordering Kötény to come to him wished to save his life and retain the loyalty of the Cuman troops. But their signals were crossed and the frustrated nobles, a "mob," evidently wholly unaware of the seriousness of the Mongol threat, moved in front of Kötény's residence, besieged it, and after a short resistance had Kötény murdered, together with his bodyguard. The Cumans became a public enemy, free personal prey to be hunted down and killed by anyone.<sup>12</sup>

The Cumans had no alternative but to fight back. In revenge for the scandalous, unjust murder of their leader, they devastated the countryside, burning villages to the ground.<sup>13</sup> They also confronted Hungarian troops en route to their gathering destination near Pest--as, for instance, the troops of Bölcs, royal reeve of Csanád, and the contingent of Nicholas, son of Bárcz<sup>14</sup> - and carried out an awful devastation along the Danube.<sup>15</sup> Then they left the country toward the Bulgarian border, while the Cumans who had stayed behind submitted to Tartar rule.<sup>16</sup> Duke Frederick went home to Austria with his troops, while King Béla IV and his people found themselves alone in facing the immediate Tartar threat in the very heart of their country.<sup>17</sup>

In the beginning of April, 1241, Béla IV, urged on by Archbishop Ugrin, made his move against the Mongols.<sup>18</sup> The first encounter took place at Rákos, but it caused little damage; the Hungarian troops were still attempting to develop an order-of-battle formation. The complete lack of leadership was evident everywhere, in almost any step and movement that had been undertaken by the king's command.<sup>19</sup> Wild, undisciplined lust for war, total unappre-

ciation of the enemy characterized the attitude of the Hungarian leaders and of their men.

The nobles simply would not comprehend the seriousness of the danger, the horrors of the Mongol invasion. When, for example, Bishop Benedict (the son of Ost) of Várad,<sup>20</sup> who most unwillingly complied with the king's orders to arms,<sup>21</sup> had heard that [the town of] Eger, northeast of Pest, had been destroyed by the Tartars, he attacked what must have seemed to him a small group of Tartar horsemen roaming about in that region. But the Mongols laid a trap for him.<sup>22</sup> They pretended to withdraw, placed stuffed sack dolls on their reserve horses, and awaited the Hungarian attack on the prairie. Then they withdrew from the scene for a second time, and the bishop's men came face to face with stuffed rag dolls tied to horses; the men, frightened by the number of dolls (and their horses, probably by the smell), turned and ran. The Tartars took them under pursuit and cut all of them to pieces.<sup>23</sup> The bishop escaped.<sup>24</sup>

The king's army - finally gathered together, and in some order - had made a halt at the Sajó stream, not too far from its estuary into the Tisza river, where they set up camp near a place named Mohi.<sup>25</sup> On the left-hand bank of the stream, Batu Khan set up his headquarters, cleverly choosing his camp site.<sup>26</sup> The Sajó stream in front of him, on his right-hand side the Hernád river, on his left the Tisza river, provided him with a natural barrier of defense. Thick woods protected him from an unexpected attack in the rear.<sup>27</sup> Were the Hungarians to surprise his headquarters by crossing the rivers - assuming that the psychological impact of such a surprise had occurred before the attack - and were to inflict a defeat upon him, he could always escape with his men into the woods before the pursuers, who, presumably would give chase on horse and on foot. The heavily forested area further aided Batu to conceal his forces while crossing through the woods; the direction of his movements, and the positions he had taken up behind the Sajó remained wholly hidden from Béla IV and his commanders.<sup>28</sup>

In this regard one must, once again, blame the king for neglect, because he evidently did not have the military intelligence capability to keep abreast of the news of his opponent's movements, plans, military strength, or even strategy. Worse still, Béla IV did not seem to be too familiar with the geography (for the purpose of military deployment) of his country's terrain. Could the Hungarian high command have been so naive as to assume - an entire week after

the Mongol capture of the Verecke Pass - that the Mongol armies would not pass through the mountain forests of the Carpathians?<sup>29</sup>

The Hungarian high command had made another serious mistake. It did not sufficiently reconnoissance the area around Mohi, nor did it undertake any of the much needed defensive preparations for an expected enemy offensive from the right-hand side of the Sajó stream. The idea conceived by the monarch and his command that they set up camp near the stream, send out scouts to observe the bridge across the stream, and the possible fording areas downstream, and to await the next move by the khan was irresponsibly naive and disastrous.

