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The Rebellion of Taghri Birmish, viceroy of Aleppo (1439) Internal strife was a constant feature among
the Mamluks. More often than not, their sultan's death was caused by
his fellow Mamluks. Rebellions was also very common, especially in
Syria. The following events are no exception: in September 1438, al-Malik
az-Zahir Jaqmaq became the Sultan after overthrowing and imprisoning the
previous ruler, al-'Aziz Yusuf, who was only fourteen and ruled for a few
months. Jaqmaq's reign was soon threatened by supporters of Yusuf and
his father al-Malik al-Ashraf Barsbai, but this sultan would manage to hold
onto power for 15 years, quite a long time for Mamluk standards. Wednesday, Ramadan 11, 842 / February 25, 1439: A letter came to the Sultan from Emir Qani Bai al-Hamzawi, viceroy of Hama, containing a report that Emir Bardbak al-‘Ajami al-Jakami, grand chamberlain of Aleppo, had come to him accompanied by two emirs of Aleppo after their flight from Emir Taghri Birmish, viceroy of Aleppo, following his defection from the Sultan and his rebellion. A report of his rebellion had been rumored several times, so when this report arrived everyone was convinced of the truth of the rumor. In the account of his rebellion is the following: Taghri Birmish from the day al-Malik al-Ashraf [Barsbai] died had begun arrangements for the revolt, and on his return in company with the armies to Aleppo took the most careful precautions, so that he did not enter Aleppo until some days after the Egyptian forces had gone from it. Then when he entered Aleppo he began to plan his affairs and examine into what he might do for himself. He did not purpose to seek supreme power, because he knew that the people would not be satisfied with him in that capacity. But he knew also that they, if they had it in their power, would not leave him in the vice-regency of Aleppo, because he was a Turcoman, of another race. Being convinced of this he began to take measures of his own welfare, and invited the Turcoman emirs to stand by him. A large number answered him favorably and very many became attached to him. He had intelligence, craftiness, good judgment, efficiency, and ambition, but he knew not a single question of the religion of God, and was dull in social intercourse and rough in speech, which was apparent in him as is customary in the lowest Turcomans; all his effort and knowledge were concerned with the things of the world, nothing else; and this was coupled with cowardice and with miserliness except in regard to his own rights. When his position was strengthened through the secret agreement with him of the Turcoman emirs, the increase in the number of his mamluks and servants and the wealth that he had acquired, and at the same time he learned that dispatches from the Sultan had come to the emirs of Aleppo to seize him, he thought it best to reveal his hidden plan to revolt; he believed that he could retain possession of Aleppo and its districts all his life because of what he had planned, namely, that when he took possession of Aleppo and his forces had become numerous in it he would fortify it and stay there; then if there came an army which he was capable of resisting, he would fight it; otherwise he would flee before it after having fortified the citadel, and would go to the land of the Turcomans until the army which had come had gone away and there would be left only the man who had been made the viceroy there; then Taghri Birmish would go and take possession of it from him, as Shaikh and Nauruz used to do against al-Malik an-Nasir, though this Taghri Birmish was more firmly footed in those regions because he was a Turcoman, had vast wealth, and was more shrewd and crafty; and though Shaikh and Nauruz were more highly regarded and braver than he, this was not a place for bravery and respect, it was a place for causing trouble and disturbance. Support for what I have said is the fact that al-Malik az-Zahir Jamaq was disturbed at the rebellion of Taghri Birmish more than by that of Inal al-Jakami, viceroy of Damascus, which is to be mentioned later. Al-Malik az-Zahir sent after me and spoke to me about the document which had previously been composed about Taghri Birmish in regard to his killing one of my father's mamluks when Taghri Birmish was in the service of my father, as will be explained in the account of deaths in this work, God the Exalted willing. Al-Malik az-Zahir spoke to me concerning the affair of Taghri Birmish in the matter of the document and other subjects, and I noticed in him his fear because of the prolongation of the Taghri Birmish affair with him. The first thing that Taghri Birmish did was that he tried to win over Emir Hatat, viceroy of the citadel of Aleppo; he was not successful in that, so he began to plan to seize the citadel by guile. Hatat sensed this; he spoke to the emirs of Aleppo about it and they agreed to fight him. They anticipated Taghri Birmish and rode against him after things had happened which it would take long to expound. Hatat fired at him from the top of Aleppo citadel; Emir Bardbak al-'Ajami al-Jakami, chamberlain of