methods. Given the current move towards eco-tourism, the development of archaeological heritage sites, and the participation of academics in NGOs, his models for report-writing and fund-raising are appropriate and timely. Based on a

graduate seminar offered at Harvard University, Françoise Vigier strongly urges

that project creators maintain the concept of šarāb, which is the most important

unit of the medieval city, when planning improvements in circulation (stree)r and

parking in Islamic Cairo. His emphasis on the integrity of the medieval quarter

echoes statements made by Denoix and Asfouri earlier in the volume.

The concluding essay in the volume is a bittersweet tribute to Islamic Cairo by

John Rodenbeck. Like Vigier, Rodenbeck strongly supports area conservation,

with an emphasis on streets and neighborhoods, over the restoration of individual

monuments. He is critical of recent restoration designs that do not take into

account entire neighborhoods, such as the USAID-funded project administered by

the American Research Center in Egypt. The author overlooks, however, the very

successful restoration of Bayt Subaymi, an ARCE collaboration, that has included

the cleaning and repainting of Darb al-ʿAsfūr (just off of the qaṣābāh), as well as

the economic revival of the block of shops facing the house.

Rodenbeck emphasizes that in spite of the many conferences convened and

organizations formed since the 1980s to address the decline of the old city, few of

their initiatives have been put into action, and the medieval quarters of Cairo may

be gone by the next generation. His sobering message has resonated with this

scholar, who recently took a dozen Oklahoma State University students for their

first visit to Islamic Cairo: "those of us will disappear who were once able to

recognize that neither memory nor legend can ever take the place of the real

thing" (p. 338).

Although occasional grammatical mistakes and missing words, the result of poor

correcting, detract from the book, the festschrift is a well-balanced, multi-disciplinary

contribution to scholarship on Cairo. Marshuk specialists will find it a valuable

addition to their libraries.

War and Society in the Eastern Mediterranean, 7th–15th Centuries. Edited by


REVIEWED BY W. W. CLIFORD, The University of Chicago

This assembly of fourteen variegated inquiries into the characteristics of the medieval

Middle Eastern military institution is taken, the editor readily conceded, "from a
broad perspective" and with an "arrangement" that might appear "arbitrary." The consequence of such broadness and randomness is predictable. Lev's volume, like other collections of its kind, suffers a good deal from topical fragmentation, particularly among the first half dozen so-called "early Muslim period" offerings—a highly diverse mix of technological, literary, and administrative perspectives that, whatever their individual merits, seem collectively to add or clarify little about the institutional structure or process of the medieval Syro-Egyptian military. Only Lev's contribution, "Regime, Army and Society in Medieval Egypt, 9th—12th Centuries," really brings us anywhere near this goal. He considers principally the troubled emergence of the institution of military slavery in the Tulunid-Ikhshidid period. Despite uncertainty about the long-term macroeconomic impact of military slavery, particularly on urban development, Lev is otherwise unequivocal in his conclusion: "In fact, the destructive nature of the institution of military slavery was manifested already during the Tulunid-Ikhshidid period" (p. 150). The article affords him a natural opportunity to reiterate his long-standing complaint about the consequences of such a system on the later Fatimid state. Indeed, Lev's chief purpose in this article seems to be to rediscover in the Tulunid-Ikhshidid ninth—tenth centuries his earlier prejudice against a system he believed ultimately responsible for the Fatimid twelfth—century collapse.