The monarch and his high command (or was it the King and his [military] advisors?) evidently could not foresee the probability that Batu Khan would invade their camp at any moment, and that his would be a sudden attack, even before the king's had made adequate preparations for fortifying their camp, and readied themselves for a countermove.<sup>30</sup>

If Béla IV and his staff had expected gentlemanly behavior of Batu Khan, assuming that their opponent would wait until they had rested for a few days before an encounter with them, they were gravely mistaken.<sup>31</sup> The Hungarians had arrived from Asia a long time before they had accepted western customs of (military) behavior; they had become too acclimatized to western civilization during the preceding centuries, and were psychologically unprepared to face the Asiatic Mongols in a military encounter at Mohi. Dishonest and inhumanly cunning behavior, a ruthless employment of raw physical forces in the battlefield were, and would have been, the only means of effective defense against such an opponent.<sup>32</sup>

The number of troops encamped on both sides must have been the same in proportion; Batu Khan had some fifty thousand men under his command,<sup>33</sup> and the Hungarians numbered some fifty thousand men also.<sup>34</sup> In terms of geography, Béla IV had set up camp on the right-hand bank - that is, west of the Sajó stream, on a plain next to the village of Mohi (no longer in existence), south of the Ondó.<sup>35</sup>

The monarch and his advisors had made a basic mistake in their plan for the outlay of their camp: they had the tents (awnings) placed far too close to one another. The ropes holding down the tents further slowed down movements of the men, and their animals, kept secured next to them. The camp seemingly had no streets, and

movement in it must have difficult in daytime and almost impossible at night. Again, the camp had no layout for streets and lights. There were no campfires lit. Worse still, they had erected a "protective fort" from wagons closely drawn together around the perimeter of the camp. Their wagons were placed closely side by side - the camp had no exits or gates - so that the "enclosed fort" concept must have hindered the movement of troops and animals in and out of the camp.<sup>36</sup> Carelessness characterized the entire planning process, as if to prove pointedly that the Hungarian high command, overconfident and sure of victory, had displayed only contempt for the Tartars, whom they regarded as stupid and barbaric people.<sup>37</sup>

The king's men now settled down in the camp and began, once again, to compare the Cumans with the Tartars.<sup>38</sup> Many nobles had openly expressed their hope that the monarch would suffer "some" humiliation at the hands of the Mongols because, they argued, having a minor defeat in front of the enemy would make him appreciate his own countrymen more!<sup>39</sup> Lack of foresight had characterized the leaders and the men of the royal armed forces. They openly ridiculed the monarch when Béla IV had flags distributed to the troops, encouraged them to fight bravely in the forthcoming hard battle, to make their stand in front of the enemy.<sup>40</sup>

In the Mongol camp on the other bank of the Sajó stream, the Khan and his advisors were less apprehensive. Even Batu began to have doubts about the outcome of the forthcoming encounter. He was nervous and concerned about the unforeseen results of the battle. He ascended to the top of a hill near his camp to spend a day and night in meditation. Upon completing his prayers, he surveyed the Hungarian camp site across the stream; he wished to put his mind in order, to make plans. Batu was curious about the preparedness of the Hungarian forces, about their size and fighting potential. He could not believe his eyes at what he saw. All of his fears were eliminated. The Hungarians were closed in their camp like sheep in a narrow sheepfold.<sup>41</sup> Allah had heard his prayers and given the enemy into his hands.<sup>42</sup> Batu gave orders for the encounter to take place at early dawn of April 11th.<sup>43</sup>