Aleppo, and Emir Qutuj min Timraz, its commander in chief, and a number of its emirs and soldiers, rode out and fought him. With his mamluks he delivered a charge against them in which he dispersed them and they fled and scattered. Qutuj went toward al-Bira, I think; Bardbak al-'Ajami, and with him also a number, went to Hama. The battle took place on the eve of Friday, Sha'ban 28 [February 13]; and Bardbak entered Hama at the end of Saturday, the last day of Sha'ban [February 14]. That is what happened in the affair of Taghri Birmish; and an elucidation of this event will come later in connection with the letter of Taghri Birmish to the Sultan. The Sultan, when the report of his rebellion reached him, summoned the emirs and held a conference with them concerning it; the consensus was that he should be removed from the vice-regency of Aleppo and another be appointed, then the Sultan after that should wait to see what reports from Syria should come to him, because it was rumored in Cairo that Emir Inal al-Jakami was the one who had advised Taghri Birmish to become disloyal, and inwardly was in agreement with him. For this reason the Sultan did not designate anyone in the Egyptian forces or among the viceroys of Syria to fight Taghri Birmish. Thursday, Ramadan 12 / February 26: The Sultan wrote to transfer Emir Julban, [known as] Emir of the Horse, viceroy of Tarabulus, to the vice-regency of Aleppo in place of Taghri Birmish; that Emir Qani Bai al-Hamzawi, viceroy of Hama, should become viceroy of Tarabulus in place of Julban, and Bardbak al-'Ajami al-Jakami, grand chamberlain of Aleppo, mentioned before, should be appointed viceroy of Hama in place of Qani Bai al-Hamzawi. Emir 'Ali Bai al-'Ajami al-Mu'ayyadi, an emir of the third class and head of guards, took the diploma and robe of Julban for the vice-regency of Aleppo, and the diploma of Bardbak al-'Ajami for the vice-regency of Hama; Bardbak, just mentioned, was the uncle of the 'Ali Bai who went [on this mission] and the one who imported him [into Egypt], and 'Ali Bai was known as al-'Ajami from the cognomen of his uncle. Emir Janibak al-Mahmudi al-Mu'ayyadi, an emir of the third class and head of guards, carried the diploma and robe for Qani Bai al-Hamzawi as viceroy of Tarabulus; 'Ali Bai and Janibak had the real authority in the government that day. The Sultan remained troubled on account of Inal al-Jakami, viceroy of Damascus, because it had been rumored that Sudun, Inal al-Jakami’s brother, since he had come from Inal to Cairo, was winning the men over to him. When al-Malik az-Zahir became Sultan he had sent Sudun to all the viceroys in Syria, although the custom was current that there should go to each viceroy separately an emir who would announce that the Sultan had ascended the throne. All this az-Zahir had done out of regard for the feelings of Sudun's brother, Inal al-Jakami. The Sultan had also sent to Inal a second robe by Emir Nasir ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn Manjak, on account of his continuance as viceroy of Damascus. Monday, Ramadan 16 / March 2: The report came to the Sultan from Emir Tukh Mazi an-Nasiri, viceroy of Gaza, that Emir Nasir ad-Din Muhammad ibn Manjak, mentioned above, when, after leaving the Sultan with the robe of honor, he arrived at the Bridge of [the Daughters of] Jacob, had been met by a courier sent to him by Inal al-Jakami urging him to hasten his arrival at Damascus. Then he sent after him another courier, so that Ibn Manjak had arrived at Damascus on Saturday, Ramadan 7 [February 21]. Inal had gone out to meet him, put on the Sultan's robe sent to him at the hand of Ibn Manjak, kissed the ground, mounted the horse which also had been brought with him, and entered Damascus in a great procession. He alighted at the Viceregal Palace, and the people of, Damascus were tranquilized by this, for the revolt of its viceroy had been rumored there also. When it was Monday , the 9th, Emir Inal al-Jakami had ridden in procession as usual, and entered the Viceregal Palace with all the Damascus emirs and the bureau officials before him; everyone had become calm because the Prince of the Emirs [i.e., the viceroy] was remaining loyal. But he had hardly taken his place in his council when he had signaled for the chief emirs of Damascus to be seized. The door had heen locked, and all the emirs and officials had been apprehended. The seizure of the emirs had been effected by Emir Qani Bai al-Abubakri an-Nasiri, commander in chief of Damascus, and Qansuh an-Nauruzi, one of the emirs of the first class of Damascus. The most eminent of those arrested was Emir Barsbai the chamberlain, with a large number of others to be mentioned. He [Tukh Mazi] said, “Ali Bai al-‘Ajami and Janibak al-Mahmudi, the two who had gone to take the diplomas to the viceroy of Aleppo and Tarabulus, arrived at Gaza and remained there.” When the Sultan heard this report he was disturbed and very much troubled; because it was a most grievous and bitter matter to him. He assembled the emirs and consulted them about Inal and Taghri Birmish. They all advised that he journey [to Syria], and the Sultan recalled what