Lev achieves such better results with a more coherent cache of Mamluk-related offerings. Both Anne-Marie Eddé and Reuven Amitai-Preiss consider the composition and dynamic of the military class in thirteenth—fourteenth century Syro-Egypt, providing collateral a welcome critique of David Ayalon's long-enshrined reconstruction of the early Mamluk military institution. Eddé revives in her article "Kurdes et Turcs dans l'armée ayyoubide de Syne du Nord" one of the key issues Ayalon no doubt believed he had settled—the significance of Kurds in the late Ayyubid military structure. She suggests that ethnic antagonisms not just between Kurds and Turks but among Turkish and non-Turkish (e.g., Armenian) mamluk reflected ties of loyalty among the Syrian soldiery. Moreover, while the Syriac army on the brink of the Mamluk period could still be considered dominated by Turks, an important role continued to be played by Kurds, whose influence actually increased after 1250—51/6648 as a result of a concatenation of socio-political circumstances: loss of power by the free-born Turkish families associated with the Zangiids, adherence of Syrian Turks to the new Mamluk regime in Cairo, and the continued loyalty of Kurdish families like the Qaymariyah to the Syrian Ayyubids.

Eddé is moved at the end of her piece to temperize her conclusions, claiming her remarks represent only a "slight nuancing of D. Ayalon's perspective on the Ayyubids" (p. 236). Perhaps. But no such disclaimer can be applied to Amitai-Preiss's head-on confrontation with yet another aspect of the Ayalon legacy, at the beginning of his article "The Mamluk Officer Class During the Reign of Sultan Baybars."
Grappling with an issue left conspicuously unaddressed in his earlier book, Amitai-Preiss reveals here finally his unreserved support for the position long espoused by R. S. Humphreys center David Ayalon concerning the institutional origins of the Mamluk army. In what constitutes perhaps the most important, certainly controversial, statement in the whole of the Lev volume, Amitai-Preiss observes candidly: "Even taking into consideration..." the reservations of Ayalon, it appears that Humphreys is correct on a number of important points: the early Mamluk army (at least after A.D. 1260) was bigger, better organized and more centralized than its Ayyubid precursor. Humphreys is right in attributing these 'reforms' to a large degree to Baybars's need to create a military machine capable of dealing with the ongoing [Ilkhanid] menace. . . . (p. 269).

In fact, Amitai-Preiss takes his cue in this article from a topic raised initially by Humphreys and later reconsidered by Robert Irwin—the composition and underwriting of the senior officer corps under Baybars. He affirms that while the Mamluk military establishment was not exclusively of slave origin, many of the officer class were mamluk, the šāhid and zāhir admit particularly enjoying the lion's share of Baybars's munificence. Amitai-Preiss's extrapolation of the foundation of Baybars's power rightly stresses his attempts at making stakeholders in his regime of all officer grades, even amirs whom he characterizes as "unaffiliated. . . . nobodies." In re-evaluating Baybars's consolidation of power over his Mamluk colleagues it is perhaps time to recognize finally his true political skills, not as a despot but rather as a consummate deal-maker.

Yehoshua Freinkel's contribution, "The Impact of the Crusades on Rural Society and Religious Endowments: The Case of Medieval Syria (Bilad al-Sham)," dovetails neatly with Amitai-Preiss's, demonstrating just how Baybars underwrote economically this consolidation of power. Just as Ayyubid and early Mamluk regimes continued the Crusader practice of allocating assets and properties to fund religious establishments in Syria so, too, they embraced the Latin Kingdom's policy of enserfment, continuing to convert local cultivators (faštahān) into sharecroppers (mādirīʿah) in order to guarantee better their system of military land assignment. Though clearly countering shariʿah this practice, Freinkel opines, proved "a powerful device to forge bonds of loyalty between the sulṭan and the amīn"—just as suggested by Amitai-Preiss. 


The contributions by John Masson Smith, Jr., and Bernadette Martel-Thoumian shift focus away from the military institution itself to consideration of its operational art. Smith’s contribution “Mongol Society and Military in the Middle East: Antecedents and Adaptations” is actually a strategic consideration of Mongol logistical and tactical shortcomings in their thirteenth–early fourteenth-century Syrian campaigns, but can be considered a kind of rejoinder to Amitai-Preiss’s prior observations in his book, Mongols and Mamlik, about the relative merits of the two opposing forces in Syria. Most interestingly, Smith, who did not have access to Mongols and Mamlik at the writing of his article for this volume, attempts to argue for the very Mamlik military superiority that Amitai-Preiss attempted to deny in his book. Whereas Smith believes that in light of their larger horses, armor, swords, and high-speed archery, [man] for man, and horse for horse, the Mamlik were better than the Mongols’ (p. 255), Amitai-Preiss earlier wrote: “Taken as a whole, the Mongols were not significantly inferior soldiers to their Mamlik enemies, in spite of certain differences in arms, horses and tactics.5