The Mongol plan was simple enough: encircle the Hungarian camp, and let nobody escape. Therefore, he had, already on April 10, dispatched some of his men to capture the bridge over the Sajó, and to establish a bridgehead across, thereby to have a base on the Hungarian side of the river directly fronting the forces of the king.<sup>44</sup>

Another contingent - there must have been some splinter groups operating within the fifty thousand men enemy force - the Khan sent further south along the Sajó with orders to ford it and to establish another position on the right bank directly behind the camp, in the rear of the Hungarian forces. Batu had kept the main body of his forces in reserve, so that he might, at the proper moment, order a frontal attack and demolish the Hungarian camp.<sup>45</sup>

One must note here that the Hungarian high command - perhaps more properly, the camp headquarters - had failed to set up guard posts at the bridge, along the stream, and around the camp! The Tartar plan would have caught the Hungarians by surprise, had a Kievan - now a Tartar prisoner of war - not escaped from his captors and informed the Hungarian camp command of the immediate danger.<sup>46</sup>

Prince Coloman, the king's younger brother, and Archbishop Ugrin now hurried with their men to the bridge to prevent the Mongols from occupying it.<sup>47</sup> A segment of the Tartar force had, however, already crossed it.<sup>48</sup> The prince and the archbishop now attacked the enemy on the west side of the stream, surprised and defeated it. Coloman took possession of the bridgehead on the west (Hungarian) side of the stream, and posted guards to watch over it. Under the false assumption that they had won a decisive victory, and even eliminated the threat of another enemy attack, the prince and the archbishop victoriously returned to the camp with their men.<sup>49</sup>

In the camp, the prince and the archbishop, joined by the Master of the Knights Templar [of Hungary], stayed awake with their bodyguards, and watched over the bridge for the rest of the night.<sup>50</sup> (The chronicler wrote about "troops" of the three men, but he must have meant bodyguards, personal retainers, of the *comitatus* type, who stood by and fought close by their leader.) It was those three men who, together with their guards, met the second Mongol attack at early dawn on April 11th, when the Mongols easily repossessed the bridge, crossed the stream in large numbers, and nobody could stop them.<sup>51</sup>

Awful confusion must have prevailed in the Hungarian camp. Actually, it was this pandemonium caused by total surprise that decided the outcome of the Mongol skirmish - one could hardly call it a battle.<sup>52</sup> While Prince Coloman and Archbishop Ugrin had at the previous evening defeated a Tartar force and reoccupied at least a portion of the bridge - they failed to clear the bridge entirely from

enemy presence and secure both of its terminals - the Mongol main force led by Batu Khan himself forded the stream southward of the bridge. At dawn, the Mongol troops drove the Hungarian garrison (guards?) from the bridge, crossed the stream in force, and began, with seven catapults, the attack on the Hungarian camp.<sup>53</sup>

The chronicler at this point zealously remarked that, awakened by the unusual noise, the Hungarians in the camp at first washed themselves, combed their hair carefully, slowly attached their bracelets - he must have meant body armor - when the Mongols were upon them!<sup>54</sup> One may, of course, question the credibility of Thomas of Spaleto in recording the event. Did he interview eyewitnesses or did he rely on hearsay in collecting his intelligence?<sup>55</sup>

Batu's main army must have totally surprised the overconfident and carelessly relaxed Hungarians in the camp. Only Prince Coloman, Archbishop Ugrin, and the Grand Master of the Templars with their bodyguards were ready to meet with the enemy. They had encountered the Tartars - who were also confused and must have lacked a sense of direction in the dark - pushed them back to the Sajó stream, and beyond it.<sup>56</sup> It seemed that they had scored another victory. Batu Khan's attack at early dawn was, however, a sham. Had it succeeded, it would have decided the outcome of the Hungaro-Mongol confrontation right there. It had failed, and yet it enabled the khan to survey the area first hand, to gather intelligence on the strength of the Hungarian troops (and the Hungarian order-of-battle?), and prepare another main attack a few hours later.