Aqbugha at-Timrazi said when, before Jaqmaq became Sultan, he had advised him to go to Syria and then afterwards become Sultan; but the recollection profited him nothing now. The gathering disbanded with the understanding that the Sultan should make the journey to fight those mentioned. Then on Wednesday [Ramadan 18 / March 4] the Sultan received a report that Emir Qutuj, commander in chief of Aleppo, also had arrived at Hama, and that Taghri Birmish had taken the city of ‘Aintab and its citadel; and that the number of emirs of Damascus whom Emir Inal al-Jakami had seized was nineteen emirs, and that he had arrested also Jamal ad-Din Yusuf ibn as-Safi al-Karaki, controller of the army of Damascus, and Cadi Baha ad-Din Muhammad ibn Hijji, confidential secretary of Damascus. Likewise that Ali Bai and Janibak al-Mahmudi had gone from Gaza to Emir Inal an-Nasiri al-‘Ala’i, viceroy of Safad. Thursday, the 20th: The letter from Emir Taghri Birmish, viceroy of Aleppo, dated Ramadan 12, came to the Sultan; its contents were that on the 23d day of Sha'ban [February 20] Emir Hatat, viceroy of the citadel, and those with him in the citadel, had put on their weapons and stood upon the wall of the citadel, erected guns and other [weapons], and ordered those engaged in business and the occupants of the shops below the citadel to move from there. When he [Taghri Birmish] saw this he sent to ask Hatat the reason for it, but he did not reply to him. However, on the eve of the 29th Emir Qutuj, commander in chief, and emir Bardbak the chamberlain, with a number of emirs wearing arms, rode and halted below the citadel. He [Hatat] had sent toward them a number of his soldiers and a great battle took place between the two parties in which Qutuj had fled. [The letter stated] that he [Taghri Birmish] was remaining loyal to the Sultan; that he had sent asking Hatat again the reason of this movement, and he had answered that Emir Bardbak the chamberlain had received the [written] order of the Sultan to mount against him and seize him. Taghri Birmish sent also a second document to the Cadis of Aleppo on the subject mentioned, stating that he was maintaining his obedience to the Sultan and that he had not made any hostile move against the citadel. (End of the contents of the letter of Taghri Birmish.) The Sultan placed no reliance on his letter or on anything that he said, because of what he had previously had in mind regarding his rebellion. Then came to the Sultan the letter of Emir Faris, viceroy of the citadel of Damascus, that at Emir Inal al-Jakami's order a proclamation of safety and tranquility, and of prayer for Sultan al-Malik al-‘Aziz Yusuf, had been made in Damascus; [it reported] also that Cadi Taqi ad-Din ibn Qadi Shuhba, Chief Cadi of Damascus, had prayed for al-Malik al-‘Aziz on the pulpit of the Umayyad Mosque on Friday, but that the sermon in the citadel of Damascus was continuing in the name of aI-Malik az-Zahir Jaqmaq. In the meanwhile the Sultan's opinion had become fixed upon sending an expedition to Syria. Saturday, Ramadan 21 / March 7: Cadi Badr ad-Din Muhammad ibn Qadi al-Qudat Nasir ad-Din Ahmad al-Tanasi, one of the deputy cadis of the Malikite school, was appointed Chief Cadi of Egypt after the death of the very learned Shams ad-Din Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Bisati. The next day, Sunday, the Sultan began to review the Sultan's mamluks and designated 320 intimate mamluks to make the journey to Damascus with the emirs of the first class and others to be named below. Monday, the 23rd: The Sultan invested Aqbugha at-Timrazi, the grand emir, with the appointment to the vice-regency of Damascus in place of Inal al-Jakami because of the latter's rebellion; [the appointment] was against Aqbugha's will and with great objection on his part. Tuesday. The Sultan again reviewed the intimate mamluks and designated for the journey 330 of them, to complete the number 660 of them; then after a few days he reduced the number by five. Wednesday, the 25th. The Sultan designated for the journey, of the emirs of the first class Qara Khuja al-Hasani, the chief head of guards, and Tamurbai as-Saifi Tamurbugha al-Mashtub. Of the emirs of the second class he designated Emir Tukh min Timraz an-Nasiri, second head of guards; he was also the official escort of the commander in chief …[this is followed by a list of people who received various appointments]. The report then came to the Sultan from Emir Tughan al-'Uthmani, viceroy of Jerusalem, that Inal al-Jakami had set free the emirs who had been seized before this date, and had sworn them to allegiance to al-Malik al-‘Aziz Yusuf, this being at the intervention of Qani Bai an-Nasiri al-Bahlawan, commander in chief of Damascus. Intelligent men conjectured that Inal al-Jakami would not succeed in his plan, because he showed a loss of good judgment in the action he took of letting free the emirs after hostility between them had once been established; furthermore, there was to be considered the old animosity between him and Emir Barsbai the chamberlain. Men's hearts therefore were
turned from Inal al-Jakami, and the first to turn from him was Taghri