Smith and Amitai-Preiss are even more diametrically opposed on the issue of the logistical limitations of Syria itself to Mongol military operations. Smith stresses the “ecological constraints” of climate and geography on the availability of water and fodder sufficient for “a short campaigning season for a [Mongol] force big enough to meet strategic requirements” (pp. 254–55). Amitai-Preiss, however, minimized these considerations insisting that “[l]ogistical problems did not prevent the Mongols from invading Syria with large forces, nor do they fully explain [their] withdrawal . . . when the Mongols did succeed in occupying the country.”6

The compact excellence of Smith’s article contrasts with the slower-paced artisanship of Bernadette Martel-Thoumian’s piece “Les dernières Batailles du grand émir Yaïbak min Mahdi.” While Smith vigorously diagrams the operational problems confronting the Mongol army in Syria, Martel-Thoumian attempts a more subtle sketch of the operational competence displayed by the late Mamlik military institution on the Syro-Mesopotamian frontier. While not fruitless, her long and elaborate narration of events threatens at times to overwhelm the reader, nearly camouflaging her principal insight, that while possessing superior numbers and probably comparable equipment, the Mamlik somehow proved militarily incompetent in dealing with Dûû al-Qadr and Aqqurynu challenges between 1468/872 and 1481/885. Why? Martel-Thoumian is ultimately better at raising the question than answering it. Her general conclusion, that the manpower costs and

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5Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamlik, 229.
6Ibid, 229.
political humiliation attendant on these defeats opened the province of Aleppo to the possibility of future (i.e., Ottoman) invasion, seems rather patented as well.

In sum, Mamlukists are undoubtedly the victors in this volume, which in spite of its cost is worth obtaining for both its historical and historiographic insights into the institutional problems of war-making in late medieval Syria-Egypt.


Reviewed by Amalit Levangon, University of Haifa.

This book is the seventy-first volume in the series Al‘im al-Musulûn (Celebrated Muslims) and is dedicated to the figure of Sultan al-Muzaffar Quwâz (1259–60), the 15th sultan of the Mamluk state (1250–1517). It has six chapters, a preface and a summary.

The author places at the center of the discussion of Sultan al-Muzaffar Quwâz’s curriculum vitae the principal issue with which historians and historical philosophers have been occupied for years: Man’s desires as a reason for deeds in history. In other words, have “history’s heroes,” by their intended actions, been the cause of historical events or was it the force and processes embodied in history that have brought about its movement in a direction over which “the heroes” had little control? However, it is clear also that celebrated men in history reflect in their actions the values of the society in which they live and therefore their deeds all move towards a historical consequence compatible with the desire of society.

Based on these arguments, the author feels that Sultan Quwâz, too, was a product of contemporary Muslim society and that despite his short period of rule, the course of history moved in only one direction, that of his decision to protect Islam and the Arab region (al-mintaqah al-Arabiyyah) from the enemies of Islam. Quwâz took the stage of history to fulfill the role designated for him. That is, to lead the Muslims to victory over the Mongols at the battle of ‘Ayn Jâlîl. These are the main arguments developed by Qâsim in the six chapters of the book.

The first chapter is a review of the political situation in the Muslim states on the eve of the battle of ‘Ayn Jâlîl in the face of the Mongol threat from the east and the Crusader threat from the west. Adopting the traditional perception of leadership in Islam that one of the principal roles of political leaders is to protect Islam from threats from without by means of jihad, the author maintains that the Ayyubids and the Mamluks after them played an identical historical role. The