In the morning, in broad daylight, when the forces of Subutai Khan had merged with the army of Batu, and the Tartars were able to surround the Hungarian compound in its entirety, they opened fire and arrayed the camp with flaming arrows.<sup>57</sup> The compound easily caught fire - panic broke out among the king's men, whose leadership was of no avail.<sup>58</sup> "In fuga" - flight from the scene was the only way out of a disaster.<sup>59</sup>

The Tartars had, indeed, opened up a passageway toward the south in their line of siege around the compound and let many of the king's men escape, after they had taken everything from them,<sup>60</sup> but they kept a lookout for the king, with orders from the khan to capture him alive.<sup>61</sup>

King Béla IV was surrounded by men loyal to him to the death.<sup>62</sup> Many of his men had sacrificed themselves for the survival of their king. Ernye, *de genere* Ákos,<sup>63</sup> and András, son of Ivánka,

forefather of the Forgách family, both had asserted self-sacrificing behavior.<sup>64</sup> They had fought themselves through the Tartar ranks - that is, not through the passageway purposefully kept open by the Mongols where Batu's men were on the lookout for the king,<sup>65</sup> and when a small Mongol contingent had directly attacked the monarch, it was Detre, son of Mohol, who had fought them off and suffered heavy wounds in the hand-to-hand struggle.<sup>66</sup>

Móric (Maurus), son of Móric Pók, had killed a Tartar who had pointed his lance at the king.<sup>67</sup> The small group of men (royal bodyguard?) that had surrounded the king's person now fled with him toward the wooded areas of the northwest, into the Bükk Hills in Borsod county.<sup>68</sup> Ernye had placed his own horse under the monarch; then András, Ivánka's son, had his horse placed at the king's disposal. Prince Coloman, severely wounded, hurried toward Pest on a different route.<sup>69</sup>

The road leading to Pest was filled with the decomposing bodies of murdered people and animals; many had drowned in the marshes of the Tisza river.<sup>70</sup> Archbishop Ugrin, Archbishop Matthias of Esztergom, a brave fighting hero,<sup>71</sup> Gregory, bishop of Győr,<sup>72</sup> Ronald, bishop of Transylvania,<sup>73</sup> Jacob, bishop of Nyitra,<sup>74</sup> Eradius, bishop of Bács,<sup>75</sup> all had died in the encounter at Mohi, together with Albert, archdean of Esztergom,<sup>76</sup> and Nicholas, archdean of Nagyszeben, who was the royal vice-chancellor.<sup>77</sup>

The entire equipment of the Hungarian camp, much of the royal treasure, fell into the hands of the enemy.<sup>78</sup> The Tartars had also captured the royal tent, in which Batu Khan would later, at his headquarters on the Volga, receive foreign dignitaries and the submission of the Russian princes.<sup>79</sup> The royal seal had also been captured; it was found on the dead body of the royal vice-chancellor.<sup>80</sup>

Batu Khan knew how to exploit the unexpected victory. With the aid of some frightened clerics,<sup>81</sup> he had a letter written in the name of the king - he could do this as the royal seal was in his possession<sup>82</sup> - to warn the population to be aware of the blind anger of the Mongol dogs, and not to leave their homes.<sup>83</sup> Although he (that is, the king) might have lost a battle because of unforeseen misfortune, he remained hopeful that, by the grace of God, he would not give up the good fight, and would destroy the head of the enemy.<sup>84</sup>

It was quite a letter. Batu wanted in a such a manner to persuade the country's population to remain - not to flee. His nomad Mongols needed the agricultural population to stay in place, cultivate their fields, and feed the conquerors. It seemed to be good politics. However, the khan already had in mind the partition of the land, and had summoned into his presence the commanders of all Mongol forces operating in the country.<sup>85</sup>