Birmish, viceroy of Aleppo, who said to himself concerning the Inal
mentioned, "This man is not really a revolter; by rumors of his rebellion he
intends merely that I come to him, and then he will seize me in order to
bring himself near to the The report then reached the Sultan that Inal al-‘Ala'i an-Nasiri, viceroy of Safad, had left it and had gone on until he alighted at ar-Ramla on Ramadan 17 [March 3]; this was after Inal al-Jakami had sent to him calling on him to agree with him and had also informed him that he had taken this position only after there had agreed with him the viceroys of the provinces, the pillars of the government and the important emirs of Egypt. Inal al-‘Ala'i disregarded his words; then feared that he might be suddenly attacked in Safad, so, after placing his family in the citadel of Safad, had left it and proceeded until he alighted at ar-Ramla. The Sultan was pleased with this, and wrote him to praise and thank him. Thursday, Ramadan 27 / March 12: The Sultan made a distribution to the forces going on the expedition to Damascus, to the number of 652, including intimate mamluks and other mamluks, 80 dinars each. The report then came that Emir Julban, who had been appointed to the vice-regency of Aleppo, had arrived at ar-Ramla on Monday, Ramadan 23, in flight from Taghri Birmish, viceroy of Aleppo. In the account concerning Taghri Birmish is this: When his position became strong and there reached him the report that Inal al-Jakami also had revolted, his position was further strengthened, so he summoned the Turcomans to Aleppo, and an exceedingly large number of them came. Then he made a great cannon of brass to fire at the Aleppo citadel with it. At the same time he tried to win over a number of the men of the Aleppo citadel; they turned to him secretly and promised to surrender the citadel to him. In the meanwhile he was continuing to besiege the citadel, the piercing of its wall was in progress, and the fighting between them and him was increasing each day, until Emir Hatat, viceroy of the Aleppo citadel, learned about the men of the citadel who had made an agreement with Taghri Birmish. He seized them all, took one of them, placed him in a ballista, and hurled him at Taghri Birmish. Then he killed a number of them and set their heads upon the wall of the citadel. Taghri Birmish disregarded that, and continued his siege of the citadel until he was on the point of taking it, when some of his companions made him fear that the inhabitants of Aleppo city would fall upon him; they advised him to issue a proclamation of security for them, which he did. For the people of Aleppo had learned that Taghri Birmish intended to command the Turcomans to pillage Aleppo, and when security was proclaimed they believed what had been said about the pillaging of Aleppo, and God inspired their minds to ride against him and fight him before he ordered this pillage. So all the people and inhabitants of Aleppo suddenly rose up with their bows and other weapons and went all together and surrounded the Viceregal Palace, in which was Viceroy Taghri Birmish. It has been noted before that Taghri Birmish was a coward, unsteady in battle and weak of heart when meeting the enemy; his planning was good and his diplomacy excellent only relatively, that is, when compared with the ignorance of others like himself. So when he learned that the people of Aleppo were rising against him, he did not remain firm but turned in flight, intending to leave the city. He proceeded until he halted outside the wall with approximately 40 horsemen; the populace had plundered all his horses, property, and weapons in the Viceregal Palace; their hands stretched out to the mamluks and followers of Taghri Birmish with death and robbery; he had many mamluks, magnificent in dress and arms, but they were of unsteadiness in war. There did not appear any achievement on the part of any of them on this day or on the day when they were drawn up in battle with the Egyptian army; indeed most of them had fled and gone over to the Egyptian army before the battle began, deserting their master as on this day, despite his great generosity to them and their acceptance of his favors. This battle had taken place on Tuesday, Ramadan 10 [February 24], after Taghri Birmish had been besieging the citadel thirteen days. A number of the companions and mamluks of Taghri Birmish met him, but he did not find for himself the strength to return to Aleppo to fight its inhabitants. So he went with those with him toward Tarabulus; he was joined also by Emir Tur ‘Ali ibn Saqal Siz the Turcoman, with his companions. When he neared Tarabulus, Emir Julban did not make a stand but fled hastily from Tarabulus toward ar-Ramla, and when he reached there he joined the viceroys and others who were in al’-Ramla. Julban also was of the class of Taghri Birmish in fighting, but his condition was concealed because of matters known to everyone. The drums were sounded for this [good news] and the Sultan was made happy by the report, but the men wondered at the defeat of Taghri Birmish despite the strength of his position and his numerous forces. |