Prince Coloman headed on changed horses toward Pest, but avoided taking the main road. He kept riding on dirt tracks in the country in order to avoid his pursuers.<sup>86</sup> Pest was a rather large town by this time,<sup>87</sup> with German inhabitants;<sup>88</sup> they had begged the prince to stay with them until at least their wives and children had been transferred across the Danube to safety,<sup>89</sup> but the severely wounded prince did not have the peace and presence of mind to stay.<sup>90</sup> He crossed the river, headed for Somogy county toward Següsd, where he died of his wounds.<sup>91</sup>

The inhabitants of Pest had hurriedly begun to fortify their town. They dug ditches, threw up earthworks, built woven reed fences, but before they had completed their projects, the Mongols appeared and put their haphazardly fortified town under siege.<sup>92</sup> In three days the Mongols had taken Pest and massacred the entire population.<sup>93</sup> Thomas of Spaleto wrote that one could hear from afar the "noise" of the killings. As if old trees in the forest were cut down with innumerable axes, the howl of crying children and shrieking women cried to heaven. There was no time for burials, nor for meals to commemorate the dead. The Tartars had massacred everyone in sight regardless of age or sex. Where was the chronicler, Thomas asked the question, who could depict in detail the misery of that most horrible day, who could report in depth on the suffering and the loss of thousands of human lives?<sup>94</sup>

The Mongols had devastated the town - they had to burn the remains of the thousands of unburied dead,<sup>95</sup> though many of the inhabitants had sought refuge behind the stone walls of the Dominican monastery near the town.<sup>96</sup> The Tartars did not even attack the monastery; they shot flaming arrows (matchsticks?) behind its walls, burning all the refugees to death.<sup>97</sup>

## NOTES

1. "Venerunt versus Pestinum, quae erat maxima villa;" *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,15-17; Rogerius, c. 21, *SSH*, II, 565,1-4; Hóman-Szekfű, I, 542f., or *MGHSS*, XXIX, 555,20-22; on Pest, see *Medieval Hungarian Towns*, 35ff., and nn. 69, 88, and 92; L. Gerevich, "A pesti és budai vár" [The Fort of Pest and Buda], *Budapest Régiségei*, 24 (1986), 43ff.; idem, "Hungary," in M.W. Barley (ed.), *European Towns* (London, 1977), 431ff.
2. *SSH*, II, 565,7-9; the Chronicle briefly mentioned the Mongol invasion, *ibid.*, I, 467f. (c. 177), by recording its date in the previous paragraph, *ibid.*, I, 467,12-14. The "Chronicler of Óbuda" recorded the date in c. 177, *ibid.*, I, 467S,17-19; both chroniclers spoke of "Mangali sive Tartari," *ibid.*, I, 467f. See further the *Thuróczy Chronicle*, c. 101, *ed. cit.*, p. 137.
3. *SSH*, I, 565,6-7.
4. Ugolinus de genere Csák, royal chancellor from 1217 to 1219 - cf. *RA*, nn. 317-353; archbishop of Kalocsa since 1219, *RA*, nn. 352, etc., who fell at Mohi, *SSH*, II, 570 (c. 28); between 1230 and 1235, he, as archbishop, also fulfilled the role of royal chancellor - *RA*, nn. 461-538; for text, see *ÁUO*, VI, 567f.; *CD*, III-2, 204; Hóman-Szekfű, I, 441.
5. *SSH*, I, 565,9-25.
6. "...quod rex non fecit aliquem in sui subsidium properare;" *ibid.*, II, 565,24-25, compare with II, 560,22-25; Hóman, *Ungarisches Mittelalter*, II, 105ff.
7. It may not have been intentional, but the drawing in the Chronicle MS. fol. 63b, where six Tartars pursue the fleeing king Béla, who held a straight sword in his hand, but looked back upon his pursuers, has a significant title: "Adventus primus Tartarorum," *SSH*, I, 467,15-16, as if to suggest royal un-readiness for the forthcoming event.
8. *SSH*, II, 565,27-37; on the destruction of Eger, cf. *CD*, IV-3, 34f.
9. *SSH*, II, 565,2-4; Rogerius, c. 24; *MGHSS*, IX, 640.
10. *SSH*, II, 566,4-16 (c. 23).
11. *Ibid.*, II, 566,18-25.
12. *Ibid.*, II, 566f.
13. *Ibid.*, II, 567,18-26.
14. *Ibid.*, II, 567f.; "...cum Bulzu Chanadiensis episcopus et Nicholas filius Bore" [recte: Borc], *ibid.*, II, 567,29-30 - Bölc (=Wise), or Balázs (Balasius), who will later join the forces of King Béla IV - see Spaletto, c. 39. There is a Borc "de genere Szák," *Comes curialis Reginae* (1212-13) recorded on a royal writ in 1212 - *RA*, n. 280; *CD*, III-1, 118; Katona, *Historia critica*, V, 154, and after 1222, *RA*, n. 382; *CD*, III-1, 368; also, *RA*, nn. 386,393, 394 or, in the year 1225, *RA*, n. 426; *CD*, III-2, 71; Katona, *Historia critica*, V, 480, probably identical with Nicholas the Palatine, *RA*, nn. 289 and 290. Appeared as palatine in 1219, *RA*, n. 354, as Palatine Nicholas, son of Borz. *RA*, nn. 357 and 358, though on a royal writ, dated 1221, the name was spelled Borch, *RA*, n. 362; *CD*, III-1, 316, to appear, again, as son of Borc - cf. *RA*, n. 368; *CD*, III-1, 381f.; *ÁUO*, VI, 408f.; was also known as the Reeve of the Queen's Court, and the Reeve of Sopron. *RA*, n. 382; *CD*, III-1, 368f.
15. *SSH*, II, 567f.
16. *Ibid.*, II, 568,14-15.
17. *Ibid.*, II, 567,17-19; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 556,35-37; Ebendorf, 111,13-18, a less reliable source? - *ibid.*, 111, n. 718.
18. "...instabat archiepiscopus Colocensis apud regem, ut exiret cum exercitu contra Tartaros;" *SSH*, II, 567,15-16.
19. *Ibid.*, II, 569,18-22; and Spaletto, c. 37; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,5.

20. Cf. *RA*, n. 471; *ÁUO*, XI, 230; in a 1243 writ, he was listed as bishop of Várad and bishop-elect of Győr, *RA*, n. 744; *ÁUO*, XII, 685f.
21. *SSH*, II, 568,18-20.
22. *Ibid.*, II, 568,26 - 569,4; compare to *CD*, IV-3, 34f.
23. *SSH*, II, 569,7-14.
24. The bishop had escaped - *ibid.*, II, 569,14-16.
25. *Ibid.*, II, 569,23-24; Spaletto, c. 37; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,31-34.
26. *SSH*, II, 569,27-28; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,34-35.
27. *SSH*, II, 569,28-30; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,35-36.
28. The main Mongol force - *ibid.*, XXIX, 586,16-19; *CD*, IV-1, 405f.
29. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,37-38; *SSH*, II, 569,30-34.
30. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,38-39.
31. Maybe on purpose: "volebant quidem, quod rex perderet," *SSH*, II, 569,34; the khan rejoiced, *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,45-47.
32. "sed non sic, quia hecultima primis minime responderunt;" *SSH*, II, 570,6-7; for maps on the Tartar movements in Hungary, see Hóman-Szekfű, I, 544; Székely, 1424.
33. See the "Chronicon Poseniense," c. 68: "Tartari cum quinquies centensis milibus regnum Hungarie invaserunt;" *SSH*, II, 42,22-23; Macartney, 142f.: not to be confused with the "Annales Posenienses," *SSH*, I, 125ff.; Macartney, 84f., though Radó, *Libri liturgici*, 40, used the term "Chronicon Poseniense" when describing its contents on ff. 9-9' of the Pray Codex, probably following the text publication of F. Toldy, *Chronicon Hungarorum Poseniense* (Buda, 1852).
34. "...fere extinguitur militia Hungarie universa;" *SSH*, II, 42,25-26. repeated by von Mügelin, "Indem streit wart erslagen die ritterschaft von Ungern nahent allzumal;" *ibid.*, II, 207,10-11; Székely, 1428ff., spoke of the battle of Mohi as a "[military] happening." Also, E. Olchváry, "A muhi csata" [The Battle of Mohi], repr. from *Századok*, 1902 (pp. 309ff., 412ff., and 505ff.).
35. "...iuxta fluvium Seo, prope villam Muhi;" *SSH*, II, 42,23-24.
36. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,38-42.
37. "Hungari autem habeant hec omnia in derisum de multitudine confidentes;" *SSH*, II, 569,30-33.
38. *Ibid.*, II, 570,1-6.
39. "Volebant quidem, ut rex perderet, ut ipsi chariores post modum haberentur;" *ibid.*, II, 569f.
40. "Rex suos interim hortabatur, ut ad pugnam viriliter se haberent; ...ad pugnam tamen...cor et animum non habebant;" cf. *ibid.*, II, 569,34-35.
41. "Vidi enim eos quasi gregem in quodam artissimo stabulo interclusos;" *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,46-47.
42. "Bono animo nos esse oportet socii, quia multitudo gentis istius improvido reguntur consilio;" *ibid.*, XXIX, 586,45-46.
43. "Tunc autem nocte,...iussit aggredi pontem;" cf. *ibid.*, XXIX, 586,47-48.
44. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 586,48-49; and XXIV, 65,28-29 and 65,32-34,3.
45. *SSH*, II, 570,8-14.
46. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 586,49-51.
47. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 586f.
48. "...ecce iam pars quedam hostium ultra transierat;" cf. *ibid.*, XXIX, 587,3-4.
49. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 587,4-8.
50. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 587,16-19.
51. "Et ecce summo diluculo apparuit universa multitudo Tartarorum per campum diffusa;" *ibid.*, XXIX, 587,11-12. Rogerius, *SSH*, II, 570,9-11.
52. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 587,21-28; András Barosi, "A tatárjárás és Muhi csata 750 évfordulója: történetírók a tatárjárásról" [The 750th Anniversary of the Mongol

Invasion and the Battle of Mohi in the Interpretation of Historians], *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 104 (1991), 3ff.

53. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 587,8-11.

54. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 587,12-16.

55. See the remarks made by L. de Heinemann, *ibid.*, XXIX, 568f.; Hóman-Szekfű, I, 656; *Memoria Hungariae*, I, 43, 156 and 158.

56. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 587,19-23.

57. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 587,36-41; Hóman-Szekfű, I, 546f.

58. *SSH*, II, 570,19; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 587,24-26.

59. *SSH*, II, 570,2-26; *MGHSS*, XXIV, 65,28-29; 65,32-43; *ibid.*, XXIX, 587,46-49; *Chronica regia Coloniensis*, SSrG, 280.

60. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 588,5-8.

61. *SSH*, II, 571,3-4.

62. *Ibid.*, II, 571,4-6; *ÁUO*, VI, 321.

63. Cf. *RA*, n. 928; *CD*, IV-2, 92ff.; *RA*, n. 956; *ÁUO*, VII, 321f.

64. *RA*, n. 885 (anno 1248); *RHM*, 498; *CD*, IV-2, 455f.

65. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 589,12-13; on this, see also Carpini's report, vi:3 and vi:3,8.

66. Katona, *Historia critica*, VI, 126 and *CD*, IV-2, 11, or *HO*, VII, 37, although it is listed as a false writ in *RA*, n. 898; however, the writ related to this matter, *RA*, n. 744; *ÁUO*, XII, 685f., *CD*, IV-1, 287ff., is valid. Woch(o)v, citizen of Pozsony, who had distinguished himself in the battle at the Sajó, and had later aided the monarch, was also rewarded, *RA*, n. 749; Knauz, I, 346.

67. His signature appears on a royal writ of March 18, 1242: "Mauritius Pincenarum Magister in aula nostra," *RA*, nn. 715 and 716; *ÁUO*, VII, 188ff. (dated 1245!).

68. *SSH*, II, 571,4-6, to the effect that only the monarch had fled the wooded area, "viam habuit versus silvam;" in connection with the flight of the king, see also other documents under *CD*, IV-1, 405 and IV-2, 93.

69. *SSH*, II, 571,6-1.

70. *Ibid.*, II, 572,23-33; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 588,10-15.

71. *SSH*, II, 572,3-6.

72. *Ibid.*, II, 572,10-11; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 588,19-20, and note 2.

73. *SSH*, II, 572,11-12.

74. *Ibid.*, II, 572,12-13.

75. *Ibid.*, II, 572,16.

76. *Ibid.*, II, 572,17-18.

77. *Ibid.*, II, 572,13-16. "...ibi multa prelatorum et clericorum turba occubuit;" *MGHSS*, XXIX, 588,20, and the angry outburst of the chronicler: "Heu, heu, Domine Deus!" - why does the Lord punish his priest so heavily? - cf. *ibid.*, 588,20-22.

78. *SSH*, II, 573,16-18 and 573,24-27; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 588,8-13. "Ubi fere tota regni militia est deleta, ipso Bela coram eis...fugiatur," cf. Keza, *Gesta*, *SSH*, I, 184,14-15, and compare with "Annales Posenienses," *MGHSS*, XXIX, 440,18-22, and with the "Chronicon Poseniense," *SSH*, II, 42,21-29; the "Annales Posenienses," *ibid.*, I, 125ff. (*MGHSS*, XXIX, 502ff.), made no mention of the events of 1241. Macartney, 142f.

79. See Carpini's report, ix:17 and Wyngaer, XLVIII.

80. *SSH*, II, 573,36-37.

81. *Ibid.*, II, 574,7. For comparison, see Paul Rachnevsky's study, *Genghis Khan, His Life and Legacy*, trans. Th.N. Haining (Oxford, 1993), 145ff.

82. *SSH*, II, 573,36.

83. *Ibid.*, II, 574,10-11.

84. *Ibid.*, II, 574,12-16.

85. *Ibid.*, II, 574,18-23.

86. *Ibid.*, II, 571,6-8.

87. *MGHSS*, XXIX, 589,13-14, referred to Pest on the Danube as a larger village (town) - "villam magnam, que sota est super ulteriorem ripam Danubii." See also A. Kubinyi, *Die Anfänge Ofens* (Berlin, 1972), 25ff. and 30ff.; idem, "A mezőgazdaság történetéhez a Mohács előtti Magyarországon" [Some Remarks of Hungarian Agriculture Prior to 1526], repr. from *Agrártudományi Szemle* (Budapest, 1964).

88. That is, with German migrants, as evidenced by the chronicler's remark: "A burgensibus rogaretur," as in the German "Bürger;" cf. *SSH*, II, 571,10-11, and note 2.

89. *Ibid.*, II, 571,11-13.

90. *Ibid.*, II, 571,13.

91. *Ibid.*, II, 571,14-15 - *Segusd*, today called Felsőseged, *ibid.*, II, 571, note 4; *MGHSS*, XXIX, 589,21-22; *ibid.*, XXVIII, 209,20.

92. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 589,21-26.

93. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 589,26-41.

94. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 589,42 - 590,4, and compare to *SSH*, II, 571,16-18. Strakosch-Grossman, 90f.

95. "...ignem undique posuerunt, aquam totaliter flamma consumpsit;" *MGHSS*, XXIX, 590,7-9.

96. "...addecem milia;" *ibid.*, XXIX, 590,12.

97. *Ibid.*, XXIX, 590,9-13.